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Insight in psychiatric illness is a multi-dimensional construct incorporating 
awareness of: illness, symptoms, and the need for treatment. Individuals with 
schizophrenia frequently have poor insight in one or more of these dimensions, 
which in turn has been linked to poor medication compliance and poor outcome. 
Neuropsychological data suggest that poor insight is associated with cognitive 
impairment, while neuroirnaging data suggest that poor insight may have a brain 
basis. This supports the analogy made between poor insight and anosognosia, the 
unawareness of deficits in people with acquired brain damage. A number of studies 
have suggested that poor insight may reflect the use of denial as a coping style. 
The recent development of relevant psychometric measures has made it possible to 
measure 'cognitive insight', the evaluation and correction of distorted beliefs and 
misinterpretations, and extended the concept of insight beyond the medical model. 
This thesis aimed to investigate relationships between clinical as well as cognitive 
insight in schizophrenia and: (i) cognitive abilities using a comprehensive 
neuropsychological test battery, (i i) brain structure/s using voxel-based 
morphometry, and (iii) coping style using a standardised questionnaire in a single 
large sample. It further aimed to combine these analyses to examine the unique 
contribution that each domain of investigation makes to explaining poor insight. 
Four factor scores were used to describe levels of clinical insight. Integrating the 
findings for these factor scores, a combination of greater use of social support as a 
coping style and greater volume of a right parietal lobe brain region contributed to 
higher 'awareness of and attribution to illness' scores. Both greater volume of the 
left precuneus (also in the parietal lobe) and lower preference for disengaging from 
problems (giving up) contributed to higher 'awareness of problems' factor scores. 
The volume of a right temporal lobe region was the largest contributor to the 
'symptom re-labelling' factor score. None of the variables were significantly 
associated with 'recognition of the need for medication". Cognitive insight was 
strongly correlated with a measure of executive functioning. 
In conclusion, these studies have demonstrated that insight in schizophrenia has 
relationships with a range of neuropsychological, coping style and brain structure 
variables, and that combining these influences offers a more complete explanation 
of this important and complex phenomenon. Future studies should continue to 
combine multiple domains of investigation and aim to confirm the parietal and 
temporal lobe correlates of insight using the region of interest method. 
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Individuals with schizophrenia frequently disagree with their friends, relatives and 
clinicians about whether they are mentally ill, whether their experiences and 
behaviours are abnormal, and whether they are in need of psychiatric treatment. 
Such disagreements are widely held to reflect poor insight on the part of the patient 
in the dimensions of awareness of illness, awareness of symptoms, and recognition 
of the need for treatment respectively. Insight in schizophrenia has increasingly 
been recognised as an important area of psychiatry research due to its links with 
medication compliance and outcome. 
The last 15 years have seen an explosion of interest in insight research, driven 
initially by two review articles written in the early 1990's (David, 1990; Amador et 
al., 1991). These papers highlight a number of possible aetiological models of 
insight, including the theory that poor insight is analogous to anosognosia, the 
unawareness of demonstrable deficits (e. g. limb paralysis) in patients with acquired 
brain damage. Two main approaches have been used to examine whether insight in 
schizophrenia also has a brain basis. The most common has been to examine the 
neuropsychological correlates of poor insight, and use what is known about the 
neurological correlates of these tests to draw conclusions about the neurological 
basis of poor insight. A second, more direct method has been to examine the brain 
correlates of insight directly through neuroirnaging, either by manually measuring 
regions of interest, or using the automated algorithms of voxel-based morphometry 
to analyse the whole brain voxel-by-voxel. 
The use of denial of illness as a coping mechanism is also highlighted in these early 
reviews as a potential aetiological factor, and a number of subsequent experimental 
studies have linked denial to poor insight. These models are not mutually exclusive, 
and combining measures relevant to multiple models in a single investigation allows 
the contribution that each makes to the aetiology of schizophrenia to be 
established. 
The present investigation poses the questions of insight in schizophrenia: "'What are 
its neuropsychological correlates? ", ""Does it have a structural brain basis? ", "'Is it 
associated with a particular coping style? " and ""Can it be better explained by 
integrating these influences? ". 
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CHAPTER 1: SCHIZOPHRENIA 
1.1 - Chapter overview 
This chapter begins by describing how the observations of Emil Kraepelin 
(1919/1987) and Eugen Bleuler (1911/1987) have evolved into the current 
definition of schizophrenia and the modern methods by which it is diagnosed. An 
overview of the wide range of symptoms experienced by individuals with 
schizophrenia is presented, followed by a review of research into the presence of 
cognitive deficits in schizophrenia and their possible basis in structural brain 
alterations. The role of genetic and environmental factors in the aetiology of 
schizophrenia is then considered. Finally, theoretical work attempting to integrate 
research at different levels of understanding is summarised. 
As a starting point for describing the construct of schizophrenia, figure 1.1 lists 
some of the problems that are commonly experienced by individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia (from Birchwood & Jackson, 2001). 
FIGURE 1.1: Problems experienced by individuals with schizophrenia 
Intrinsic impairments 
" Persisting symptoms: hallucinations, delusions, thought disorders 
" Tendency to withdrawal, apathy, emotional blunting 
" Cognitive impairments: attention and problem-solving 
" Vulnerability to further episodes 
Secondary impairments 
Social 
" Unemployment, downwards social drift 
" Social adversity: housing, finance etc. 
" Institutional isation 
" Diminished social network 
" Family discord or rejection 
9 Social prejudice to mental illness 
Psychological 
Loss of confidence and achievement motivation 
Social and community survival skills impaired or fall into disuse 
Dependent or semi-dependent on family or institutions 
Distress due to poor coping with persisting symptoms 
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Schizophrenia is almost universally described as 'heterogeneous' (Andreasen et al., 
1999). In the absence of an objective diagnostic marker or test, the definition of 
the disorder has, unsurprisingly, proved difficult and controversial. 
1.2 - History of the concept 
The modern concept of schizophrenia stemmed from the work of Kraeplin and 
Bleuler. Kraepelin (1919/1987) differentiated dementia praecox from manic 
depressive psychoses, terms which have evolved into the contemporary diagnoses 
of schizophrenia and bipolar affective disorder respectively. The term 'dementia 
praecox' reflects Kraepelin's observation that a group of psychiatric patients showed 
a global disruption of perceptual and cognitive processes (dementia) with an early 
onset (praecox) (Tsuang et al., 2000). These perceptual and cognitive disruptions 
differ greatly from the loss of memory and orientation that frame our current 
concept of dementia (McCarley et al., 1993). Kraepelin focussed on the onset, 
course and outcome of dementia praecox, contrasting its early onset and 
deteriorating course with what he viewed as the late onset, episodic nature of 
manic depressive psychoses, which often permitted a return to normal function 
between acute episodes. He emphasised the biological, degenerative basis of 
dementia praecox,, implicating damage to the cerebral cortex in the "singular, 
permanent impairment of the inner life" (page 154,1899). His belief that 
schizophrenia has a biological basis remains widely held. 
Bleuler (1911/1987) reformulated Kraepelin's dementia praecox as schizophrenia, a 
name that reflected Beuler's belief that the fundamental deficit in this group of 
individuals was the separation or splitting of the normally integrated functions that 
coordinate thought, affect, and behaviour. As well as this emphasis on 
psychological rather than biological disturbances, Bleuler's schizophrenia differed 
from Kraepelin's dementia praecox in its rejection of an invariantly early onset and 
deteriorative course (McCarley et al., 1993). Bleuler divided the symptoms of 
schizophrenia into those he considered to be 'fundamental' and those considered 
'accessory'. Fundamental symptoms were further divided into 'primary' (direct 
manifestations of the disorder) and 'secondary' (psychological reactions to 
manifestations of the disorder). Bleuler's sole primary symptom is the 'loosening of 
associations', where an individual shifts from one subject to another completely 
unrelated or only obliquely related subject, without showing any awareness that the 
topics are unconnected. Secondary symptoms included disorders of affectivity, 
ambivalence, autism, attention and will. Finally, catatonia, delusions, hallucinations 
and behavioural disturbances were held to be 'accessory' because they could occur 
in other disorders (Wing, 1992). 
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Sub-types of schizophrenia 
Historically, there have been numerous attempts to divide individuals with 
schizophrenia into sub-types. Kraepelin (1907/1987) proposed three sub-types of 
schizophrenia: catatonic, hebephrenic and paranoid. The catatonic sub-type was 
characterised by motor symptoms and swings from stupor to excitement. Emotional 
indifference, laughing and immature speech was held to be characteristic of the 
hebephrenic sub-type. Finally, the paranoid sub-type were characterised by well- 
organised delusions (usually persecutory or grandiose) and suspiciousness. A fourth 
sub-type of 'simple schizophrenia' was added by Bleuler, which was characterised 
by mixed psychotic symptoms that did not fit the other three sub-types (Bentall, 
1992). These concepts have endured, and their equivalents can be found in the 
modern diagnostic systems. However, the stability of the neo-Kraepelinian sub- 
types is modest at best (Kendler et al., 1985), and the symptom profiles of 
individuals assigned to different sub-types do not differ significantly (Carpenter et 
al., 1976). There is therefore little evidence to suggest that these sub-types 
represent distinct entities (Bentall, 1992), or are clinically useful. The use of 
hebephrenia and catatonia as diagnostic terms have effectively fallen into disuse in 
clinical practice (Kuipers et al., in press). 
1.3 - The modern diagnosis of schizophrenia 
A psychiatric diagnosis must be both reliable and valid in order to have either 
scientific or clinical utility (Bentall, 1990). In order for a diagnosis to be reliable, it 
must be reached with consistency when the same person is evaluated by different 
clinicians. Validity refers to the meaningfulness or usefulness of the diagnosis, and 
can be established in a number of ways, including correlation amongst symptoms of 
a diagnosis, and its ability to predict course and outcome (Bentall, 1990). The 
means by which an individual is diagnosed with schizophrenia is therefore a focus of 
considerable discussion and research (Lenzenweger, 1999). The early work of 
Kraepelin and Bleuler on schizophrenia was mainly descriptive in nature, and did 
not provide operational criteria from which a diagnosis could be made. Without 
such criteria, diagnosis was inconsistent (e. g. Cooper, 1972), limiting the reliability 
and validity of the concept of schizophrenia (Birchwood et al., 2001; Bentall, 1990). 
This problem has been tackled by the development and refinement of 
internationally accepted diagnostic criteria which have considerably improved the 
reliability of the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders, including schizophrenia. Over 
time, two main diagnostic systems for classifying for serious mental illnesses have 
evolved, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (now in its fourth edition, DSM-IV), 
and the International Classification of Diseases (in its tenth revision, ICD-10), used 
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mainly in the United States and Europe respectively. Their diagnostic criteria for 
schizophrenia define the contemporary clinical concept, and these are set out in 
figures 1.2 and 1.3. 
The DSM-IV criteria for schizophrenia consist of a symptornatological criterion, a 
chronological criterion, a functional criterion, and some exclusion criteria (Maj, 
1998). Similar criteria are present in ICD-10, although it lacks a functional criterion. 
The symptornatological criterion requires the presence of two or more symptoms 
from a list in both systems, although "bizarre delusions' or certain types of voices 
can be sufficient on their own according to the DSM-IV criteria. The chronological 
criterion for DSM-IV requires continuous signs of disturbance for six months and 
the presence of symptoms (meeting the symptornatological criterion) for one month 
(or shorter if successfully treated), whereas ICD-10 simply requires the clear 
presence of symptoms (meeting the symptornatological criterion) for 1 month. The 
functional criterion, present only in DSM-IV, requires an impairment of functioning 
in the social, vocational or self-care domains. Finally, the exclusion criteria require 
that other factors (or psychiatric diagnoses) could not better explain the observed 
symptoms. Disorders such as drug-induced psychosis, organic brain disorders (e. g. 
temporal lobe epilepsy) and obsessive-compulsive disorder must therefore be ruled 
out for a differential diagnosis of schizophrenia to be made. 
While the use of the DSM-IV and ICD-10 criteria has vastly improved the reliability 
with which schizophrenia is diagnosed, these systems are not without their 
limitations. The two systems disagree on certain aspects and details, and studies 
have yet to be undertaken to establish their comparative validity (Bertelsen, 2002). 
Maj (1998) has highlighted a number of limitations of the DSM-IV criteria. The 
threshold beyond which unusual experiences or behaviours become symptoms is 
unclear, and therefore left to the subjective judgement of each clinician. The 
judgement of what constitutes a 'bizarre' delusion has also been reported to be 
highly unreliable (Kendler et al., 1989). Further subjective judgements may be 
required to determine whether an individual meets the chronological criterion 
for 
schizophrenia, as the clinician may have to decide whether 'odd beliefs' or 'unusual 
experiences' are prodromal features of a current acute state. The functional 
criterion is also poorly defined and is not present in ICD-10. Finally the exclusion 
criteria dictate that if a biological aetiological mechanism can be identified, then 
the 
person should not receive the diagnosis of schizophrenia. This raises the interesting 
question of what would happen if biological research into schizophrenia was 
to 
identify a testable biological substrate of the disorder. 
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FIGURE 1.2: DSM-IV Criteria for Schizophrenia. 
A. Characteristic symptoms: Two (or more) of the following, each present for 




" Disorganized speech (e. g., frequent derailment or incoherence) 
" Grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior 
" Negative symptoms, i. e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition 
Note: Only one Criterion A symptom is required if delusions are bizarre or hallucinations consist of a 
voice keeping up a running commentary on the person's behaviour or thoughts, or two or more 
voices conversing with each other. 
B. Social/occupational dysfunction: For a significant portion of the time since 
the onset of the disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning such as 
work, interpersonal relations, or self-care are markedly below the level achieved 
prior to the onset (or when the onset is in childhood or adolescence, failure to 
achieve expected level of interpersonal, academic, or occupational 
achievement). 
C. Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least 6 months. 
This 6-month period must include at least 1 month of symptoms (or less if 
successfully treated) that meet Criterion A (i. e., active-phase symptoms) and 
may include periods of prodromal or residual symptoms. During these prodromal 
or residual periods, the signs of the disturbance may be manifested by only 
negative symptoms or two or more symptoms listed in Criterion A present in an 
attenuated form (e. g., odd beliefs, unusual perceptual experiences). 
D. Schizoaffective and Mood Disorder exclusion: Schizoaffective Disorder 
and Mood Disorder With Psychotic Features have been ruled out because either 
(1) no Major Depressive Episode, Manic Episode, or Mixed Episode have occurred 
concurrently with the active-phase symptoms; or (2) if mood episodes have 
occurred during active-phase symptoms, their total duration has been brief 
relative to the duration of the active and residual periods. 
E. Substance/ general medical condition exclusion: The disturbance is not 
due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e. g., a drug of abuse, a 
medication) or a general medical condition. 
F. Relationship to a Pervasive Developmental Disorder: If there is a history 
of Autistic Disorder or another Pervasive Developmental Disorder, the additional 
diagnosis of Schizophrenia is made only if prominent delusions or hallucinations 
are also present for at least a month (or less if successfully treated). 
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FIGURE 1.3: ICD-10 Criteria for Schizophrenia (F20) 
A. One of the symptoms under Al 
OR two of the symptoms under A2 
Must be present for most of an episode lasting at least a month 
Al a. Thought echo, insertion, withdrawal, broadcasting. 
b. Delusions of control, influence, or passivity, delusional 
perception. 
c. Hallucinatory voices giving a running commentary, or discussing 
the patient among themselves, or voices coming from some part 
of the body. 
d. Persistent delusions of other kinds that are culturally 
inappropriate. 
A2 e. Persistent hallucinations in any modality, with fleeting or half- 
formed delusions without clear affective content. 
f. Breaks or interpolations in the train of thought, resulting in 
incoherence or irrelevant speech, or neologisms. 
g. Catatonic behaviour. 
h. "Negative" symptoms such as marked apathy, paucity of 
speech, and blunting or incongruity of emotional responses, 
usually resulting in social withdrawal and lowering of social 
performance; not due to depression or to neuroleptic medication. 
B. If manic or depressive episode, Criterion A must be met before mood 
disturbance developed. 
C. Not attributable to organic brain disease (FO) or substance misuse (Fl). 
All three conditions,, A. B and C,, must be satisfied. 
Despite the limitations of the diagnostic criteria, the diagnostic stability of 
schizophrenia in research studies is high, with 90% of individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia receiving the same diagnosis six months later (Schwartz et al., 
2000). 
1.4 - Is schizophrenia a discrete entity? 
One of the major difficulties with DSM-IV and ICD-10 systems is that the diagnoses 
they contain are mutually exclusive, but the symptoms and experiences of people 
with mental health problems do not fall into discrete, non-overlapping clusters. 
Each diagnostic system contains a number of diagnoses which share some features 
of schizophrenia, against which a differential diagnosis must be made. In DSM-IV 
this includes: Schizoaffective Disorder, Schizophreniform Disorder, Brief Psychotic 
Disorder, Delusional Disorder, Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, Psychotic 
Disorder Due to a General Medical Condition, Delirium, Substance-Induced 
Psychotic Disorder, Mood Disorder With Psychotic Features, Schizotypal Disorder, 
Schizoid Personality Disorder and Paranoid Personality Disorder. 
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The congruence of symptoms with mood can be used as a diagnostic indicator to 
differentiate schizophrenia from affective disorders. For example, mood-congruent 
delusions held to be more indicative of an affective disorder with psychotic features 
than mood-incongruent delusions, which are held to be more indicative of 
schizophrenia. The extent to which schizophrenia is a separate entity from the list 
of diagnoses above (with each of which it shares some features) is a matter of 
debate. 
While Kraepelin's binary distinction between (what have become) schizophrenia and 
bipolar affective disorder has remained at the centre of modern psychiatric 
nosology, others have questioned whether it might be more appropriate to consider 
serious mental illnesses as existing on one or more continuum, rather than as 
discrete entities. Crow (1986) proposes that there is a continuum of psychosis from 
pure affective disorder through to schizophrenia. He notes the failure of two studies 
(Kendell & Gourlay, 1970; Kendell & Brockington, 1980) to statistically separate 
schizophrenia from bipolar affective disorder on the basis of symptoms or outcome. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the genetic vulnerability for schizophrenia and 
affective psychoses, including schizoaffective disorder, cannot be separated, 
indicating that the psychoses constitute a genetic continuum rather than two 
unrelated diatheses (review, Crow, 1995). Bentall (1990) suggests that it may be 
more appropriate to try to understand psychiatric problems at the level of individual 
symptoms, such as hallucinations or delusions (regardless of the diagnosis), rather 
than at the level of syndromes such as schizophrenia. Whilst this approach has 
produced some fruitful results (e. g. Chadwick & Birchwood, 1995), it has yet to 
become widely adopted in the research literature. 
While prototypical examples of schizophrenia and bipolar affective disorder differ 
considerably, a large number of individuals have symptoms and features of both, 
and the boundaries between them are not clean-cut (Birchwood et al., 2001). 
Multivariate statistical techniques have been used to establish the degree of overlap 
between the symptoms of different psychiatric diagnoses, including schizophrenia 
and bipolar affective disorder. Factor analytic studies of the symptoms of first- 
episode patients with a range of psychotic diagnoses have all yielded solutions 
which include "positive' psychotic symptoms, mania and depression as separate 
factors, despite considerable variation in the number of other factors derived (e. g. 
van Os et al., 1999; Rosenman et al., 2000; Serretti et al., 2001). These factors 
represent clusters of symptoms which tend to re-occur, rather than mutually 
exclusive, discrete entities - individuals can, and often do, score highly on more 
than one factor. 
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Despite the difficulties and limitations of the current diagnostic systems, categorical 
diagnoses have some practical utility and continue to be widely used in clinical 
practice and research. The research approaches of grouping individuals by 
diagnosis and by individual symptoms are not mutually exclusive, and each has its 
strengths and weaknesses. When investigating the basis of auditory hallucinations, 
it may be most appropriate to look at individuals who experience voices across a 
range of diagnoses, whereas when examining neural basis of psychiatric disorders, 
it may be more appropriate to group people by diagnosis. 
Schizoaffective disorder 
As noted above, there are a number of individuals who display the symptoms of 
both bipolar affective disorder, and of schizophrenia. Some such individuals are 
diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. There has been considerable debate over 
whether schizoaffective disorder should be considered a form of schizophrenia 
(Lehman, 1975), a form of affective disorder (Clayton et al., 1968), a completely 
separate condition (Procci, 1976), or part of a continuum from schizophrenia to 
bipolar disorder (Crow, 1986). 
Aside from the nosological difficulties of the diagnosis, individuals with 
schizoaffective disorder have been found to have symptoms which resemble those 
of individuals with schizophrenia (Pini et al., 2004), but a course of illness which 
more closely resembled individuals with bipolar affective disorder (Benabarre et al., 
2001). Outcome is more favourable for schizoaffective disorder than schizophrenia, 
and is associated with less functional disability (Benabarre et al., 2001). In both 
DSM-IV and ICD-10, schizoaffective disorder is treated as a separate diagnosis 
from both schizophrenia and bipolar affective disorder. 
1.5 - The symptoms of schizophrenia 
As can be seen from the diagnostic criteria, a constellation of different symptoms 
can contribute towards a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Such is the range of symptoms 
that it is possible for two individuals to both have a diagnosis of schizophrenia yet 
not share a single common symptom. There have been numerous attempts to 
organise the many symptoms of schizophrenia into meaningful groups. Each model 
comprises a different number of symptom groups, and more recently, hierarchical 
models have been proposed (Cuesta et al., 2003). One classical distinction which 
remains popular in contemporary research is the differentiation between 'positive' 
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and 'negative' symptoms, which fell into common usage through the work of Crow 
(1980) and Andreason and colleagues (e. g. Andreasen & Olsen, 1982). 
Crow (1980) distinguished between two 'types' of schizophrenia which differed in 
responsiveness to treatment, chronicity, degree of intellectual impairment, 
hypothesised aetiology and whether 'positive' or 'negative' symptoms were 
prominent. While the distinction between "Type I' and 'Type II' schizophrenia has 
been abandoned (see Crow, 1998) in favour of the continuum hypothesis, the 
partitioning of symptoms into "positive' and 'negative' has remained a widely used 
tool in schizophrenia research. At a descriptive level, positive symptoms involve 
unusual mental activity, while deficits in normal mental activity and everyday 
functioning are termed negative symptoms. 
The statistical data reduction method of factor analysis has suggested that the 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia can be further subdivided into psychotic 
(hallucinations and delusions), and 'disorganised' (disorganised speech, 
inappropriate affect and disorganised behaviour). The validity of three factor 
models has been supported by their reproducibility across differing samples, 
countries, and statistical methods (Andreasen et al., 1995b). This three dimensional 
descriptive structure will therefore be used to structure this chapter's description of 
the symptoms of schizophrenia. 
1.5.1 - Psychotic symptoms 
The dimension of psychotic symptoms, as described by Andreasen and colleagues 
(1995b), encompasses two symptoms of schizophrenia which are commonly 
experienced during acute episodes of illness; hallucinations and delusions. 
Hallucinations are traditionally defined as sensory perceptions which occur in the 
absence of external stimuli, and are most commonly auditory, although they can 
also occur in the visual, olfactory, gustatory, somatic and tactile domains. Auditory 
hallucinations often take the form of voices and, like many aspects of 
schizophrenia, the manifestation of such voices is highly heterogeneous. The 
complexity of what is said by the voices can vary from single words to whole 
conversations. The form of the voices can be in the first, second or third person, 
and their duration can vary from a few seconds to an unrelenting, continuous 
stream. The individual experiencing voices may hear two voices discussing his/her 
actions, or a single voice may give a running commentary. In some cases, a voice 
may issue an individual with commands. The content of what the voices say may be 
positive or negative. Recent studies have highlighted the importance of how 
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powerful the voices are perceived to be in determining the distress they cause to 
the individual hearing them (Chadwick et al., 1995). 
A delusion can be defined as "a belief that is held firmly but on inadequate grounds, 
is not affected by rational argument or evidence to the contrary, and is not a 
conventional belief that a person might be expected to hold given his cultural 
background and level of education. " (Gelder et al., 1999). However, separating 
what is a delusion from other unusual or unverifiable beliefs is highly problematic. 
It requires considerable judgement on the part of the clinician, invoking aspects 
such as the person's attitude toward the belief and the effect the belief has on 
him/her (David, 1999b). The content of delusions varies widely, but there are a 
number of 'themes' by which they can be grouped (Gelder et al., 1999). Some of 
the most common are: persecutory/paranoid delusions, delusions of reference (the 
belief that normal events carry special personal significance), grandiose delusions 
and delusions concerning the possession of thoughts (thought insertion, thought 
withdrawal, thought broadcasting). 
1.5.2 - Symptoms of disorganisation 
The 'clisorganisation dimension' includes thought disorder, disorganised or bizarre 
behaviour and incongruous affect (Black & Andreasen, 1996). Thought disorder 
involves aspects of language and communication including derailment, poverty of 
the production and content of speech, tangentiality, neologisms and blocking. The 
disorganised behaviour displayed by individuals with schizophrenia can include 
catatonic stupor (lack of mobility and responsiveness), and catatonic excitement 
(uncontrolled or aimless motor activity). Some individuals with schizophrenia adopt 
bizarre or awkward postures, which they may maintain for long periods of time, or 
may exhibit repeated movements (stereotypies) such as rocking. Incongruity of 
affect, such as laughing without reason, or smiling when talking about sad topics, is 
a further component of the disorganisation dimension. 
1.5.3 - Negative symptoms 
Negative symptoms encompass a range of internal experiences and external 
behaviours. In addition to the negative symptoms listed in DSM-IV (alogia, affective 
blunting and avolition), anhedonia and attentional impairment are also common in 
individuals with schizophrenia (Andreasen et al., 1982). Alogia is characterised by a 
reduction in either the quantity or content of spontaneous speech. This represents 
the external expression of the impoverishment of thought present in schizophrenia. 
Affective blunting describes a reduction in emotional intensity, which may be 
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manifested in behaviours such as unchanging facial expression or a reduction in 
expressive gestures. The inability to experience pleasure, anhedonia, is common in 
schizophrenia, and is often accompanied by feelings of emotional emptiness. 
Avolition represents the loss of the ability to either initiate goal-directed behaviour, 
or to complete goals. Attentional impairment, the inability to concentrate for 
sustained periods, has been described as a negative symptom of schizophrenia, 
although it is also considered to be a cognitive deficit (see 1.7.1). 
Negative symptoms are problematic to evaluate both because they are non- 
specific, and because they are on a continuum with normality. There is also 
considerable difficulty in distinguishing which experiences and behaviours are 'true' 
negative symptoms of schizophrenia, and which are the 'indirect' result of other 
factors, such as mood disorder, medication side effects and stigma. For example, 
social withdrawal is a complex outcome of a range of symptoms and non-symptom 
variables, not a direct measure of negative symptoms (Carpenter et al., 1988). 
Carpenter and colleagues (1988) attempted to differentiate between primary 
'deficit' negative symptoms which result "directly' from the psychopathology of 
schizophrenia and secondary 'non-deficit' negative symptoms, which, although not 
qualitatively different from deficit symptoms, are regarded as arising from other 
causes such as depression, medication side effects, and environmental deprivation. 
They contended that deficit symptoms are present as enduring traits, while non- 
deficit symptoms may be transient over 12 months in an otherwise clinically stable 
state. However, in practice, distinguishing whether negative symptoms are deficit 
or non-deficit in these terms is not straightforward. 
In addition to psychotic, disorganised and negative symptoms, a substantial 
proportion of individuals with schizophrenia are depressed, anxious, and in some 
cases suicidal, generally in the early course of the disorder. It is estimated that as 
many as 13% of individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia complete suicide, and 
a great many more attempt to take their own lives (Caldwell & Gottesman, 1990). 
1.6 - Incidence, course and outcome 
The lifetime prevalence of schizophrenia is approximately 1% with comparable 
rates across the developed and developing world (Jablensky, 1997). The incidence 
of schizophrenia is higher in men than women, with a median rate ratio of 1.4: 1 
across studies (review, McGrath et al., 2004). The typical age of onset of 
schizophrenia also differs by gender. Examining the distribution of onsets in 5-year 
age bands, Hafner (2003) found an early and steep increase peaking between 15 
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and 25 years for men which then gradually decreased to a low level with advancing 
age. In women, the rate rose less steeply, reaching a lower and broader peak 
between 15 and 30 years. After a similar gradual decrease, a second, somewhat 
smaller peak emerged at 45 to 50 years, around the time of pre-menopause (see 
fi gu re 1.4). 
FIGURE 1.4: Age of onset of schizophrenia (from Hafner, 2003) 
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The onset of schizophrenia is often gradual, with 'negative' and depressive 
symptoms emerging first, followed by cognitive and social impairment, and then 
(sometimes several years later) by the emergence of psychotic symptoms (Hafner 
et al., 1999). The course of schizophrenia is highly variable, with four pathways 
highlighted by Shephard and colleagues (1989). 
1. About 16% have only a single episode and then return to their level of 
functioning before they became ill. 
2. After being diagnosed with schizophrenia, 32% return to their premorbid 
level of functioning between repeated acute episodes. 
3. A further 9% follow an episodic course, but with a return to a stable but 
somewhat impaired level of functioning between acute episodes. 
4. For about 43% of individuals, their level of functioning deteriorates with 
each acute episode, the course highlighted by Kraepelin. 
Attitudes to long term outcome in schizophrenia are changing as evidence emerges 
that a large number of individuals recover from what was once thought to be an 
invariantly life-long, debilitating, inevitably deteriorating disorder (British 
Psychological Society Division of Clinical Psychology, 2000). Contrary to Kraepelin's 
inevitable deteriorating course, almost half of individuals with schizophrenia achieve 
long-term recovery (Harrison et al., 2001). 
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There is some evidence that outcome in schizophrenia is better in developing 
countries (Sartorius et al., 1986). This has been attributed by some as relating to 
the retention of a 'work role' and a lack of personal blame for individuals with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia. Both of these are more likely to be affected in 
individuals in the developed world. 
1.7 - Cognitive deficits in schizophrenia 
The presence of cognitive deficits has never been listed in the criteria for 
schizophrenia in any of the major diagnostic systems (Lewis, 2004). However, such 
deficits have become increasingly accepted as a relatively stable, almost universal 
core characteristic of the disorder. The notion that cognitive functioning is impaired 
in schizophrenia goes back as far as the work of Kraepelin and Bleuler. However, it 
is only with the relatively recent development of standardised neuropsychological 
assessments, normed on large populations of healthy controls, that such deficits 
have been quantified. This has also allowed the possibility of relationships between 
cognitive functioning and clinical symptoms, structural brain abnormalities, and 
functional outcome to be investigated. 
What are the deficits? 
The cognitive deficits of individuals with schizophrenia are both general and 
specific. Individuals with schizophrenia have been found to score, on average, at 
least one standard deviation below the mean of healthy controls across a wide 
range of neuropsychological measures (Flashman & Green, 2004). In addition, 
there are areas in which individuals with schizophrenia show disproportionately 
greater deficits, against this background of generalised impairment. In a large 
meta-analysis of 204 studies of cognitive deficits in schizophrenia, Heinrichs and 
Zakzanis (1998) analysed 22 mean effect sizes, grouped into the constructs of 
global verbal memory, selective verbal memory, nonverbal memory, motor skills, 
attention, general intelligence, spatial ability, executive function, language function, 
and tactile-transfer. All showed moderate to large effect sizes (d > 0.60), indicating 
a broad-based cognitive impairment in people with schizophrenia as a group. In 
addition, there is evidence that some cognitive domains are particularly impaired in 
people with schizophrenia, with global verbal memory, general intelligence, 
attention, and word fluency yielding the highest effect sizes. 
One limitation of the Heinrichs and Zakzanis (1998) meta-analysis is that different 
studies use different tests to index each domain of cognitive ability. Recently, a 
concerted attempt has been made to reach a consensus battery of tests for 
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assessing cognition in schizophrenia, with the specific aim of measuring the efficacy 
of pharmacological agents which aim to improve cognition - the Measurement and 
Treatment Research to Improve Cognition in Schizophrenia (MATRICS, Kern et al., 
2004). However, the final battery of tests chosen has only recently been announced 
(http: //www. matrics. ucla. edu/), and has yet to be widely adopted. 
It has been suggested that cognitive deficits in schizophrenia may reflect, at least 
in part, the influence of other factors, such as antipsychotic medication or 
depression (Brebion et al., 1997). Nevertheless, some cognitive deficits, including 
verbal learning and memory, attention and language abilities have been found to be 
impaired in first episode, never-medicated individuals with schizophrenia (reviews, 
Torrey, 2002; Bratti & Bilder, 2006). Consistent with the genetic basis of 
schizophrenia (see section 1.9.1) verbal memory, executive function and attention 
deficits are also found in the non-affected relatives of people with schizophrenia 
(meta-analysis, Sitskoorn et al., 2004). 
1.7.2 - How universal are cognitive deficits in schizophrenia? 
Given the heterogeneity of schizophrenia, the consistency with which cognitive 
deficits are found is striking. Depending on the test in question, between 61% and 
78% of individuals with schizophrenia perform below the median of the patient- 
control aggregated sample (Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998). Nevertheless, there is 
considerable overlap between the distribution of scores for individuals with 
schizophrenia and healthy controls, suggesting that there are a sub-group of people 
with schizophrenia who are "neuropsychologically normal' (Allen et al., 2003). The 
existence of such a sub-group (who are otherwise clinically similar to those with 
cognitive deficits) would be problematic for the view that cognitive deficits are a 
core feature of schizophrenia, as has been suggested by Lewis (2004). 
Nevertheless, when individual cognitive domains are examined in isolation, 64% of 
'neuropsychologically normal' individuals with schizophrenia show impairment in 
one or more domain compared with 35% of healthy controls (Palmer et al., 1997). 
This suggests that "neuropsychologically near-normal' may be a more appropriate 
term for this sub-group (Allen et al., 2003). Furthermore, the 'near-normal' 
performance of this sub-group may still represent a decline in cognitive ability, 
albeit from a high level of premorbid function (Allen et al., 2003; Lewis, 2004). 
Indeed, there is evidence that 'neuropsychologically normal' individuals with 
schizophrenia show evidence of a deterioration from higher levels of 
(retrospectively assessed) premorbid ability (Kremen et al., 1996). 
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1.7.3 - How stable are the deficits? 
Reviewing the findings of 15 longitudinal studies, Rund (1998) concludes that after 
the onset of the disorder, cognitive deficits in schizophrenia are relatively stable 
over long periods. There appears to be no significant decline in cognition over time, 
with some longitudinal studies of first-episode patients even suggesting a slight 
improvement (Lewis, 2004). 
1.7.4 - Are cognitive deficits related to symptom severity? 
The symptoms of schizophrenia fluctuate over time, whereas cognitive deficits are 
relatively stable (Elvevag & Goldberg, 2000). Neither psychotic nor disorganisation 
symptoms have been reliably associated with specific cognitive deficits (Hughes et 
al., 2003). Although negative symptoms are found to be associated with cognitive 
deficits in some cross-sectional studies (Addington & Addington, 1999; Cadenhead 
et al., 1997), longitudinal data suggest that changes in symptoms (positive, 
negative or disorganisation) are not strongly associated with changes in 
performance on cognitive tests (Hughes et al., 2003). Combined with the stability 
of cognitive deficits over time, these data indicate that cognitive impairment is a 
more stable feature of schizophrenia than the presence of symptoms. The existence 
of subtle cognitive impairments in the relatives of individuals with schizophrenia 
(Snitz et al., 2006), which occur in the absence of symptomatology, suggest that 
cognitive deficits may be a heritable endophenotype of schizophrenia which follow a 
separate course than symptoms. 
1.7.5 - How specific are cognitive deficits to schizophrenia? 
The question of whether individuals with schizophrenia display a particular profile of 
cognitive impairments that is not seen in other disorders has yielded inconsistent 
results (Lewis, 2004). Goldberg (1999) argues that people with schizophrenia are 
generally more cognitively impaired than individuals with bipolar disorder, a mental 
illness with which schizophrenia is often compared. No study has found the opposite 
profile of results, although a number studies have found no significant differences. 
The differential performance of these two groups appears to be particularly marked 
for general intellectual ability (IQ), and some tests of attention, memory and 
executive function. The performance of individuals with bipolar disorder is often 
intermediate between that of people with schizophrenia and healthy controls 
(Lewis, 2004). An alternative possibility is that it is the presence of psychotic 
symptoms, rather than schizophrenia as a disorder, that is associated with a 
particular profile of cognitive impairment as individuals with a psychotic affective 
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disorder resemble individuals with schizophrenia in cognitive profile (Jeste et al., 
1996). However, other studies (e. g. Mojtabai et al., 2000; Frangou et al., 2006) 
have found consistent differences between schizophrenia and psychotic affective 
disorders, supporting a degree of specificity to schizophrenia in the pattern of 
deficits. 
1.7.6 - What is the functional significance of cognitive deficits in 
schizophrenia? 
Since the early 1990's there has been a surge of interest in the relationship 
between neuropsychological deficits and functional outcome in schizophrenia. In a 
review and meta-analysis, Green and colleagues (2000a) confirmed that deficits in 
secondary verbal memory, immediate memory, vigilance and executive functioning 
are related to the functional outcome domains of success in psychosocial 
rehabilitation programs, social problem solving, and community outcome in 
individuals with schizophrenia. Although everyday functional capacity is likely to be 
dependent on a number of factors, neuropsychological functioning is a key 
determinant, explaining more variance than clinical symptoms (Evans et aL, 2003). 
1.8 - Structural brain alterations in schizophrenia 
After the disappointing and often contradictory findings of early investigations into 
the neuropathology of schizophrenia, Plum (1972) famously declared that 
"schizophrenia is the graveyard of neuropathologists'. However, since the advent of 
in vivo brain imaging, interest in the possibility of brain abnormalities in 
schizophrenia has been revitalised. Reviewing the findings of 193 structural 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) studies in schizophrenia, Shenton and 
colleagues (2001) found evidence that a wide range of cortical and sub-cortical 
structures are abnormal in individuals with schizophrenia. The proportion of studies 
in this review finding abnormalities in each brain area are summarised in table 1.1. 
It is clear from this summary that the structural brain alterations in schizophrenia 
are widespread. The size of these volumetric changes was the subject of a meta- 
analysis by Wright and colleagues (2000). They found a mean decrease in total 
cerebral volume in schizophrenia (relative to healthy controls) of 2%, and an 
increase in total ventricular volume of 26%. The volumes of individual brain regions 
were assessed relative to this overall reduction in cerebral volume. Relative to the 
cerebral volume differences, individuals with schizophrenia had slightly greater 
reductions in the volume of the frontal lobe bilaterally (2%), but no greater 
loss in 
the temporal lobe. Bilateral reductions in the region of 5-7% were found for the 
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volumes of several medial temporal lobe structures, including the amygdala, the 
hippocampus and the parahippocampus. The volume of the thalamus was also 
reduced relative to the cerebral volume differences (3%). 
TABLE 1.1: Structural brain abnormalities in schizophrenia 
Number of O/o of studies finding 
Brain structure studies alterations in 
reviewed schizophrenia 
Whole brain 50 22% 
Whole frontal lobe 50 60% 
Whole temporal lobe 51 61% 
Whole parietal lobe 15 60% 
Whole occipital lobe 9 44% 
Cerebellum 13 31% 
Ventricular measures 
Lateral ventricles 55 80% 
Third ventricles 33 73% 
Fourth Ventricles 5 20% 
Temporal lobe 
structures 
Medial temporal lobe 49 74% 
superior temporal gyrus 12 100% 
(STG) (grey matter only) 
STG (grey & white matter) 15 67% 
Planum Temporale 10 60% 
Sub-cortical structures 
Basal Ganglia 25 68% 
Thalamus 12 42% 
In contrast, the volumes of several basal ganglia structures were higher in 
individuals with schizophrenia, including the caudate (2-4%), putamen (60/o), 
globus pallidus (21-24%). The size of these subcortical enlargements are 
associated with medication dose, and are much less common in individuals who are 
neuroleptic-na*fve (Gur et al., 1998; Chakos et al., 2005). This suggests 
that some 
of these volumetric increases may be medication-induced. 
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1.8.1 - The relationship between brain structures and cognitive functions 
Research has increasingly focussed on the relationship between structural brain 
measures and the cognitive functions in schizophrenia, as well as in healthy 
controls. In a recent review, Antonova and colleagues (2004) summarise the results 
of some 35 studies investigating such (brain) structure / (cognitive) function 
relationships in individuals with schizophrenia and healthy controls. The pattern of 
relationships between groups was compared to determine whether individuals with 
schizophrenia show 'normal' structure/function relationships. 
1.8.1.1 - Global brain measures 
A number of studies indicate that greater whole-brain volume (particularly total 
grey matter) is correlated with better performance on tests of general intellectual 
ability in individuals with schizophrenia as well as healthy controls, indicating a 
'normal' structure/function relationship (Gur et al., 1999; Kareken et al., 1995). 
Other studies have found this 'bigger brain - better performance' relationship only 
in females with schizophrenia (e. g. Flaum et al., 1994), suggesting that this 
relationship may be disturbed in some samples of male individuals with 
schizophrenia. 
One of the most robust findings in neuroirnaging studies of individuals with 
schizophrenia is a significant increase in the ventricle-to-brain ratio (VBR) 
compared to healthy controls (see figure 1.5). Given that greater VBR is thought to 
be an indicator of the loss of either grey or white matter, one would expect greater 
VBR to be associated with poorer cognitive performance. However, not only does 
the relationship between ventricular size and cognition appear to be complex, but 
the issue is further clouded by the mixture of study designs, with some adopting 
VBR measures and others using absolute ventricular volume measurements. Some 
studies have found the expected relationship between poorer cognition and greater 
absolute size of the lateral ventricles in healthy controls (Hoff et al., 1992), and 
greater lateral VBR in females with schizophrenia (Bornstein et al., 1992). Greater 
VBR of the third ventricle, which may indicate a pathology of the adjacent 
thalamus, is associated with poorer abstraction/categorisation in both males and 
females with schizophrenia (Bornstein et al., 1992). The latter study, however, 
found the opposite profile in healthy controls, with greater VBR correlating with 
better cognitive performance. Overall, the link between VBR and cognition is 
unclear. The difficulty in finding consistent associations with cognition may reflect 
the inconsistent way that it has been measured across studies. 
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1.8-1.2 - Frontal lobe 
Greater total frontal lobe volume has been found to be associated with better verbal 
fluency and immediate visual memory recall in individuals with schizophrenia, but 
with delayed visual memory recall in healthy controls (Baare et al., 1999). The 
authors suggest that these differences may reflect the difficulty of the tasks relative 
to the cognitive ability of each group as the greater the variance in test scores, the 
easier it is to detect a relationship with other variables. Delayed recall, being a 
more difficult task, and may have produced more variability in the controls and a 
floor effect in the patients, while immediate recall may have produced more 
variability in the patients and a ceiling effect in the controls. A further study has 
found a relationship between working memory and both frontal grey matter and 
frontal white matter volumes in individuals with schizophrenia, but not in healthy 
controls (Nestor et al., 2002). However, the frontal lobe is far from homogeneous, 
and there is evidence that specific areas of prefrontal cortex are related to specific 
cognitive functions. One way to sub-divide the frontal lobe is into archicortical 
(dorsolateral) and paleocortical (orbitofrontal) regions. Antonova and colleagues' 
review (2004) highlights the consistent correlation of dorsolateral volumes with 
measures of executive function, attention, verbal and visual memory in individuals 
with schizophrenia (Gur et al., 2000b; Szeszko et al., 2000; Seidman et al., 1994), 
reflecting the a similar pattern of structure/function relationships to those found in 
healthy controls. Paleocortical volumes were found to have a less straightforward 
relationship with cognition, with no consistent pattern emerging from the reviewed 
research (Antonova et al., 2004). It is important to note that not all measures held 
to be 'frontal lobe tests' were found to correlate with frontal lobe volumes in 
individuals with schizophrenia. Alterations in other brain regions which make up the 
distributed networks utilised in the these tasks may contribute to impaired 
performance on these tests (Antonova et al., 2004). 
I. S. 1.3 - Temporal lobe 
Most studies examining the total volume of temporal lobe volume have failed to find 
relationships with cognition in schizophrenia (e. g. Sanfilipo et al., 2002). One study 
(Flaurn et al., 1994) found a relationship between total temporal lobe volume and 
IQ in healthy controls (men and women), and in female but not male individuals 
with schizophrenia, suggesting a disrupted structure/function relationship for this 
group. Studies focussing on the volumes of temporal sub-regions have obtained 
stronger associations than those utilising total temporal lobe volumes. The volume 
of the superior temporal gyrus is associated with verbal fluency (Vita et al., 1995) 
and abstraction/categorisation (Nestor et al., 1993) in individuals with 
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schizophrenia. The role of this area in normal language processing suggests that a 
dysfunction of the semantic system might underlie these deficits (Antonova et al., 
2004). 
The volume of the parahippocampal gyrus region has been found to relate to verbal 
intelligence in individuals with schizophrenia, but not healthy controls (DeLisi et al. / 1991; Hoff et al., 1992). The relationship between the volume of the hippocampus 
(part of the medial temporal lobe) and cognition has received considerable 
attention. Hippocampal volume correlates with better verbal and spatial memory in 
both healthy controls and individuals with schizophrenia (Gur et al., 2000a), as well 
as with cognitive domains more commonly attributed to the frontal lobes, including 
the perseveration and inhibitory control aspects of executive function (Szeszko et 
al., 2000). 
I. S. 1.4 - Parietal and occipital lobes 
These brain areas have received very little attention in the literature, and their 
structure/function relationships in schizophrenia are therefore mostly unknown 
(Antonova et al., 2004). 
I. S. 1.5 - Basal ganglia 
Stratta and colleagues (1997) examined the associations between basal ganglia 
structures and performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) of 
executive function (see section 5.3.4.2.3.2) in both individuals with schizophrenia 
and healthy controls. They found that the number of categories completed was 
associated with larger basal ganglia structures, including the striatum, in individuals 
with schizophrenia. No associations were found for healthy controls, indicating that 
this relationship may be specific to schizophrenia. However, greater variance in 
WCST performance in the patient group could contribute to this differential finding, 
and another study (DeLisi et al., 1991) found no associations between basal ganglia 
structures and WCST performance in individuals with schizophrenia. The 
insensitivity of the brain measurements in this early study may account for this 
negative finding. 
I. S. 1.6 - Summarising the structurelfunction findings 
The approach of examining the correlations between scores on tests of different 
domains of cognitive ability and structural brain measures has produced a number 
of replicated findings in both healthy controls and individuals with schizophrenia. 
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This supports the hypothesis that particular brain structures are important for 
different domains of cognitive performance. Some structure/function relationships, 
such as the relationship between IQ and total brain volume appear to be disturbed 
only in males with schizophrenia (Flaum et al., 1994). Additional relationships, such 
as the association between frontal lobe volume and working memory (Nestor et al., 
2002) appear to be specific to schizophrenia. Task difficulty may be an important 
variable in determining whether there is enough variance in cognitive test scores to 
detect structure/function relationships in particular groups (Baare et al., 1999). 
Nevertheless, these support the link between the cognitive deficits observed in 
individuals with schizophrenia (see section 1.7) and the structural brain alterations 
which have been observed (see section 1.8). 
1.9 - The aetiology of schizophrenia 
Almost every aspect of human life has been implicated in the aetiology of 
schizophrenia, with each factor favoured by some researchers but rejected by 
others (Bentall, 1990). The summary which follows is therefore a brief overview of 
the main factors which have been repeatedly implicated in the aetiology of 
schizophrenia. 
1.9.1 - Genetic factors 
Schizophrenia is a highly heritable disorder, with its heritability estimated to be 
higher than 80% (Cardno et al., 1999). Family studies show that for a child of two 
parents with schizophrenia, the risk of developing the disorder is 46% (Gottesman 
& Shields, 1972; McGuffin et al., 1995), and is 60-84% when a monozygotic twin is 
affected (Cardno et al., 1999). Adoption and twin studies clearly demonstrate that 
this familial risk has a very strong genetic component, rather than being the result 
of shared environment (Gottesman, 1991; Ingraham & Kety, 2000). The nature of 
the genetic transmission is unclear and does not follow a simple dominant or 
recessive singe gene pattern. Polygenetic models of inheritance hypothesise that 
there are multiple genes which confer vulnerability for schizophrenia, each of which 
exerts a small additive effect. These genes are likely to act in concert with 
epigenetic and environmental factors to determine whether and when an individual 
develops schizophrenia. 
Finding the specific chromosomal loci and genes for schizophrenia has proved to be 
slow, frustrating, difficult and expensive. Recent research has produced a number 
of promising 'schizophrenia genes' (Harrison & Owen, 2003), but most findings are 
preliminary and have not been consistently replicated. Although these findings 
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represent a substantial step forward in our understanding of the genetics of 
schizophrenia, the case for each gene is, to some degree, incomplete. Furthermore, 
the combined effects of the genes identified this far do not account for the very 
high heritability of schizophrenia and our understanding of how genetic risk 
interacts with environmental factors remains limited. 
1.9.2 - Environmental factors 
A number of environmental factors, both biological and psychosocial ' have been 
shown to increase the risk of schizophrenia. A number of prenatal and perinatal 
events increase the risk of an individual developing schizophrenia, including: 
maternal influenza, rubella, malnutrition and smoking during pregnancy (Mueser & 
McGurk, 2004). One of the most investigated environmental risks for schizophrenia 
is obstetric complications. A number of such complications have been associated 
with schizophrenia, including: complications of pregnancy (bleeding, diabetes, 
rhesus incompatibility, preeclampsia), abnormal foetal growth and development 
(low birth weight, congenital malformations, reduced head circumference), and 
complications of delivery (meta-analytic review, Cannon et al., 2002). However, the 
effect sizes involved are generally small, and do not indicate a strong causal link. 
The socio-demographic factors of poverty and lower social class have been linked 
with higher rates of schizophrenia (Bruce et al., 1991). This may reflect either a 
causative link between stressful environments and the development of 
schizophrenia, or downward social drift, whereby schizophrenia reduces the social 
and occupational functioning of individuals who develop the disorder. Current 
thinking suggests that both are involved in the causation of poor recovery 
(Kinderman & Cooke, 2000). 
Individuals born in cities are more likely to develop schizophrenia than those born 
in rural areas (review, McGrath et al., 2004). Possible explanations put forward for 
this "urbanicity' effect include differences in social support, stressful life events, and 
familial liability (Peen & Dekker, 2004). Migrants are also more likely to develop 
schizophrenia than native-born individuals, with a median rate-ratio of 4.6 (review, 
McGrath et al., 2004). Social inequalities, family fragmentation, urbanicity, and the 
stress of the migratory process itself are the main hypotheses that have been 
proposed for these increased rates (Hutchinson & Haasen, 2004). 
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1.10 
- Biological accounts of schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia research has focussed on understanding the aetiology of the disorder 
at a number of different levels of understanding. Each level, from genetic to 
neurochemical, to neuropsychological, to environmental, seeks to add to our 
understanding of what causes and maintains the clinical syndrome of schizophrenia, 
i. e. its signs and symptoms. A number of theories have been proposed which 
attempt to integrate the findings of schizophrenia research at different levels of 
understanding. Research at each level of understanding is enormously complex in 
its own right and the explanations within each integrating model are therefore 
necessarily brief. 
1.10.1 - Cognitive dysmetria 
Andreasen and colleagues (1998; 1999) propose that schizophrenia in its many and 
varied forms is caused by a unifying fundamental cognitive deficit, "cognitive 
dysmetria', which has a single common pathophysiology. In order to understand 
how this cognitive deficit may be involved in schizophrenia, it is important to first 
consider how the system that is held to be altered in schizophrenia functions in 
healthy individuals. 
A specific circuit of brain regions, the cortico-cerebellar-thalamo-corticaI circuit 
(CCTCC) is held to be essential in the normal synchrony of the motor system. For 
example, complex acts such as hitting a baseball are facilitated by the rapid online 
processing and feedback of information between the sensory-motor cortex and the 
cerebellum, mediated by the thalamus. In neurology, dysmetria refers to a 
disruption in this fluid coordination and synchrony of motor activity. Andreasen and 
colleagues propose that the CCTCC is not only involved in the synchrony of the 
motor system, but also the synchrony of cognition. The disruption of this synchrony 
is therefore termed cognitive dysmetria, a deficit in the fluid coordination of mental 
activity that is the hallmark of normal cognition. Rather than a traditionally defined 
cognitive system such as memory or attention, Andreasen and colleagues consider 
cognitive dysmetria to be the disruption of a more basic process behind such 
systems and therefore refer to it as a 'metaprocess'. The common pathophysiology 
of both motor dysmetria and cognitive dysmetria is hypothesised to be a 
misconnection in the CCTCC. 
Andreasen and colleagues (1999) cite evidence from three sources to support their 
contention that the CCTCC is involved in normal human cognition. Firstly, tract- 
tracing studies have demonstrated that the connections between the cerebellum 
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and the cortex are not limited to the sensory-motor areas, but include connections 
to other cortical regions as well (Schmahmann & Pandya, 1995). Secondly, 
theoretical arguments have been presented for the importance of the CCTCC as the 
neural substrate of complex mental activities (e. g. Leiner et al., 1995). Finally, 
functional neuroirnaging studies have supported the role of this circuit in cognition 
(Allen et al., 1997). 
The strongest evidence for abnormalities in the full CCTCC in schizophrenia comes 
from PET functional brain imaging studies (Andreasen et al., 1999). For example, 
decreased blood flow in individuals with schizophrenia has been observed in frontal, 
cerebellar and thalamic brain regions during the practiced and novel recall of word 
lists (Crespo-Facorro et al., 1999). However, for the concept of cognitive dysmetria 
to offer a convincing unifying explanation of schizophrenia, it must be able to 
account not only for cognitive and neuroirnaging findings, but also for the 
symptoms of the disorder. Andreasen and colleagues hypothesise that when the 
synchrony of mental processes is 'off' in individuals with schizophrenia (cognitive 
dysmetria), the transfer of information between different parts of the brain is 
mistimed. This may lead an individual with schizophrenia to incorrectly connect 
perceptions and associations and misinterpret both internal and external processes. 
Such disrupted processes are held to cause hallucinations and delusions, while 
deficits in the coordination of language caused by cognitive dysmetria are held to 
account for thought disorder. The 'paralysed' flow of information through the 
CCTCC is hypothesised to cause negative symptoms such as alogia. 
1.10.2 - Schizophrenia as a disorder of heteromodal association cortex 
Pearlson and colleagues (1996) propose that schizophrenia is primarily the result of 
the disruption of the heteromodal association cortex (HASQ, and that other brain 
changes are secondary to this primary disturbance. The heteromodal areas that 
make up the HASC, by definition, either receive inputs from multiple sensory 
modalities, or transmit information to multiple secondary motor corticies. Rather 
than receiving sensory data directly, they coordinate complex pre-processed data 
from more than one sensory sphere. The HASC, as defined by Pearlson and 
colleagues, comprises the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the auditory association 
portions of the STG, and the inferior parietal lobule. They note that individuals with 
schizophrenia have cognitive deficits in functions subserved by the heteromodal 
cortex (see section 1.8.1). Pearlson and colleagues contend that structural brain 
deficits in schizophrenia should be specific to HASC regions. They cite only one 
study (Schlaepfer et al., 1994) in support of this hypothesis, and the findings of 
widespread cortical deficits in schizophrenia (Shenton et al., 2001) argues against 
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this specificity. Furthermore, only a very limited attempt is made by Pearlson and 
colleagues to explain how HASC disruption could account for the symptoms of 
schizophrenia. 
1.10.3 - Gray's neuropsychological model (1991,1998) 
Gray and colleagues' (1991; 1998) neuropsychological model of schizophrenia aims 
to offer a full explanation of schizophrenia at four levels of understanding: 
structural brain abnormalities, functional neurochernical abnormalities, cognitive 
disruptions, and positive psychotic symptoms (it does not attempt to account for 
negative symptoms). In doing so, it integrates the findings of a wide range of 
schizophrenia research. Gray and colleagues propose a central role for 
abnormalities in a circuit of brain systems that acts as a comparator system (in the 
limbic forebrain), and the passage of information from this system to a motor 
programming system (in the basal ganglia) which controls perception and action. 
The comparator system in the limbic forebrain is hypothesised to use stored 
regularities of previous input to compute the next state of the perceptual world, 
given the motor program currently engaged. It compares this prediction to the 
actual state of the world, and transmits the outcome of this comparison via a 
projection from the subiculum to the nucleus accumbens (NA). If the NA detects a 
'mismatch' (indicating that something novel or unusual has occurred), the current 
motor program will be interrupted (the NA forms part of the motor programming 
system). 
Gray and colleagues hypothesise that, in schizophrenia, the projection from the 
subiculurn to the NA is disrupted, causing a functional neurochernical imbalance, 
specifically hyperactivity of the mesolimbic doparninergic pathway. This leads to the 
disruption of cognitive processes which Hernsley (1993) described as a weakening 
of the influence of past regularities on the control of current perception. This 
intrusion of apparently novel events into consciousness leads to the positive 
psychotic symptoms of hallucinations and delusions, because individuals attribute 
the occurrence of such stimuli to external causes. This could lead to great 
significance being ascribed to what are in fact trivial events, and hence play a 
crucial role in the formation and maintenance of delusions (Garety & Hernsley, 
1994). Hallucinations are explained by integrating Frith's (1987) neuropsychological 
model of schizophrenia, in which hallucinations are considered to arise from a 
failure of the 'self- mon itori ng' of willed intentions. Such self-monitoring is 
considered to be a type of comparator activity, and thus fits naturally into Gray and 
colleagues model. The failure of self-monitoring in schizophrenia leads to internal 
speech not being recognised as a self-generated act, and is instead treated as 
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eternal. This externally attributed internal speech is therefore experienced as an 
auditory hallucination. 
1.11 - Summary 
The concept of schizophrenia has evolved from the early work of Kraepelin and 
Bleuler. In recent years, the diagnosis of schizophrenia has been made considerably 
more reliable through the introduction of standardised clinical interviews and 
diagnostic criteria, most recently DSM-IV and ICD-10. However, the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia continues to be debated, particularly with regard to its distinctiveness 
from other serious mental illnesses, including bipolar affective disorder and 
schizoaffective disorder. Despite these difficulties, the categorical diagnosis of 
schizophrenia remains widely used in both research and clinical practice. 
The symptoms of schizophrenia can be divided into three broad categories; 
'positive' (hallucinations, delusions), 'disorganised' (thought disorder, incongruous 
affect), and 'negative' (alogia, anhedonia). In addition, many individuals with 
schizophrenia are depressed and about 13% complete suicide. The lifetime 
prevalence of schizophrenia is approximately 1%. 
Individuals with schizophrenia, as a group, have substantial and widespread 
cognitive deficits relative to healthy controls. There is also evidence for 
disproportionately greater deficits in the domains of verbal memory, attention, and 
verbal fluency, against this background of generalised impairment. These deficits 
are strongly related to functional outcome, relatively stable over time and show few 
reliable relationships with symptom severity variables. 
Modern neuroirnaging methods have revealed widespread brain abnormalities in 
individuals with schizophrenia. The ventricle-to-brain ratio has been found to be 
significantly higher, and the volumes of all four cerebral lobes have been found to 
be reduced in the majority of studies. Slightly greater reductions have been noted 
in the frontal lobes and some medial temporal lobe structures relative to these 
generalised reductions in brain volume. Structural brain measures have been found 
to be associated with different domains of cognitive performance in schizophrenia. 
Some structure/function relationships appear to be different to those observed in 
healthy controls, and this disturbance from the 'normal' pattern of 
structure/function relationships may be greatest in men with schizophrenia. 
Schizophrenia has a very high heritability, although the search for specific genes 
which contribute to its aetiology has produced few replicated results. It is likely that 
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the genetic basis of schizophrenia is complex, involving multiple genes of small 
effect. Environmental factors including obstetric complications and %urbanicity' have 
also been implicated in the aetiology of schizophrenia. Dysfunctions in specific 
neural circuits, such as the CCTCC, have been proposed to account for the 
symptoms of schizophrenia. However, the evidence for each aetiological model is 
inconclusive and the aetiology of schizophrenia remains a matter of considerable 
debate. 
47 
CHAPTER 2: INSIGHT IN SCHIZOPHRENIA: DEFINITION, 
MEASUREMENT AND IMPORTANCE 
2.1 - History 
Poor insight in schizophrenia has been a subject of interest since the disorder was 
first delineated. Kraepelin (1919, quoted in Amador & Seckinger, 1997) wrote: 
"The patients have, at first at least, no real understanding of the 
gravity of the disorder. ... To all representations of the 
incomprehensibility and morbidity of their conduct the patients give 
as answers explanations which say nothing. " 
The question of how and why some individuals arrive at answers which 'say 
nothing' has occupied the field of research into insight in schizophrenia ever since. 
However, research in this area was initially slow to get off the ground. A paper by 
Aubrey Lewis (1934) on 'the psychopathology of insight', defined insight as 'the 
correct attitude to morbid change in oneself, and moreover, the realisation that the 
illness is mental', a definition relatively close to modern definitions (David, 1999a), 
a number of which are detailed below. Despite this, relatively little literature was 
published on insight between the time of Kraepelin and the 1980's. In the early 
1990's, two independently written literature reviews on insight by David (1990) and 
Amador (1991) sparked a rejuvenation of interest in the subject, and an explosion 
in the amount of research undertaken. 
2.2 - The definition and measurement of insight in schizophrenia 
There is considerable debate in the literature as to how insight in schizophrenia is 
best defined. Intertwined in this debate is the question of how an individual's level 
of insight should be measured. In fact, it is difficult to separate these issues, as 
each insight measurement tool effectively operationalises a particular definition of 
insight. However, both the measurement of insight and the conceptual frameworks 
within which it is defined have evolved considerably in recent years. There is an 
emerging consensus that insight is a multi-dimensional concept, with each 
dimension being measured along a continuum (Mintz et al., 2003). However, the 
number and nature of these dimensions, as well as the time-frame within which 
they should be assessed, remain matters of debate. 
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2.2.1 - Categorical definitions and measures 
Insight in schizophrenia was initially measured as if it were a binary, 'all or nothing,, 
phenomenon, where individuals are considered categorically to possess, or to lack 
insight. For example, the widely quoted World Health Organisation study (Carpenter 
et al., 1973) defined insight as being present 'if there was some awareness of 
emotional illness' and absent if the patient "vigorously denied he was disturbed". 
This approach did not capture the clinical complexities of how individuals with 
schizophrenia are aware of their mental health problems (Amador et al., 1997). 
Despite the rejection of this categorical approach, research on insight in 
schizophrenia still frequently compares a 'good insight' group to a 'poor insight' 
group, even when continuous or multi-dimensional measures are used. 
2.2.2 - Continuous definitions and measures 
Insight was later recognised as being a continuous rather than dichotomous 
variable, with a continuum from full insight to complete lack of insight. This 
conceptualisation of insight is operationalised in a number of different measures. A 
number of aspects of insight which feature in these uni-dimensional measures 
became dimensions of insight in their own right in later scales, as discussed further. 
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS,, Kay et al., 1987) is a popular 
semi-structured interview which assesses a wide range of symptoms of 
schizophrenia, yielding 'positive', 'negative' and 'general' symptom sub-scales. One 
item of this scale (G12) deals with "Lack of Judgement and Insight' and has been 
used as a measure of insight in a substantial number of studies. Kay and 
colleagues' definition of 'lack of judgement and insight' as well as their scoring 
criteria for the PANSS G12 item are detailed in Table 2.1 below. 
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TABLE 2.1: The PANSS Lack of judgement and insight (G12) item 
Definition: Impaired awareness or understanding of one's own psychiatric 
condition and life situation. This is evidenced by failure to recognise past or 
present psychiatric illness, or symptoms, denial of need for psychiatric 
hospitalisation or treatment, decisions characterised by poor anticipation of 
consequences and unrealistic short-term and long-range planning. Basis for 
rating thought content expressed during the interview. 
_ Score Criteria 
_ 1- Absent Definition does not apply. 
2- Minimal Questionable pathology; may be at the upper extreme of 
normal limits. 
3- Mild Recognise having a psychiatric disorder but clearly 
underestimates its seriousness, the implications for treatment 
or the importance of taking measures to avoid relapse. 
Future planning may be poorly conceived. 
4- Moderate Patient shows only a vague or shallow recognition of illness. 
There may be fluctuations in acknowledgement of being ill or 
little awareness of major symptoms which are present, such 
as delusions, disorganised thinking, suspiciousness and social 
withdrawal. The patient may rationalise the need for 
treatment in terms of its relieving lesser symptoms, such as 
anxiety tension and sleep difficulty. 
5- Moderate Acknowledges past but not present psychiatric disorder. If 
severe challenged, the patient may concede the presence of some 
unrelated or insignificant symptoms which tend to be 
explained away by gross misinterpretation or delusional 
thinking. The need for psychiatric treatment similarly goes 
unrecognised. 
6- Severe Patient denies ever having had a psychiatric disorder. He 
disavows the presence of any psychiatric symptoms in the 
past or present and, though compliant, denies the need for 
treatment and hospital isation. 
7- Extreme Emphatic denial of past and present psychiatric illness. 
Current hospitalisation and treatment are given a delusional 
interpretation (e. g. as punishment for misdeeds, as 
persecution by tormentors, etc. ) and the patient may thus 
refuse to co-operate with therapist, medication or other 
aspects of treatment. 
It is clear from this table that each point on the PANSS G12 continuum is a 
composite of a number of different factors, including awareness of 
different 
symptoms, whether an individual believes they have an illness, and 
both their 
awareness of the need for, as well as their compliance with, treatment. The 
PANSS 
G12 criteria also address insight over a range of timeframes, including current and 
retrospective aspects of awareness of illness, as well as future planning. 
These 
aspects are all, however, integrated into a single score for each individual. 
Many 
studies have already been conducted using the PANSS, making it easy 
for data on 
insight to be '*harvested' (Amador et al., 1997), even if this was not an aim of the 
study when it was designed. The relationships between insight and other variables 
such as cognitive functioning measured in such studies can 
therefore be easily 
investigated. 
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McEvoy and colleagues (1989a) define insight based on the view that individuals 
who possess 'good' insight judge some of their experiences or behaviours as being 
pathological in a way that is congruent with the involvement of mental health 
professionals and the need for treatment. The Insight and Treatment Attitudes 
Questionnaire (ITAQ) is a structured interview which operationalises this definition, 
and its questions are listed below. 
1. At the time of admission to this hospital, did you have a mental (nerve, 
worry) problems that were different from most other people's? 
2. At the time of admission, did you need to come to this hospital? 
3. Do you have mental (nerve, worry) problems now? 
4. Do you need to be in hospital now? 
5. After you are discharged, is it possible that you may have mental (nerve, 
worry) problems again? 
6. After you are discharged, will you need to be followed-up (looked after) by a 
psychiatrist (mental health centre)? 
7. At the time of admission, did you need to be treated with medications for 
mental problems (nerves, worries)? 
8. Do you need to be treated with medications for mental problems (nerves, 
worries) now? 
9. After you are discharged, will you need to take medications for mental 
problems (nerves, worries)? 
10. Will you take the medications? 
11. Did the medications do you any good? 
Answers to each question are scored either 0,1 or 2 for no, partial and good insight 
respectively, and are added to give a total insight score. As one would expect from 
McEvoy and colleagues' definition of insight, the ITAQ is heavily geared towards 
acceptance of the need for treatment in the forms of hospitalisation and 
medication. As such, it is most suitable for administration to acutely ill inpatients. It 
is interesting to note that this scale includes retrospective (q. 1. q. 2), current (q. 3, 
q. 4) and prospective (q. 5, q. 9) questions, although these aspects are not separated 
into sub-scales. 
A further uni-dimensional measure of insight, the Davidhizar Insight Scale 
(Davidhizar et al., 1986) was employed in a very small number of studies, but has 
not been used as the main measure of insight in any study published since 1990. 
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2.2.3 - Measurement of insight with items from general symptom rating 
scales 
Despite the agreement of the multi-dimensional nature of insight, individual items 
from a number of general assessment interviews have continued to be used to 
measure insight in schizophrenia. In addition to the PANSS G12 item (see above), 
items from the Manual for the Assessment and Documentation of Psychopathology 
(AMDP, Guy & Ban, 1982), Present State Exam (PSE, Wing et al., 1974) and even 
the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HDRS, Hamilton, 1960) have been used as 
insight measures. All of these items provide more general criteria for the 
assessment of insight than multi-dimensional scales such as the SAI and SUMD. For 
example, the scoring criteria for the PSE insight item are: 
0= Perfect insight, defined as "'Full insight ... able to appreciate the issues 
involved"'. 
1= Limited insight, or "As much insight into the nature of the condition 
as social background and intelligence allow. 
2= "Agrees to nervous condition but ... does not really accept the 
explanation in terms of nervous illness (e. g. gives delusional 
explanation)". 
3= "Denies nervous condition entirely". 
The continued use of these items in contemporary insight research (e. g. Shad et 
al., 2004) is likely to reflect the ease with which such data are available from large 
samples of individuals who have already been recruited into research studies that 
were not designed specifically to investigate insight in schizophrenia. The 
abundance of data on individuals with psychosis who have completed these general 
symptom ratings allows scores on these insight items to be investigated in relation 
to neuropsychological functioning (Kim et al., 1997), and structural brain measures 
(Shad et al., 2004). However, the use of single item ratings of assessment is not 
recommended, both because they do not reflect the complexities of the concept of 
insight and schizophrenia, and because the principles of test construction dictate 
that the fewer items a scale has, the inherently less reliable and valid it will be 
(Amador et al., 1997). 
2.2.4 - Multi-dimensional definitions and measures of insight 
There is now some agreement that insight is multi-dimensional and consists of 
several continua, although full consensus on the exact number and nature of these 
dimensions has yet to be reached (Mintz et al., 2003). Two major theoretical 
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strands have emerged, each defining insight in terms of different dimensions, and 
operationalising them in different measures. In addition, a number of other multi- 
dimensional insight scales have been developed, each reflecting a different 
conceptual isation of insight. 
2.2.4.1 - David's three-dimensional model 
David (1990), contends that there are three distinct but overlapping dimensions of 
insight: recognition that one has a mental illness, treatment compliance, and the 
ability to re-label unusual mental events as abnormal. These dimensions are based 
on a review of previous literature together with the author's clinical experience. 
Questions have been raised concerning the meaning of 'treatment compliance' as 
an insight dimension (e. g. Beck-Sander, 1998), particularly when it is compared to 
observed compliance with medication. David and colleagues (David & Kemp, 1997) 
have clarified that the compliance dimension of insight is 'the informed acceptance 
by the patient that his or her symptoms or state is a medical condition that requires 
treatment and that there is a reasonable chance that the treatment offered may be 
of benefit'. 
Two interview schedules have been developed to assess these dimensions: the 
Schedule for the Assessment of Insight (SAI, David et al., 1992) and the SAI- 
Expanded (SAI-E, Kemp & David, 1997, see appendix 2.1). The SAI-E includes 
items on awareness of change and difficulties resulting from mental condition which 
were not part of the original SAL 
A self-report measure which is based on David's (1990) three dimensions of insight, 
the Birchwood Insight Scale (BIS, Birchwood et al., 1994, see appendix 2.2) is also 
available (see also section 5.4.3.1). This scale comprises the following eight items: 
1. Some of my symptoms are made by my mind 
2.1 am mentally well 
3.1 do not need medication 
4. My stay in hospital is necessary 
5. The doctor is right in prescribing medication for me 
6.1 do not need to be seen by a doctor or psychiatrist 
7. If somebody said that I have a nervous or a mental illness then they would 
be right 
8. None of the unusual things I experience are due to an illness 
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These items are counterbalanced for response valence, and each is answered 
'agree', 'disagree' or 'unsure. The BIS shows excellent one-week test-retest 
reliability, indicating that it assesses a stable characteristic, and it is also sensitive 
to change over the course of a hospital admission (Birchwood et al., 1994). 
2.2.4.2 - Amador's five-dimensional model 
Based on a review of previous literature, Amador and colleagues (1993) define 
insight in terms of a five-dimensional construct, comprising: 
1. Awareness of having a mental disorder 
2. Awareness of the effects of medication 
3. Awareness of the consequences of mental illness 
4. Awareness of symptoms of mental disorder 
5. Attribution of symptoms to a mental disorder. 
These dimensions are further divisible into current and retrospective components. 
For example, an individual who denies currently having a mental illness but 
recognises that she has been ill previously could be said to possess poor current 
awareness of illness, but good retrospective awareness of illness. Amador and 
colleagues (1993) have developed an interview, the Schedule for the assessment of 
Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD) to assess these dimensions. 
The SUMD has two parts: a set of three general items and two sets of symptom 
items. Each item is rated of a 5-point scale, with higher scores representing greater 
unawareness (i. e. poorer insight). The general items measure awareness of mental 
disorder, awareness of the achieved effects of medication and awareness of the 
social consequences of mental disorder. Each of these items is rated for both 
current and retrospective awareness, yielding four sub-scale scores. 
The symptom items measure the awareness and attribution of the following 17 
symptoms (when present in an individual): hallucinations, delusions, thought 
disorder, inappropriate affect, unusual dress or appearance, stereotypic or ritualistic 
behaviour, poor social judgement, poor control of aggressive impulses, poor control 
of sexual impulses, alogia, flat or blunt affect, avolition-apathy, anhedonia- 
associality, poor attention, confusion-disorientation, unusual eye contact, and poor 
social relationships. Thus four scores can be derived from each symptom: current 
awareness, current attribution, retrospective awareness, and retrospective 
attribution. These scores are averaged across the symptoms that are present to 
yield four sub-scale scores. 
54 
A number of researchers (e. g. Arduini et al., 2003) have used an abbreviated 
version of the SUMD which omits the retrospective component, the attribution sub- 
scale and reduces the number of symptoms for which awareness is rated. This scale 
has become known as the SUMD-Abbreviated (SUMD-A). 
More recently, other authors (e. g. Mohamed et al., 1999) have further sub-divided 
the awareness and attribution of symptoms SUMD scales into: 
a. Awareness of positive symptoms 
b. Awareness of negative symptoms 
c. Attribution of positive symptoms to mental disorder 
d. Attribution of negative symptoms to mental disorder 
Given that each dimension can be either current or retrospective, insight in relation 
to symptoms of schizophrenia can be rated along up to eight dimensions using the 
SUMD. 
2.2.4.3 - Other multi-dimensional measures and models of insight 
Marks and colleagues (2000) developed the Self Appraisal of Illness Questionnaire 
(SAIQ) to measure aspects of insight beyond the acknowledgement of illness 
including the subjective experience of illness. For example, a number of items deal 
with the extent to which respondents worry about different aspects of their illness. 
However, it is unclear whether 'worry about illness' is a separate dimension of 
insight, or a more secondary construct. No further studies have been published 
which utilise the SAIQ. 
Markova and Berrios (1992) developed a self-report insight scale (which they did 
not name, but which will be referred to hereafter as the Markova and Berrios 
Insight Scale, MBIS) based on a broad definition of insight as a form of self- 
awareness which an individual has about their illness and how this affects their 
ability to function in the world. This scale has recently been revised to make the 
items easier to understand and score, as well as to remove those items which 
focussed on views about treatment (MBIS-R, Markova et al., 2003). Factor analysis 
of the MBIS-R yielded 4 factors, although these are not named and no specific 
relationships between factor scores and clinical variables are reported. The extent 
to which answers reflect a lack of insight or the absence of a particular symptom is 
questionable, as the same 30 questions (in the case of the MBIS-R) are put to all 
respondents regardless of their symptoms. For example, a negative answer to item 
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14 '1 find it difficult to be at ease with people I know' may reflect a lack of insight, 
or simply the fact that the respondent does not have that particular experience. 
Neither the MBIS nor the MBIS-R has been widely used in research into insight in 
schizophrenia. 
2.2.5 - Choosing a multi-dimensional insight scale 
Each of the insight scales described above has strengths and weaknesses. It is 
therefore necessary to select an instrument that will answer the specific questions 
posed by any given study (Amador et al., 1997). One major difference between the 
scales is obviously the dimensions that each measures (see Table 2.2). The 
reliability and validity of each scale is an important consideration, as is the time 
taken to administer the scale. The number of scores which each scale produces also 
needs to be considered, as a large number of scores can lead to multiple 
comparisons problems if the analyses are not hypothesis driven. 
A further difference between scales is the timeframe within which they evaluate 
components of insight. Most scales examine insight in relation to current clinical 
features, while the SUMD (but not the SUMD-A) also examines 'retrospective' 
insight. None of the currently available insight scales produce sub-scales for 
prospective insight (e. g. if I heard voices in the future, they would be caused by a 
mental illness). 
As well as the characteristics of the scales themselves, it is also important to 
consider how frequently a scale has previously been used, as this has a major 
impact on how many previous studies it can be directly related to. It is particularly 
important to begin with instruments that have already detected the types of 
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2.2.6 - Cognitive insight 
Beck and colleagues (2004a; 2004b) distinguish between two aspects of insight in 
psychiatric illness: 'clinical insight' and 'cognitive insight'. Clinical insight refers to 
the awareness of illness and its need for treatment (which are measured by most of 
the scales above), while cognitive insight encompasses the evaluation and 
correction of distorted beliefs and misinterpretations. They contend that a crucial 
cognitive problem in the psychoses (including schizophrenia) is that individuals are 
unable to distance themselves from their cognitive distortions (e. g. 'there is a 
conspiracy against me"), and are also impervious to corrective feedback. The lack of 
cognitive insight in such individuals contributes to both the impairment of clinical 
insight, and the development of delusions (Beck & Warman, 2004a). In contrast, 
individuals with panic disorder or obsessive-compulsive disorder, on the whole, 
have good cognitive insight as they retain the ability to recognise that conclusions 
they have made were incorrect. 
The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS, Beck et al., 2004b, see appendix 2.3) was 
developed in order to measure the components of cognitive insight, and has two 
sub-scales, self-reflectiveness and self-certainty, in addition to a composite index 
(self- reflectiveness score minus self-certainty score). Lower scores on the self- 
certainty dimension and higher scores on both self- reflectiveness dimension and the 
composite index indicate greater cognitive insight (see also section 5.4.3.1). This 
two-factor structure, initially derived in inpatients, has been replicated in a 
population of older outpatients with schizophrenia (Pedrelli et al., 2004). Unlike 
clinical insight, cognitive insight is not based on the medical model of 
schizophrenia, which Beck-Sander (1998) has criticised for assuming that there is a 
"right way" and a "wrong way" to view mental illness. 
2.3 - Associations between different measures of insight 
Table 2.2 summarises the measures of insight in schizophrenia that have been 
described earlier. With the exception of the BIS, which is based on David's three 
insight dimensions (also measured by the SAI), additional insight scales have been 
created because their authors believe that they capture important aspects of their 
particular conceptual isation of insight, which are not measured by existing scales. 
Despite these subtly different conceptualisations of insight, the total scores of 
different insight scale have been found, on the whole, to correlate significantly, 
endorsing a degree of inter-scale reliability. Table 2.3 details the associations which 
have been found between different insight scales. As this table shows, the 
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magnitude of most of these correlations is above 0.5, with the exception of some of 
the correlations with the MBIS and BCIS scales. This suggests that the MBIS and 
BCIS scales may be measuring something conceptually different to that measured 
by other insight scales. However, the MBIS scales have not yet been widely used in 
research (e. g. see table 3.1), and the BCIS does not aim to measure the same 
construct as "clinical' insight scales (see section 2.2.6). 
2.4 - Prevalence of poor insight in schizophrenia 
There has been substantial variation in the proportion of individuals with 
schizophrenia who are reported to "lack insight'. The range is large, from a low of 
11% (Foldemo et al., 2004) to a high of 89% (Wilson et al., 1986). A number of 
factors contribute to this variation. The use of different instruments to measure 
insight is undoubtedly an important variable. With a number of older insight scales, 
the poor definition of anchor points (e. g. what constitutes "partial insight) is also an 
issue. When continuous scales are used, the choice of which score constitutes the 
threshold of 'poor insight' is obviously important. For example, Goldberg and 
colleagues (Goldberg et al., 2001) defined a score of 3 or more on the PANSS G12 
item as representing poor insight, while a number of other studies (Lysaker & Bell, 
1994b; Lysaker et al., 1998a; Dickerson et al., 1997) have used the criterion of a 
score of 4 or more. Studies can be most meaningfully compared when they contrast 
the level of insight of their participant group with the level of insight obtained in 
other studies which have used the same measure. Given that different insight 
scales measure different aspects of insight, one cannot conclude that a score of Y 
on one scale is equivalent to a score of 'y' on another scale. 
2.4.1 - Is insight poorer in schizophrenia than other psychiatric disorders? 
Schizophrenia is not the only disorder in which individuals' insight is less than 
perfect. Poor insight cuts across all diagnoses, both psychiatric and medical 
(Ghaemi, 1997). However, there is some evidence that schizophrenia is one of two 
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Using the SUMD-A, Amador and colleagues (1994) compared insight in individuals 
with schizophrenia to people with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar affective 
disorder, psychotic depression and non-psychotic depression. All of these 
participants were acutely ill at the time of assessment. They found that individuals 
with schizophrenia had significantly lower awareness of having a mental disorder 
than all groups except for bipolar affective disorder. Using the older ITAQ measure, 
Weiler and colleagues (2000) found that individuals with schizophrenia had 
significantly poorer insight than people with non-psychotic depression. However, no 
significant differences were found between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, 
schizoaffective disorder or 'other psychoses". 
A further study (Pini et al., 2001) used the full SUMD to measure insight in 
individuals with schizophrenia, schizo-affective disorder, bipolar affective disorder 
and unipolar depression. They found that awareness of symptoms was lower in 
individuals with schizophrenia than those with either schizoaffective disorder or 
psychotic depression. However, in contrast to Amador et al. (1994) awareness of 
mental disorder did not differ between any of the groups. This finding was 
replicated in a later study (Pini et al., 2004) for current awareness of illness. 
Retrospective awareness of illness was, however, lower in the schizophrenia group 
compared to bipolar disorder, but did not differ from a group of individuals with 
schizoaffective disorder. 
These findings suggest that insight is poorest in schizophrenia and bipolar affective 
disorder. However, it is currently unclear in which dimensions of insight these 
diagnoses differ most from schizoaffective disorder, psychotic depression and non- 
psychotic depression. 
2.5 - Insight and psychopathology 
A number of studies have investigated whether there is a relationship between 
insight and severity of the symptoms of schizophrenia. These studies have yielded 
inconsistent results. In a recent meta-analysis of 40 studies, Mintz and colleagues 
(2003) examined the relationship between insight and positive, negative, global 
and depressive symptom domains. They found a significant but modest negative 
relationship between insight and the positive, negative and global symptom 
domains, suggesting that poorer insight is associated with more severe 
symptornatology. However, the amount of insight variance accounted for by 
severity of symptomatology was small at 3-7%. A moderator analysis carried out as 
part of Mintz and colleagues" (2003) meta-analysis suggested that admission status 
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was significantly associated with the size of the relationship found between insight 
and positive symptoms. This suggests that the relationship between these variables 
is higher during acute episodes, but is less marked when individuals are in 
remission. It may therefore be more important to consider the influence of 
symptom variables on insight in acutely ill inpatients than stable outpatient 
samples. 
2.6 - The importance of insight 
Insight in schizophrenia is considered to be an important clinical and research 
target for a number of reasons. Poor insight has frequently been linked to low 
compliance with medication in individuals with schizophrenia (Cuffel et al., 1996; 
Fenton et al., 1997; Agarwal et al., 1998; Novak-Grubic & Tavcar, 2002; Yen et al., 
2005). Poor insight is also consistently associated with lower compliance in large- 
scale reviews of multiple risk factors (Lacro et al., 2002; Perkins, 2002). The 
relationship between insight and medication compliance is important because of the 
strong link between non-compliance with medication and relapse (Thieda et al., 
2003). 
Insight has also been found to correlate directly with measures of functional 
outcome. Smith and colleagues (1999) found that current awareness of symptoms 
was significantly correlated with communication skills, while McEvoy and colleagues 
(1989b) found that patients with low insight were significantly more likely to be re- 
admitted to hospital over the course of a 2-3 year follow-up period. Poor insight has 
also been associated with lower scores on both the 'global assessment of 
functioning scale' (GAF) scores, and the 'functional skills rating form, a measure of 
psychosocial skills (Schwartz et al., 1997). This study also showed that good insight 
predicts greater improvement of psychosocial skills over time. Another study found 
that increases in insight over time were correlated with improvement in global 
clinical impression scores (Gharabawi et al., 2006). The link between insight and 
functional outcome has led to the promotion of insight being viewed as an 
important target for treatment (McGorry & McConville, 1999). 
Insight is one of the many factors that can influence the quality of the relationship 
between patients and clinicians. Poor insight can create problems for therapeutic 
relationships, particularly if it prevents the patient and their clinical team from 
agreeing on what constitutes the targets for treatment (Kemp et al., 1997). 
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2.7 - Summary 
There is an emerging consensus that insight in schizophrenia is a multidimensional 
construct. However, there is considerable disagreement regarding what these 
dimension are, how many dimensions there are, and how they should be measured. 
There are a number of scales available to measure insight in schizophrenia, each of 
which operationalises a different definition of insight. These differences will be 
important when considering the aetiology of insight in the next chapter. 
Schizophrenia is not the only psychiatric disorder in which insight is impaired. 
However, there is evidence that it is one of two disorders in which it is most 
impaired (the other being bipolar disorder). There is considerable variation in the 
proportion of individuals with schizophrenia who are found to lack insight across 
studies. Insight is an important predictor of outcome in schizophrenia and is 
therefore an important area for study. Little of the variation in insight can be 
explained by severity of symptoms. It therefore appears that poor insight is not 
simply a manifestation of greater severity of illness, suggesting that other 
aetiological factors are at play. 
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CHAPTER 3: AETIOLOGICAL MODELS OF POOR INSIGHT IN 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 
3.1 - Introduction 
The last fifteen years have seen an explosion in the volume of research on insight 
in schizophrenia. This has spawned a number of theories which attempt to explain 
the aetiology of poor insight in schizophrenia. It has been noted previously (Carroll 
et al., 1999; Laroi et al., 2000) that three such aetiological models dominate the 
current literature: the clinical model, the neuropsychological model, and the denial 
/ defensiveness model. However, these models have not, in general, been 
formalised, and exactly what is meant by 'the neuropsychological model' is unclear. 
The term "kinds' of aetiological model will therefore be used in this chapter to 
provide a heuristic framework for the evaluation of research findings on insight in 
schizophrenia. The first kind, 'clinical models', view poor insight either as a primary 
symptom of a disease process in its own right (Cuesta & Peralta, 1994), or propose 
it to be related to how a particular symptom is formed (Markova & Berrios, 1995). 
The second kind, the 'neuropsychological model' (Lysaker et al., 1994b), proposes 
poor insight to be the product of deficits in neurocognition that are secondary to 
brain deficits. The third kind, the 'psychological denial model' (Moore et al., 1999), 
contends that poor insight reflects the use of denial as a coping strategy in an 
attempt to protect against the distress which acceptance of the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia would cause. 
A fourth kind of model, the 'social model' (White et al., 2000; Johnson & Orrell, 
1995), has also been proposed, although it is seldom referred to in the literature. 
This theory suggests that the level of insight that an individual is rated as 
possessing is largely determined by the social context in which it is rated. 
3.2 - Clinical models of poor insight in schizophrenia 
Two clinical models of poor insight and psychosis have been proposed (Cuesta et 
al., 1994; Markova et al., 1995). These models offer very different explanations of 
poor insight in schizophrenia and are therefore presented separately. 
64 
3.2.1 - Cuesta and Peralta's clinical model: poor insight as a primary 
symptom 
Cuesta and Peralta (1994) propose that poor insight arises directly from the 'illness 
process' of schizophrenia. Poor insight could thus be considered, in the terminology 
of Bleuler (1911/1983), to be a "primary' or 'basic' symptom (see section 1.2). 
Primary symptoms such as 'loosening of associations' are held to arise directly from 
the 'disease process' itself, whereas 'secondary' symptoms involve reactions to 
internal or external processes. For example, the content of hallucinations and 
delusions can only be understood in terms of external events and are therefore 
considered to be secondary symptoms (Bleuler, 1911/1983). Cuesta and Peralta 
contend that the 'independence' of insight from both positive and negative 
symptoms of schizophrenia supports its status as a 'primary symptom'. 
Indeed, there are several studies showing no relationship between insight and 
symptom levels (Keshavan et al., 2004). Even in those studies showing moderate 
correlations between symptoms (positive, negative or both) and insight, only 3-7% 
of variance in total insight scores (across a variety of measures) seems to be 
accounted for by symptom measures (meta-analytic review, Mintz et al., 2003, see 
section 2.5). 
The lack of a strong relationship between psychotic symptoms and insight, although 
taken as the main support for the Cuesta and Peralta's clinical hypothesis, does not 
mean that insight is 'independent' of the presence of other psychotic symptoms. 
One dimension of insight involves awareness of current symptoms, so one cannot 
possess this aspect of insight when symptoms are in remission (Markova & Berrios, 
2001), and this aspect of insight must therefore be dependent on the presence of 
current symptoms rather than being independent of them. Such individuals can, 
however, be rated on insight into past symptoms. Furthermore, it remains possible 
that 'poor insight' could be both weakly related to the presence of other psychotic 
symptoms and caused by factors other than 'the disease process itself'. Indeed, 
both the neuropsychological model and the psychological denial model offer 
explanations for poor insight which are consistent with the lack of correlation 
between insight and symptornatology. This is incompatible with the view that poor 
insight is a 'primary' Bleulerian symptom of schizophrenia, since both models view 
poor insight as secondary to a cognitive deficit, and coping style, respectively. 
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3.2.2 - Markova and Berrios's clinical model: a lack of 'insight taggingr 
Markova and Berrios (1995) conceptualise insight in relation to symptoms as being 
constructed in a hierarchy of three levels. The higher the level in this functional 
hierarchy, the greater the amount of information incorporated and the more 
developed the 'version' of insight becomes (see figure 2.1). At the first (and lowest) 
level, unusual but 'formless' experiences that are caused by pathological 'brain 
signals', are 'echoed' in a parallel system where the emotional and cognitive 
registration of the experience takes place. This echoed information is then judged 
against templates of past experiences along a continuum from a perfect match to a 
complete mismatch. If it reaches the threshold on this continuum for a match, it is 
judged to be normal. If it is below this threshold, this experience is 'insight tagged'. 
That is to say, the individual becomes aware that the formless experience is 
unusual, but does not mean that they are consciously aware that it is a symptom. 
FIGURE 2.1: Markova and Berrios's clinical model of insight 
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At the second level of insight construction, experiences which are recognised as 
being unusual are subjected to 'secondary elaborations' of emotional and cognitive 
registration. At this level, the individual may become consciously aware that their 
unusual experience is a symptom. The third and highest level of insight structure 
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involves the judgement of the symptom in terms of its impact on the individual, at 
which point individual factors such as intelligence, culture and attitudes come into 
play. 
Markova and Berrios (1995) contend that some symptoms, such as thought 
disorder, may bypass all levels of insight construction as they are not directly 
'experienced' (in the sense that they do not become 'formless experiences). Their 
construction as 'symptoms' is instead held to rely on the judgement of the clinician 
based on his/her experience of the speech and behaviour of the individual with 
schizophrenia. In terms of insight into 'the disease as a whole', Markova and 
Berrios (1995) suggest that it involves factors similar to those that determine 
insight in relation to symptoms. They do not, however, specify a model for such 
processes. 
The lack of specification of the mechanisms involved in '*insight construction' makes 
it difficult to generate hypotheses which would either support or falsify Markova and 
Berrios's model. For example, factors including 'attitudes and intelligence' are 
hypothesised to come into play in the third level of the model, but the mechanisms 
by which these factors could contribute to an individual's level of insight are not 
specified. The utility of this model in guiding future research regarding insight into 
symptoms is therefore limited. Furthermore, the model only addresses insight in 
relation to symptoms and does not specify the processes involved in awareness of 
illness, widely acknowledged to be an important aspect of insight in schizophrenia. 
This further reduces the utility of the model. 
3.2.3 - Evaluation of clinical models of insight in schizophrenia 
Clinical models, as described by Cuesta and Peralta (1994) and Markova and 
Berrios (1995), fail to account for poor insight in schizophrenia. They offer few 
testable hypotheses and thus are of little clinical or research utility. However, it 
remains possible that there are important relationships between specific symptoms 
and insight that are lost when symptoms are combined into broad categories 
(positive / negative), such as grandiosity and thought disorder. 
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3.3 - The neuropsychological model of poor insight 
3.3.1 - Anosognosia as an analogy for poor insight 
Apparent similarities between awareness deficits in neurological disorders and poor 
insight in schizophrenia have led to the suggestion that they have a similar 
neurological basis. Anosognosia, first described by Babinski (1914) in relation to 
unawareness of left-side herniplegia (paralysis affecting one side of the body), 
refers to the unawareness of deficits in individuals with organic neurological 
disorders. For example, individuals may maintain that there is nothing wrong with a 
limb that is paralysed in the face of direct evidence to the contrary. Impaired 
awareness of such deficits is sometimes domain specific; a patient may, for 
example, be aware of a motor deficit but not a visual field defect, or vice-versa 
(Marcel et al., 2004). The parallels with impaired insight in schizophrenia have led 
to the suggestion that it too may have a neurological basis (Amador et al., 1991; 
McGlynn & Schacter, 1997), specifically that it reflects cognitive impairment, 
secondary to brain abnormalities (Young et al., 1993; Lysaker et al., 1994b). This 
hypothesis has primarily been investigated by examining the correlations between 
measures of insight and performance on neuropsychological tests that index 
different domains of cognition. More recently, relationships with brain measures 
have been examined directly. 
3.3.2 - Neuropsychological studies of poor insight 
Fifty-one studies investigating the relationship between insight and 
neuropsychological test performance were identified from a review of the literature, 
of which 50 are presented in Table 3.1. One study (McCabe et al., 2002), could not 
be meaningfully described by standard cognitive domains, and was therefore not 
included in the table. The criterion for a positive relationship between insight and a 
dependent variable in each reviewed study was that the variable must show an 
association with at least one insight dimension or the total insight score at the 
p<0.05 significance level, either cross-sectionally or longitudinally. In order to 
compare studies, the tests employed were divided into the domains of executive 
function, memory, attention and IQ. 
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TABLE 3.1: Neuropsychological studies of insight in schizophrenia 
Relationship between poorer insight 
and worse scores on tests of: 
First author N 
Insight 
$ IQ 
Executive WCST Memory Attention Verbal 
measure function Fluency 
Chen 31 SAI Yes (2005) 
Lysaker 52 SUMD No No (C) Yes (2005a) 
Goodman 35 SUMD No No (2005) 
Lysaker 96 PANSS G12 Yes p (2005b) (score 4+) 
Subotnik 52 SUMD - Yes X (2005) shortened 
Donohoe 30 BIS (score 8 Yes No Yes No (2005) or lower) 
Koren 30 SUMD Yes No (P, C, 0) (2004) 
Smith 50 SUMD Yes p (2004b) 
Shad HDRS 
insight 
35 item No Yes P (C) (2004) (score 1+) 
Donohoe 38 SAI Yes (2004) 
Nakano 37 SAI No No (P, C, 0) (2004) 
Keshavan 535 PANSS G12 Yes C, 0 Yes No Yes 
(2004) 
Mintz 180 PANSS 
G12 No No No No 
(2004) (score 4+) 
Freudenreich 122 SUMD No No (P, 0) No No (2004) 




Drake 33 BIS, 
PANSS No Yes 




SADS insight No No (P, C) No No 
(2003) item 
Rossell 78 SAI-E No Yes CI (P) No No No 
(2003) 
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Relationship between poorer insight 
and worse scores on tests of: 
First author N Insight $ IQ 
Executive WCST Memory Attention Verbal measure function Fluency 
Arduini 64 SUMD - No (P, C, 0) (2003) shortened 
Lysaker 132 SUMD - Yes P Yes (2003a) shortened 
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61 ITAQ No 
108 SUMD Yes 
ITAQ, SAI, 
SAI-E, 
33 Markova and No Berrios 
insight scale, 
PANSS G12 
81 PANSS G12 No (score 4+ 
52 PANSS G12 






Yes P, (0) 
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First author N Insight $ measure 
IQ 
Relationship between poorer insight 
and worse scores on tests of: 




(1997) 44 ITAQ Yes 
Startup 
(1996) 26 ITAQ Yes X-*. - Yes X-. *- 
Kemp 
(1996) 74 SAI, SAI-E No Yes No 
McEvoy 
(1996) 32 ITAQ No No (C) No 
MacPherson 64 SAI No (1996) 
Almeida 
(1996) 40 SAI No No No No No 
Cuesta 52 AMDP items No (P C) (1995) 97-99 , 
David 150 PSE item, Yes X No (1995) SAI 
Cuesta 40 AMDP items No No Yes § No (1994) 97-99 
Lysaker 
(1994a) 85 PANSS G12 Yes Yes 
C, 0, 
(P, O) 
Lysaker 92 PANSS G12 Yes Yes P C, (0) (1994b) (score 4+) , 
McEvoy 
(1993) 25 ITAQ No No No 
Young 
(1993) 31 SUMD Yes Yes P, C No 
David 91 SAI Yes (1992) 
$- Where participants were divided into two groups based on insight level, the criterion for insight 
impairment appears in parentheses 
*- Wisconsin Card Sort test: P= perseveration measure, C= categories achieved, 0= other variable; 
non-significant results in parentheses. 
X- Non-linear relationship. 
4- - Part of a factor derived from a factor analysis of multiple cognitive variables. 
§- Association in opposite direction - better memory correlated with poorer insight. 
3.3.2.1 - Executive function 
Most studies of the neuropsychological basis of poor insight have focussed on its 
relationship with tests which purport to measure "executive function', a term used 
as an umbrella for various complex cognitive processes and sub-processes. Defining 
%executive function' remains a highly controversial matter (Godefroy, 2003), yet it 
bears heavily on conclusions that are made about the relationship between this 
domain of cognition and dimensions of insight. It has recently been summarised as 
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'a product of the co-ordinated operation of various processes to accomplish a 
particular goal in a flexible manner' (Funahashi, 2001). 
3.3.2.1.2 - Znsight and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
Despite the obvious complexity of executive function, a single test, the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST, Heaton et al., 1993, see also section 5.3.4.2.3.2) is often 
held to be its defining measure and is by far the most popular test examined in 
relation to insight in schizophrenia (30/51 studies). The impaired performance of 
individuals with frontal brain lesions on the WCST (Milner, 1964) has led many to 
conclude that the WCST is a 'frontal' task, specifically sensitive to damage to this 
area of the cortex, although this is not a universally accepted position (Laws, 1999; 
David, 1992). 
A large number of scores can be derived from the performance of an individual on 
the WCST, and there is considerable variation in which scores are selected for 
analysis across the studies reviewed. In total, 20 different scores were used across 
the 30 studies. Eight studies found worse performance on all WCST scores 
examined to be related to poorer insight, 9 found associations with some scores but 
not others, while 12 found no significant relationships. One study (Lysaker et al., 
2003b) found a non-linear relationship in a k-cluster analysis whereby one group 
made a high number of perseverative errors and displayed poor insight, while two 
further groups made relatively few perseverative errors, with one group displaying 
good insight and the other poor insight. Interestingly, there are no reported 
instances of better WCST scores being related to poorer insight. 
In order to summarise this diverse range of findings in the studies reviewed, three 
groups of WCST scores were used. The first, 'categories achieved', was by far the 
most popular single score reported (20/30 studies). Almost every study (26/30) 
included a score indexing perseveration (including percentages and raw totals of 
perseverative errors and responses). Given that perseveration is held to be the 
most characteristic aspect of the performance of individuals with schizophrenia on 
the WCST (Koren et al., 1998), it was selected as the second group of scores. 
Finally, all remaining WCST scores were assigned to the third category, 'other'. 
Nine out of 20 studies found a relationship between poorer insight and fewer 
categories achieved. Eleven found no significant relationship. Twelve out of 26 
studies found a linear relationship between a score indexing greater perseveration 
and poorer insight, 13 found no significant relationship and one (Lysaker et al., 
2003b) found a non-linear relationship between perseveration and insight. Finally, 
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WCST poorer scores in the 'other' group were found to have a significant 
relationship with poorer insight in three studies, while 10 studies found no 
significant relationships. One study (Lysaker et al., 1994a) found both significant 
and non-significant results for variables in the 'other' group. 
A major difficulty in interpreting these data is that the neuropsychological model of 
poor insight is often referred to, but has never been formally defined. Rather than 
simply establishing whether there are relationships between executive functioning 
measures and measures of insight, a key question is how deficits in executive 
function lead to poor insight in schizophrenia. It has been suggested that a failure 
to detect errors may be particularly important in the apparent unawareness of the 
'incorrectness' of symptoms in individuals with schizophrenia (Laroi et al., 2000). It 
follows that poor insight should show a relationship with perseveration on the 
WCST, as individuals with poor insight would be expected to fail to alter their 
responses in the light of negative feedback. The reviewed studies offer some 
support for a relationship between perseveration on the WCST, although the 
number failing to replicate the relationship is considerable (14 out of 26). 
A number of factors are likely to contribute to the inconsistency with which a 
relationship between insight and perseveration is found. Insight is unlikely to have 
a single aetiology, making the neuropsychological model an incomplete account of 
its determinants. The relationship may only exist in a sub-group of patients, 
although it is unclear what defines this sub-group. Weiler (2000) suggests that it 
may be in individuals whose insight is stably poor that insight neuropsychological 
deficits are related. However, some studies using chronic samples have failed to 
find such a relationship (McCabe et al., 2002). There is also some suggestion that 
the relationship between insight and cognition may be curvilinear rather than linear 
(see further), which may account for some of the inconsistency in findings when 
only linear relationships are examined. Finally, the relationship between insight and 
perseveration may be a subtle one, explaining only a small amount of the variance 
in insight scores, making it difficult to detect, particularly in studies with low 
statistical power. 
3.3.2.1.3 - Znsight and other tests of executive function 
Beyond the WCST, the Trailmaking test (Reitan, 1955; see also section 5.3.4.2.3.2) 
is the next most popular executive functioning test investigated in relation to 
insight in schizophrenia. Five studies (Mintz et al., 2004; Dickerson et al., 1997; 
Kemp & David, 1996; Cuesta et al., 1994; Young et al., 1993) have found no 
relationship between insight and performance on this test. One study (Buckley et 
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al., 2001) found that individuals who were able to complete part B of the 
trailmaking test had better retrospective awareness of illness than those who could 
not. However, the fact that only half of this sample were able to complete the test 
indicates that they had severe cognitive impairment, and may well not be 
representative of the schizophrenia population as a whole. 
Drake and Lewis (2003) found a relationship between a 'perseveration factor' 
derived by combining the number of perseverations on the Frontal Lobe Score Test 
(Ettlin et al., 2000) and the perseverative errors on the Brixton spatial anticipation 
test (Burgess & Shallice, 1996), and insight. This suggests that it may be 
perseverative errors, both on the WCST and on other tests of executive function, 
that are related to insight. Other putative tests of executive function such as the 
Stroop test and Tower of London have seldom been used in studies investigating 
the neuropsychology of insight, although the few studies which have employed 
these tests have found no significant relationships (Marks et al., 2000; Almeida et 
al., 1996). 
3.3.2.2 - Memory 
Beyond executive function, memory is the next most investigated domain in 
relation to insight in schizophrenia. Eighteen studies have examined this 
relationship, with seven finding an association between poorer memory and poorer 
insight (Keshavan et al., 2004; Upthegrove et al., 2002; Voruganti et al., 1997; 
Lysaker et al., 2003a; Chen et al., 2005; Lysaker et al., 2005a; Donohoe et al., 
2005). One study found the unexpected result of better performance on memory 
tasks (immediate verbal and delayed visual) relating to poorer insight (Cuesta et 
al., 1994) and the remaining 10 found no significant relationships. With a little over 
a third of studies finding a relationship between poorer memory and poorer insight, 
this does not appear to be a robust relationship. However, the wide variety of 
memory tests employed across different studies makes it difficult to compare them 
directly and draw firm conclusions. 
3.3.2.3 - Attention 
Only two (Marks et al., 2000; Voruganti et al., 1997) of the 10 studies evaluating 
attention found poor attention to be related to poor insight, while seven found no 
significant relationships and one study (Subotnik et al., 2005) found a number of 
complex non-linear relationships. There does not therefore appear to be a strong 
association between insight and attention. 
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3.3-2.4 - Verbal fiuency 
Two (Mohamed et al., 1999; Keshavan et al., 2004) out of 14 studies found poor 
insight to be related to verbal fluency deficits, one found a non-linear relationship 
(Startup, 1996), and the remaining 11 studies found no significant relationships. 
However, two of these positive results (Startup, 1996; Mohamed et al., 1999) 
relate to measures of verbal fluency that were combined with measures of 
executive function by factor analysis into composite factor scores, making the 
contribution of each cognitive domain to the relationship with insight unclear. The 
lack of association with verbal fluency is of particular relevance to the question of 
whether specific frontal brain deficits are associated with poor insight as the inferior 
frontal lobe is strongly implicated in this function (Fu et al., 2002), whereas there is 
evidence for dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) involvement in WCST 
performance (Ritter et al., 2004). This suggests that dysfunctions in some regions 
of the frontal lobe might be more strongly related to poor insight than others. 
3.3.2.5 - Other neuropsychological tests 
One study (McCabe et al., 2002) found relationships between insight and the 
'Motor' and 'Arithmetic' sub-scales (out of a total of 11 sub-scales) of the Luria 
Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery (which could not be meaningfully described 
by standard cognitive domains and is therefore not included in table 3.1). Recently, 
Goodman and colleagues (2005) found a relationship between SUMD awareness of 
illness and the accuracy of facial emotion recognition (happy vs. sad faces). This 
interesting finding suggests that social cognition may be associated with insight in 
schizophrenia. However, this study included a very large number of multiple 
comparisons (while maintaining ap<0.05 threshold) and the finding requires 
replication. 
3.3.2.6 - General intellectual ability 
An alternative formulation of the relationship between insight and 
neuropsychological measures is that poor insight is related to a broad, generalised 
cognitive deficit (Keshavan et al., 2004), rather than a specific impairment of, for 
example, executive function. IQ tests provide an index of global cognitive function 
and lower scores were found to have a significant linear relationship with poorer 
insight in nine (Young et al., 1998; Lysaker et al., 1994b; Startup, 1997; Lysaker 
et al., 1994a; Young et al., 1993; David et al., 1992; Donohoe et al., 2004; Koren 
et al., 2004; Donohoe et al., 2005) out of 31 studies, with two further studies 
finding trends in this direction (p, --0.05) (Lysaker et al., 2002; Rossell et al., 2003). 
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One study found a non-linear relationship (David et al., 1995) while the remaining 
19 found no significant association. The possibility of a relationship between lower 
IQ and poor insight suggests that relationships between insight and specific 
cognitive domains, when investigated in isolation, could be explained by a 
generalised cognitive deficit. This is of particular importance for WCST studies, as 
performance of individuals with schizophrenia on this test is strongly related to their 
general intellectual ability (Laws, 1999). 
3.3.2.7 - Zs insight associated with specific cognitive domains or general 
intellectual ability? 
One way to address the question of whether insight in schizophrenia is related to a 
specific cognitive deficit (e. g. executive function) or to intellectual ability in general 
is to examine the correlation between insight and the specific cognitive measure 
while controlling for general intellectual ability (e. g. an IQ estimate). A major 
limitation of the literature is that even when both WCST and IQ data are collected, 
IQ is not controlled for in the majority of studies where a relationship between 
WCST performance and insight is found (Rossell et al., 2003; Lysaker et al., 2002; 
Marks et al., 2000; Lysaker et al., 1998a; Young et al., 1998; Young et al., 1993; 
Lysaker et al., 1994a; Shad et al., 2004). Three (Young et al., 1998; Young et al., 
1993; Lysaker et al., 1994a) of these eight studies found a significant relationship 
between lower IQ and poorer insight (two studies found trends in the same 
direction (Lysaker et al., 2002; Rossell et al., 2003), as well as between WCST 
performance and insight. This suggests that the relationships between WCST 
performance and insight may be IQ dependent. Indeed, controlling for IQ in one 
study led to one relationship with a study-specific 'card sorting' factor losing 
significance (Mohamed et al., 1999). Nevertheless, two studies controlling for IQ in 
the analysis of the relationship between WCST performance and insight have found 
the results to be robust (Laroi et al., 2000; Lysaker et al., 1994b), suggesting that 
the relationship may not be due to general cognitive impairment alone. IQ was only 
measured in one of the study reporting a significant association between memory 
and insight (Cuesta et al., 1994), which did not control for IQ in its analysis. 
3.3.2.8 - The analogy with anosognosia and the selection of 
n europsych o logical tests 
Research on the neuropsychological basis of poor insight in schizophrenia has 
focussed heavily on tests which purport to index frontal lobe function. However, 
anosognosia, the supposed neurological analogue of poor insight in schizophrenia, 
has traditionally been associated with lesions in the parietal area of the right 
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hemisphere (McGlynn & Schacter, 1989), although a recent meta-analysis (Pia et 
al., 2004) indicates that anosognosia is equally frequent after damage to the 
frontal, parietal and temporal lobes, when damage occurs to a single cortical area. 
Stuss and Benson (1986) propose that frontal lobe damage is the basis of 
anosognosia, although this is based on the hypothesis that self-awareness relies on 
frontal lobe function, rather than on evidence from individuals with frontal lobe 
damage. The preoccupation with frontal lobe function in the literature on insight in 
schizophrenia may reflect 'frontal lobology' (David, 1992), the notion that almost 
every psychiatric disorder is a manifestation of frontal lobe dysfunction. This 
preoccupation may contribute to the fact that many insight studies do not use test 
batteries that are designed on the basis of clear hypotheses about associations with 
specific neuropsychological dysfunctions (Drake & Lewis, 2003), although there are 
some notable exceptions to this rule (Drake et al., 2003; Koren et al., 2004, see 
section 3.3.2.9). Without a formalised neuropsychological model of poor insight in 
schizophrenia to test, studies examining the relationships between insight and 
cognition have tended to include cognitive tests which have been shown to have 
relationships with insight in previous studies. 
3.3.2.9 - Metacognition and insight 
Koren and colleagues (2004) have developed an adapted version of the WCST to 
test their hypothesis that metacognition, which they define as a person's awareness 
or knowledge of their cognitive abilities, mediates between cognitive deficits and 
the observed phenomenon of poor insight. Participants in their study were asked to 
rate their confidence in each WCST sort they made, and also chose whether each 
sort should count towards their overall performance score. Although this is a pilot 
study with a relatively small sample size (n=30), its results are intriguing. 
Metacognitive scores were found to be much more strongly associated with insight 
than the conventional WCST scores (including categories and perseverative errors). 
However, controlling for IQ reduced the number of significant associations with 
metacognitive variables, suggesting that this association may be partially IQ 
dependent. Controlling for IQ also caused four associations between insight and 
conventional WCST measures to reach significance, although these are not specified 
in detail and were 'in sharp contrast to the study's hypothesis'. Nevertheless, this 
study clearly demonstrates the value of examining what mediates the link between 
insight and cognition, rather than simply asking whether such a link exists. 
Recently, Lysaker and colleagues (2005a) examined the correlations between 
insight and a different measure of metacognition, which examines the degree of 
metacognition present in spoken narrative. They found that better metacognition in 
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the dimension of 'understanding of one's own mind' and 'mastery' of working with 
mental states was associated with better insight (as measured by the SUMD), 
suggesting that insight may be dependent on the ability to reflect on one's own 
thinking within the context of a more 'ecologically valid' exercise, rather than just in 
a lab-based experimental design. 
3.3.3 - Evaluation of neuropsychological studies of insight in schizophrenia 
A large number of studies have investigated whether a neuropsychological deficit is 
associated with poor insight in schizophrenia. However, various methodological 
issues limit the ability of the literature to answer this question. While there is 
considerable evidence that poor insight is associated with poorer WCST scores, 
questions remain about exactly what this relationship means. For example, the 
extent to which this relationship is independent of IQ is unclear. The variation in the 
WCST measures used in different studies also makes it difficult to establish whether 
a specific association exists between perseveration (as opposed to poor WCST 
performance in general) and poor insight. The question of how this specific 
relationship, if it exists, gives rise to poor insight has only very recently begun to be 
addressed (Koren et al., 2004; Drake et al., 2003). The lack of a formalised 
neuropsychological model leaves an explanatory gap between the associations 
found in research studies and the clinical phenomenon of poor insight in 
schizophrenia. 
3.3.4 - The brain basis of insight 
The emergence of neuroirnaging as a research tool has allowed the possible 
relationship between insight and brain structure to be investigated directly, rather 
than by drawing inferences from neuropsychological tests that are held to be 
sensitive to damage to specific brain areas. 
3.3.4.1 - Global structural brain measures and insight 
Two studies have investigated the association between insight (measured with a 
single item) and ventricular enlargement on computed tomography (CT) scans. One 
found a significant association with poorer insight (Takai et al., 1992), while 
another found no relationship (David et al., 1995). Likewise, measures of total 
brain volume have been found to relate to total SUMD score in one study, 
(Flashman et al., 2000), but not to total SAI-E score in another (Rossell et al., 
2003). A further study found cortical atrophy on CT scans to be related to total 
SUMD score (Laroi et al., 2000). These early studies suggest that there may be 
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some relationship between insight and brain measures, although it is difficult to 
establish the specifics of this relationship when the measures of brain employed are 
at such a gross scale. 
3.3.4.2 - Region of interest approaches 
Modern neuroirnaging methods allow more detailed analyses of the relationships 
between specific brain areas and measures of poor insight in schizophrenia, 
including the hypothesis that intact insight relies on the integrity of the frontal lobes 
(Stuss & Benson, 1986; McGlynn et al., 1997). Shad and colleagues (2004) applied 
a 'region of interest' approach to this question by manually tracing the size of the 
DLPFC and hippocampus on both sides of the brain. They found that individuals 
with poor insight (measured using a single item from the Hamilton Depression 
Rating Scale) had significantly smaller right DLPFC volumes compared to those with 
good insight. The volumes of the other brain areas did not differ between the good 
and poor insight groups, and those with poor insight made more perseverative 
errors on the WCST (but did not complete fewer categories). Although this study 
uses a relatively crude categorical measure of insight, its results are consistent with 
an association between insight and a cognitive deficit (perseveration) that is 
mediated by a specific brain alteration (right DLPFC reduction). Recently, the same 
research group (Shad et al., 2006) found that smaller right DLPFC volume was 
correlated with lower current awareness of symptoms (as measured by the SUMD), 
while lower current attribution of symptoms was correlated with larger right medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) volume. However, the sample size in this study was 
small (n = 14), and regions outside of the frontal lobe were not measured. 
Flashman and colleagues (2001) examined the relationships between dimensions of 
insight and the volumes of eight frontal lobe sub-regions, manually traced from 
structural MRI scans. With total intra-cranial volume controlled for in the analysis 
and using the SUMD as the insight measure, lower awareness of mental disorder 
was found to correlate with smaller volumes of the bilateral middle frontal gyrus, 
the right gyrus rectus and the left anterior cingulate gyrus. Lower awareness of 
symptoms was correlated with smaller superior frontal gyrus volume. It thus 
appears that lower scores on specific insight dimensions are associated with 
reductions in the volumes of specific frontal lobe sub-regions. While consistent with 
the view that insight is related to frontal lobe structures, the possibility of 
relationships with non-frontal brain areas was not explored by this study. 
Furthermore, the sample size of this study was small (n=15) and requires 
replication before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
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Interestingly, Flashman and colleagues' preliminary conclusions emphasise the 
possible role of working memory in poor insight, suggesting that the inability to 
hold symptom information in working memory while comparing it with past 
experiences may make it difficult to recognise that a symptom is aberrant. They 
cite evidence of the involvement in working memory of the frontal brain structures 
found to be related to insight in their study and suggest that impairment on the 
WCST is evidence of working memory impairment, rather than the more traditional 
interpretation of an executive functioning deficit. However, working memory was 
not formally tested in this study, and there is little evidence on which to base an 
evaluation of which neuropsychological mechanism (working memory, executive 
function, or both) mediates the relationship between insight and frontal brain 
volumes. 
3.3.4.3 - Voxel-based approaches 
An alternative structural brain analysis approach, voxel-based morphometry (VBM), 
has also shown relationships between specific frontal lobe regions and dimensions 
of insight. This technique is based on automated algorithms which eliminate 
subjectivity in the measurement of brain structures from MRI images, a limitation 
of the 'region of interest' approach (Diwadkar & Keshavan, 2002). Analyses of VBM 
data permit the use of multivariate statistics and are not limited to selective regions 
of interest as the entire brain is covered. The preliminary analysis of Morgan and 
colleagues (2002), using the SAI to measure insight, found low awareness of illness 
to be associated with both grey and white matter reductions in the cingulate gyrus, 
while low symptom recognition was associated with grey matter reductions in the 
cingulate gyrus and inferior frontal areas. Lower global insight scores were 
associated with grey and white matter deficits at the cingulate and increased grey 
matter superior to left insula. A well-controlled regression analysis showed that 
cingulate gyrus deficits explained 36% of the variance in illness awareness and 
20% of variance in symptom recognition. However, the full results of this study 
have yet to be published. Using the uniclimensional PANSS G12 item to measure 
insight, Ha and colleagues (2004) found that poorer insight was associated with 
grey matter reductions in the cingulate gyrus (bilaterally), and an inferior temporal 
region (also bilaterally). These studies highlight the potential that VBM has as a tool 
for understanding the basis of poor insight in schizophrenia. In particular, the 
finding of a relationship between insight and a non-frontal brain region (Ha et al. 
2004) highlights the advantage of full-brain coverage in VBM analyses. 
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3.3.4.4 - Evaluation of neuroimaging studies of insight in schizophrenia 
Neuroimaging provides an alternative methodology for investigating the hypothesis 
that poor insight in schizophrenia has a neurological basis. There is tentative 
evidence to suggest a relationship with frontal lobe structures. An interesting 
question is the extent to which the influence of brain deficits on insight is 'direct', 
rather than via its influence on basic cognitive functions. One is that poor insight 
could be caused by specific cognitive deficits which are secondary to brain deficits 
(Young et al., 1993; Lysaker et al., 1994b). For example, functional MRI evidence 
suggests that the anterior cingulate is involved in error monitoring in healthy 
subjects, and that error-related anterior cingulate activation is reduced in 
individuals with schizophrenia (Carteret al., 2001). Cingulate deficits have been 
found to relate to poor insight (Flashman et al., 2001; Morgan et al., 2002), and 
thus a common brain alteration may underlie both executive functioning deficits 
(involving error monitoring) and poor insight. Flashman and colleagues propose a 
similar hypothesis for a common frontal brain deficit underlying working memory 
deficits and poor insight (Flashman et al., 2001). 
An alternative explanation, commonly adopted in the anosognosia literature 
(Vuilleumier, 2004), is that brain differences may have an influence on insight 
separate to their influence on basic cognitive processes. In such a formulation, poor 
insight in schizophrenia arises directly from differences in brain structure, rather 
than via the involvement of that area in a particular neuropsychological function. 
Although the notion of an 'insight centre' in the brain may be far fetched (David, 
1999a), it is nonetheless possible that the cerebral networks that are necessary for 
intact insight in schizophrenia could be disrupted independently from the networks 
necessary for normal performance on neuropsychological tests. This distinction has 
yet to be investigated empirically, but the multivariate statistical power of VBM, if 
combined with comprehensive assessment of insight and neuropsychological test 
performance, appears to offer a means of doing so. 
3.4 - The psychological denial model of insight in schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is seen by many as a chronic, lifelong, debilitating disorder with little 
chance of recovery. As such, a diagnosis of schizophrenia can be viewed as 
threatening, and it has been hypothesised that some individuals use denial to help 
them to cope with this threat and reduce the amount of distress that it causes. Poor 
insight in schizophrenia may thus reflect the use of a psychological coping 
mechanism in the form of denial of illness (Moore et al., 1999). 
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3.4.1 - Insight and measures of distress 
The psychological denial model predicts that those who deploy denial as a coping 
style will have poorer insight, but will suffer less distress and maintain a greater 
degree of self-esteem. Greater insight should, therefore, be related to greater 
distress in individuals with schizophrenia. Consistent with this model, there is 
considerable evidence from cross sectional studies to suggest that possessing good 
insight in schizophrenia is associated with greater distress. A recent meta-analysis 
has shown a significant but modest relationship between better insight and worse 
depression (Mintz et al., 2003). Insight has also been found to be related to other 
measures of distress including hopelessness (Carroll et al., 2004) and suicidality 
(Schwartz & Smith, 2004). In longitudinal studies, increases in insight are 
associated with worsening measures of distress, including depression (Carroll et al., 
1999), and suicidal ideation (Cunningham Owens et al., 2001). Furthermore, 
insight increases in those who develop post-psychotic depression (PPD) following 
the remission of an acute psychotic episode (Iqbal et al., 2000). Such individuals 
are more likely to feel greater loss, humiliation and entrapment before they become 
depressed than those who do not go on to develop PPD. Schwartz (2001) 
speculates on the direction of causality of these associations by suggesting that a 
linear insight-demoralisation-depression-suicidality syndrome develops in many 
individuals with schizophrenia. In a large prospective study utilising structural 
equation modelling to determine the direction of causality in the relationships 
between insight, depression, paranoia and self-esteem, Drake and colleagues 
(2004) found the likely direction of causation was that increasing insight leads to 
greater depression. This was particularly marked at baseline assessment, when the 
participants were most acutely ill and was not entirely mediated by low self-esteem. 
However, these relationships appeared to reach a 'dynamic equilibrium' quickly, 
and this study found little evidence that insight at baseline determines depression 
at later timepoints. 
3.4.2 - Coping styles and insight 
While consistent with the psychological denial model, evidence for an association 
between greater distress and higher insight does not directly test the hypothesis 
that poor insight is related to the use of denial as a coping style. Recently, studies 
have begun to address this question empirically. Moore and colleagues (1999), 
compared scores on SUMD insight dimensions to scores from the Balanced 
Inventory for Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991). They found an association 
between 'Self-Deceptive Positivity' (the tendency to give self-reports that are 
honest but positively biased) and lower current (but not past) awareness of illness 
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and its consequences. Greater 'Impression Management' (deliberate positive self- 
presentation to an audience) was correlated with lower past (but not current) 
awareness of illness and of social consequences of disorder, as well as with both 
current and past awareness of the effects of medication. Young and colleagues 
(1998) investigated the relationship between insight and the 'denial items' of the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). These items refer to minor 
personal flaws held to be of 'virtually universal proportion, such as '"I gossip a little 
at times". They found that lower endorsement of these items was correlated with 
both lower awareness and poorer attribution of symptoms, as measured by the 
SUMD. 
Using the Ways of Coping Questionnaire, Lysaker and colleagues (2003a) found 
that greater preference for 'escape-avoidance' as a coping style is related to lower 
awareness of the consequences of illness, and that lower awareness of symptoms is 
associated with greater preference for 'positive reappraisal' as a coping style. 
Donohoe and colleagues (2004) recently examined the relationships between 
insight and two different measures of coping, the Multi-dimensional Health Locus of 
Control Questionnaire, and the Coping Resources Inventory. They found that poorer 
insight was related to attributing health outcomes more to chance factors, and less 
to one's own actions. No relationships between insight and the Coping Resources 
Inventory were found. 
The variety of coping measures which have been associated with insight illustrates 
the complexity of the concept that they are attempting to measure. Despite this, 
there is some evidence suggesting an association between poor insight scores and 
coping styles aligned with denial. 
3.4.3 - Evaluation of the psychological denial model 
The evidence for a relationship between better insight and increased distress is 
consistent with the psychological denial model. However, such a relationship is 
equally consistent with the neuropsychological model as having insight into 
schizophrenia may be distressing regardless of the origin of such insight. Testing 
the psychological denial model more directly, there is preliminary evidence for a 
relationship between insight and measures relating to denial, but consensus has yet 
to be reached on how denial is best measured in this context. Complicating this 
matter further, the concept of 'denial' may mean something qualitatively different 
for individuals in remission as there are no current symptoms to deny. 
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3.5 - Integrating the neuropsychological and psychological denial 
models of insight in schizophrenia 
None of the models described thus far offer a full explanation of insight in 
schizophrenia. A more complete understanding may be reached by integrating 
these models, particularly as they are not mutually exclusive. Green and colleagues 
(2000b) contend that executive function interacts with coping style to determine 
insight in schizophrenia. They propose that the first influence on insight is 
neuropsychological (good neuropsychological functioning predicts good insight), 
since some insight, particularly in terms of re-labelling symptoms, appears to 
require a certain level of executive functioning. The second influence is 
psychological, where those individuals who have 'access' to good insight by virtue 
of relatively spared neuropsychological functioning may then use denial to cope 
with their problems, and thus manifest 'poor insight'. Such a formulation predicts 
that those with poor executive function will display poor insight. It is consistent with 
a curvilinear relationship between cognition and insight which was found in a study 
by Startup (1996). Those with impaired cognition displayed moderate insight, while 
those with intact cognition showed either very good or very poor insight. However, 
this is a relatively small study (n=26) which did not measure coping style, and thus 
does not test Green's hypothesis directly. Furthermore, other studies which have 
examined the possibility of a curvilinear relationship have failed to find one (Drake 
et al., 2003; Mohamed et al., 1999; Keshavan et al., 2004). 
Stronger support for this integrated model comes from recent research by Lysaker 
and colleagues (2003b). They conducted a k-cluster analysis of insight, executive 
function and coping style data, and found that a three-cluster (group) solution best 
fitted the data. One group had poor executive function and poor insight (group 1), 
while the other two groups had relatively intact executive function, one showing 
good insight (group 2) and the other poor insight (group 3). Group 3 showed a 
significantly greater preference for endorsement of denial as a coping style than 
group 1. Preference for two other coping styles; positive- rea ppra isa I and escape- 
avoidance, did not differ between clusters. It thus appears that the use of denial 
specifically as a coping style has the potential to make a significant contribution to 
the explanation of the complex relationship between insight and executive function. 
Recently, Subotnik and colleagues (2005) used an analysis technique which had not 
previously be applied to insight research, "classification and regression trees', to 
integrate dimensions of insight (as measured by the SUMD) with two measures of 
attention and three indicators of psychological defensiveness from the MMPI. They 
found that, in patients who were psychotic at the time of assessment, poor insight 
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was generally associated with greater psychological defensiveness, but not with 
neuropsychological functioning. In contrast, poor insight was associated with poor 
performance on the tests of attention in individuals who were not psychotic at the 
time of assessment. These data suggest that the relationship between insight and 
neuropsychological function might be obscured during acute psychosis, and the role 
of psychological defensiveness might be greater during such periods. 
3.5.1 - Evaluation of the integration of neuropsychological and denial 
models 
Currently, the most promising avenue of research involves the integration of the 
neuropsychological and psychological denial models, although this does not 
preclude the involvement of symptom levels in determining insight. Only by 
capturing measures relevant to all three models in a single sample can the question 
of how multiple factors combine and give rise to their level of insight be answered. 
Furthermore, only by applying such a range of measures to different samples of 
individuals with schizophrenia can the question of whether different models are 
relevant to different groups of individuals be addressed. 
3.6 - The social model of poor insight 
A fourth theoretical strand, the 'missing social dimension' (3ohnson et al., 1995) 
has also been proposed. This hypothesises that the greater the social distance 
between the clinician and the individual with schizophrenia, the lower the insight 
rating attributed to that individual by the clinician. However, this hypothesis was 
not supported in a large cross-sectional study (White et al., 2000) once level of 
current symptoms had been controlled for. This model has received little attention 
in the literature and currently has no empirical support. 
3.7 - Challenges faced by studies of insight in psychosis 
Much of the research in this area is struggling to overcome the distance between 
how measures of insight are used in research and modern clinical concepts of 
insight. Both the choice of insight measure and the way in which these data are 
reduced for the purposes of hypothesis testing influence the results that are 
obtained and the conclusions that can be drawn. The multi-dimensionality of 
insight, so prominent in modern clinical descriptions, is either not measured (21 out 
of 51 neuropsychological studies reviewed), or are combined into a total insight 
score for the purposes of the analysis (12 studies: Chen et al., 2005; Donohoe et 
al., 2005; Rossell et al., 2003; Donohoe et al., 2004; Upthegrove et al., 2002; 
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Arduini et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2001; Laroi et al., 2000; Sanz et al., 1998; Collins 
et al., 1997; Macpherson et al., 1996; Almeida et al., 1996). These data are often 
reduced further to 'poor insight' and 'good insight' groups at arbitrary cut-off points 
(8 studies: Donohoe et al., 2005; Mintz et al., 2004; Goldberg et al., 2001; Shad et 
al., 2004; Lysaker et al., 2002; Lysaker et al., 1998a; Dickerson et al., 1997; 
Lysaker et al., 1994b). In one study (Goldberg et al., 2001), the cut-off selected for 
poor insight of 3-or-higher on the PANSS G12 item is at odds with the cut-off point 
selected in other studies using the same measure (all of which use 4-or-higher). 
The use of cut-off scores effectively reduces insight to the dichotomous 
conceptualisation that has been rejected in recent years (David, 1990; Amador et 
al., 1991), albeit measured with sophisticated instruments. This further hampers 
interpretation of the reviewed findings. 
Recent research has begun to address this issue by focussing on the dimensions of 
insight (Lysaker et al., 2003a; Drake et al., 2003; Kemp et al., 1996; Buckley et 
al., 2001; Arduini et al., 2003; Mohamed et al., 1999; Young et al., 1998; Koren et 
al., 2004; Smith et al., 2004b; Freudenreich et al., 2004) rather than composite 
scores. However, the lack of formalised models of insight in schizophrenia continues 
to limit the conclusions that can be drawn. Without such models, only broad 
questions relating to whether relationships exist can be addressed, rather than the 
mechanisms behind why some individuals with schizophrenia manifest poor insight. 
For example, how does a failure of error monitoring lead to poor insight into 
symptoms? The answer to this question requires a model which incorporates how 
the processes necessary for the 'correct' monitoring of symptoms are compromised 
in individuals who display poor insight. Although work has begun to address this 
question (Koren et al., 2004), greater integration of different approaches to the 
basis of poor insight is necessary, both in terms of theoretical models and 
experimental research as it is likely that multiple factors are involved. The work of 
Lysaker and colleagues (2003b) demonstrates that such an integrated approach 
has the potential to explain more of the observed variation in insight than focussing 
on single models of poor insight in isolation. 
3.8 - Summary 
The reviewed data provide little empirical support for the clinical models, in part 
because of their restricted ability to generate testable hypotheses. There is 
considerable support for aspects of the neuropsychological model, in particular a 
relationship between insight and deficits in executive function. However, the extent 
to which this relationship is independent of the general intellectual impairment 
commonly associated with psychotic disorders remains to be ascertained. At an 
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anatomical level, there are preliminary indications that this relationship might 
reflect disturbances of the functions of the DLPFC, anterior cingulate or inferior 
frontal lobes. Recent evidence indicates that the relationship between 
neuropsychological factors and insight might be subject to the modulating 
influences of coping styles relevant to denial. 
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CHAPTER 4: AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This chapter sets out the broad outline of the aims and objectives of the thesis, 
followed by the plan of investigation for the experimental investigations. 
4.1 - Aims and objectives 
The associations between poor insight in schizophrenia and both medication 
compliance and functional outcome, as well as its importance for therapeutic 
relationships (section 2.5) make it an important area of research. The last 15 years 
have seen considerable development in the way that insight is conceptualised and 
measured, with a transition from insight being viewed as an 'all-or-nothing' 
phenomenon, to a multi-dimensional construct (section 2.2). This period has also 
seen an explosion in the quantity of research undertaken examining the correlates 
of poor insight (section 3.1). The findings of this research have informed a number 
of aetiological models of insight in schizophrenia. 
The impairment of cognitive ability has been recognised as a feature of 
schizophrenia since it was first delineated by Kraepelin (section 1.2). These 
impairments have been extensively characterised through the use of standardised 
neuropsychological tests (section 1.7). Numerous studies have shown that 
individuals with schizophrenia have wide-spread cognitive deficits (section 1.7). The 
neuropsychological model suggests that poor insight is caused by either a general 
or a specific neuropsychological impairment, with impaired executive function as 
the main candidate deficit. This model has received support from studies 
demonstrating significant correlations between cognitive impairments and poor 
insight, particularly in the domain of executive function. 
Modern neuroirnaging techniques have revealed widespread structural 
abnormalities in individuals with schizophrenia compared to healthy controls 
(section 1.8). Evidence is emerging that some of these alterations are associated 
with poor insight in schizophrenia, both through region of interest, and voxel-based 
approaches. Psychological factors relating to the use of denial as a coping strategy 
have also been associated with poor insight (section 3.5). 
Despite receiving considerable research interest in recent years, the aetiology of 
poor insight in schizophrenia remains unclear. The majority of studies 
have each 
investigated the contribution of only one aetiological mechanism to poor insight. 
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Recent studies incorporating measures relevant to multiple aetiological mechanisms 
in a single sample suggest that a fuller understanding of poor insight in 
schizophrenia can be reached by integrating aetiological models (section 3.6). 
The main aims of the present investigations are: (i) to investigate the relationship 
between insight in schizophrenia and domains of neuropsychological functioning, 
(ii) to utilise a voxel-based method for the identification of the structural brain 
correlates of poor insight in schizophrenia, (iii) to investigate whether poor insight 
is associated with a particular coping style, and (iv) to integrate these findings and 
examine the unique contribution of each domain of investigation to explaining poor 
insight in schizophrenia. 
4.2 - Plan of investigation 
The thesis contains four experimental investigations: 
Study 1 (Chapter 5): The neuropsychology of insight 
Study 2 (Chapter 6): Insight and structural brain measures 
Study 3 (Chapter 7): Insight, distress and coping style 
Study 4 (Chapter 8): Integrating aetiological models of insight 
A sample of individuals meeting the DSM-IV criteria schizophrenia and 
schizophrenia spectrum disorders was recruited for the investigation of the 
neuropsychological correlates (Study 1) and associations with coping style (Study 
3) of poor insight. A sub-sample of these individuals who underwent a structural 
MRI scan form the sample for the neuroirnaging investigation (Study 2). The 




CHAPTER 5: STUDY 1: THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF INSIGHT 
CHAPTER 6: STUDY 2: INSIGHT AND STRUCTURAL BRAIN 
MEASURES 
CHAPTER 7: STUDY 3: INSIGHT, DISTRESS AND COPING 
STYLE 
CHAPTER 8: STUDY 4: INTEGRATING MODELS OF INSIGHT 
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY 1: THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF INSIGHT 
5.1 - Introduction 
Insight in schizophrenia is widely regarded as a multi-dimensional construct 
incorporating awareness of symptoms, illness and the need for treatment (section 
2.2). Insight is an important predictor of outcome in schizophrenia and is therefore 
an important area for study (section 2.6). There are a number of scales available to 
measure insight in this population, which vary in their mode of collection (self- 
report vs. interview), as well as the dimensions of insight that they assess (section 
2.2). 
The aetiology of insight is a matter of considerable debate, with three models 
dominating the literature. Clinical models of insight (section 3.2) suggest that 
insight either arises directly from the 'illness process' of schizophrenia (Cuesta et 
al., 1994), or as part of the formation of symptoms (Markova et al., 1995). The 
psychological denial model (Moore et al., 1999) contends that poor insight in 
schizophrenia arises from the use of denial as a coping style (section 3.4). The third 
model, the neuropsychological model of insight (section 3.1), has proved the most 
popular. Despite the publication of over 50 studies, it remains unclear whether 
'clinical' insight has a neuropsychological basis (section 3.3.2). The development of 
the neuropsychological model of insight has been impeded by the limitations of 
these studies. For example, there has been considerable variation in how both 
insight and neuropsychological functioning have been measured. Some studies 
have used the continuous nature of insight scores in their analyses, while others 
have grouped their participants into 'good insight' and 'bad insight' categories. Such 
an approach effectively discards the continuous and multi-dimensional nature of 
modern insight scales (section 3.7). Furthermore, even when data have been 
collected using a multi-dimensional measure of insight, a number of studies have 
collapsed these dimensional scores into a 'total insight' score (see section 3.7). This 
approach retains the continuous nature of insight, but discards its multi- 
dimensionality. Analysing separate, continuous dimensions of insight minimises the 
distance between research measures and the modern clinical concept of insight in 
schizophrenia. 
Previous studies have investigated the relationships between different domains of 
cognitive functioning and insight. Executive function and general cognitive ability 
have been the most frequently investigated domains, while attention, memory and 
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verbal fluency have been investigated in a smaller number of studies (section 
3.3.2). A relationship between higher general cognitive ability and better insight 
was found in nine of these studies, while a relationship between better executive 
function and better insight was found in over 20 studies. However, different studies 
used different tests to index each of these domains (section 3.3.3). The Wisconsin 
Card Sort Test (WCST) has been the most popular measure of executive functioning 
employed, although studies have differed considerably in the scores they have 
derived from this test and examined in relation to insight. Typically, poorer insight 
was found to be associated with higher levels of perseveration on the WCST 
(section 3.3.2.1.2). However, the extent to which this relationship is specific to 
perseveration (as opposed to poor performance on the task in general), and 
independent of general intellectual ability is unclear (section 3.3.2.7). 
Relationships between insight and other domains have been found less frequently: 
3 out of 10 studies of attention, 7 out of 18 studies of memory, and 2 out of 14 
studies of verbal fluency. Although methodological differences make it difficult to 
draw firm conclusions, there is generally weaker evidence for the involvement of 
these domains in the neuropsychological basis of insight. 
It has been hypothesised that re-labelling of symptoms should show the strongest 
relationship to neuropsychological functioning, because it is less influenced by social 
factors than awareness of illness and awareness of the need for treatment (Drake 
et al., 2003; Rossell et al., 2003). However, there are insufficient data on the 
correlations between dimensions of insight and domains of cognitive functioning on 
which this hypothesis can be evaluated. 
Given that social factors have been hypothesised to play a role in insight, the 
relationship between social cognition and insight may be important. The term social 
cognition refers to aspects of cognition that are not typically assessed by traditional 
measures of neuropsychological functioning but potentially have an independent 
link to social behaviour and social function in schizophrenia (Pinkham et al., 2003). 
Insight in schizophrenia has been found to correlate with both the size of an 
individual's social network (White et al., 2000), social skills (Lysaker et al., 1994a) 
and the quality and frequency of social relationships (McGlashan & Carpenter, Jr., 
1981). Taken together, these observations indicate a possible link between social 
cognition and insight in schizophrenia. 
One of the most widely studied areas of social cognition in schizophrenia is facial 
affect recognition. Individuals with schizophrenia show deficient recognition of facial 
emotions (reviews, Edwards et al., 2001; Mandal et al., 1998). This deficit is 
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thought to be related to dysfunctional fronto-limbic connections (Gur et al., 2002; 
Taylor et al., 2002) and has been found to correlate with social functioning in 
outpatients with schizophrenia (Ihnen et al., 1998). Recent data suggest a 
relationship between facial emotion perception and insight in schizophrenia 
(Goodman et al., 2005). Social cognition therefore appears to be a promising 
avenue for expanding research on the neuropsychology of insight. 
While most research has investigated linear associations between insight and 
cognitive ability, some studies have suggested that the relationship may be 
curvilinear, with high cognitive ability associated with both the high and the low 
extremes of insight (section 3.5). Such data are consistent with the hypothesis of 
Green and colleagues (2000b) that neuropsychological functioning can interact with 
coping style to determine insight in schizophrenia. They propose that the first 
influence on insight is neuropsychological (good neuropsychological functioning 
predicts good insight), since insight appears to require a certain level of 
neuropsychological functioning. The second influence is psychological, where those 
individuals who have 'access' to good insight by virtue of intact neuropsychological 
functioning may adopt a coping style (such as denial) which maintains positive self- 
evaluation, and thus manifest poor insight. Combining the neuropsychological 
model with the psychological denial model (see section 3.4) may thus provide a 
more comprehensive explanation of the aetiology of insight than the 
neuropsychological model in isolation (section 3.5). 
Beck and colleagues (2004b; Beck et al., 2004a) developed the concept of 
'cognitive insight', the evaluation and correction of distorted beliefs and 
misinterpretations. They contend that poor cognitive insight, in the form of an 
inability to distance oneself from cognitive distortions (e. g. "there is a conspiracy 
against me') and a resistance to corrective feedback, is a defining cognitive 
problem in schizophrenia. Recent findings also highlight the potential importance of 
cognitive insight as a mediator of response to cognitive behavioural therapy 
(Granholm et al., 2005). To date, however, the neuropsychological correlates of 
cognitive insight remain unexplored. Beck and colleagues' (2004b) distinction 
between 'clinical insight' and 'cognitive insight' will be used throughout the 
experimental investigations of this thesis to distinguish measures of insight that are 
based around the medical model of schizophrenia (clinical insight measures) from 
those primarily concerned with the evaluation and correction of distorted beliefs 
and misinterpretations (cognitive insight). 
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5.2 - Aims and hypotheses 
This investigation sets out to examine the relationships between insight in 
schizophrenia and cognitive functioning across a range of domains. The associations 
between these domains and dimensions of 'clinical' insight scales, as well as with 
cognitive insight will be examined. For associations which have been examined in 
previous research, hypotheses are set out in section 5.2.1. These include 
associations between 'clinical' insight scales and previously investigated domains of 
cognitive functioning. Where no or little previous data exist and the analyses are 
more exploratory, novel hypotheses are set out in section 5.2.2. These include the 
neuropsychological correlates of cognitive insight. 
5.2.1 - Hypotheses replicating previous findings 
Hypothesis 1- Insight and general cognitive ability (IQj 
There will be either a linear relationship between better insight and higher IQ, or a 
curvilinear association between insight and IQ such that high IQ is associated with 
both high insight and low insight (see figure 5.1). 
Hypothesis 2a - Insight and executive function 
There will be either a linear relationship between better insight and higher 
executive function, or a curvilinear relationship between insight and measures of 
executive functioning such that better executive function is associated with both 
high insight and low insight (see figure 5.1). 
Hypothesis 2b - Insight executive functioning and IQ 
Any associations between insight and executive function will be strongest for 
measures which index perseveration. 
Hypothesis 2c - Insight, executive functioning and IQ 
If higher IQ is significantly associated with better insight, controlling for IQ will 
weaken any relationship between executive functioning and insight. 
Hypothesis 3- Insight and verbal fluency, attention and rnerno! 3ý 
There will be no association between insight and other standard cognitive domains 
(i. e. verbal fluency, attention, and memory). 
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5.2.2 -Novel hypotheses 
Hypothesis A- Insight and social cognition 
There will either be a linear or curvilinear association between better insight and 
higher scores on measures of social cognition. 
Hypothesis B- Dimensions of clinical insight and cognitive function 
There will be stronger relationships between measures of cognitive function and the 
awareness of symptoms dimension of insight than with other dimensions of insight 
Hypothesis C - Cognitive insi ght and coq nitive function 
There will be either linear or curvilinear associations between cognitive insight and 
domains of cognitive functioning. 
5.3 - Method 
5.3.1 - Participants 
Healthy participants were recruited from the local community. This included 
participants who had been recruited for previous neuroirnaging studies at the 
Institute of Psychiatry, as well as members of Institute of Psychiatry staff and their 
family and friends. Individuals in the patient group were recruited from the 
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% psychological interventions clinic for outpatients with psychosis' (PICuP clinic) 
which is based at the Maudsley Hospital, London, and from a local Community 
Mental Health Team, with the permission of the team's lead consultant psychiatrist. 
5.3.1.1 - Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
The inclusion criteria for the patient group were: 
i) DSM-IV diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder 
ii) Aged 18-65 
iii) Fluent English speaker 
The exclusion criteria were: 
i) Neurological conditions 
ii) Concomitant diagnosis of drug or alcohol dependence 
The inclusion criteria for healthy volunteers were: 
i) Aged 18-65 
ii) Fluent English speaker 
The exclusion criteria were: 
i) Personal history of mental illness 
ii) Family history of psychosis 
iii) Neurological conditions 
iv) Drug or alcohol abuse 
5.3.1.2 - Sample recruited 
Sixty-five outpatients who met the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994) criteria for a diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and 30 
healthy participants were recruited for this investigation. Diagnoses were 
ascertained by an experienced psychiatrist using the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV Axis I disorders Research Version (SCID-P, Spitzer et al., 1994). All 
participants gave written informed consent prior to taking part in the study, which 
was approved by the joint South London and Maudsley and Institute of Psychiatry 
research ethics committee (extension to study no. 209/02). 
5.3.2 - Demographics characteristics 
The demographic characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, handedness, premorbid 
IQ, and parental socio-economic status) of the two participant groups are shown in 
table 5.1. 
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The National Adult Reading Test - Revised (Nelson & Wilson, 1991) was used to 
assess premorbid general intellectual ability (IQ). Premorbid IQ is defined as the 
level of general intellectual ability which an individual possessed before the onset of 
a disorder, whether it is psychiatric, neurological or the result of an acquired brain 
i nj u ry. 
The patient group was, on average, significantly older than the healthy group 
(mean difference 6.79 years, t (93) = 2.819, p<0.01) mainly due to a number of 
younger patients dropping out of the study. This difference was greater amongst 
the female participants (mean difference = 12.95 years, t (23) = 2.552, p<0.05) 
than the male participants (mean difference = 4.92 years, t (68) = 1.786, ns). 
There was no evidence that the groups differed in terms of parental SES (X21 = 
0.01, p>0.05), but they did differ in terms of ethnicity, with a greater number of 
non-white participants in the patient group (X21 = 13.17, p<0.001). The patient 
group also had a significantly lower premorbid IQ (mean difference = 12.37 points, 
t (88) = 4.606, p<0.001) 
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TABLE 5.1: Participant demographics 
Patients (n=65) Controls (n=30) 
Characteristic 
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Statistics 
[Range] [Range] 
Gender Male / Female 46/19 24/6 
2 0.902 
















































Some cells too 
small for X' 
White 26 24 X21 = 13.173 
Non-white 39 6p<0.001 
Edinburgh 8.78 (2.24) 8.55 (1.31) Tgo 0.026 
Handedness handedness [0.5 - 10.0] [5.5 - 10.0] p 0.600 inventory 
Premorbid IQ NART-R 100.38 
(12.78) 112.75 (9.43) T88 = 4.606 
[71.08 - 120.7] [95.9 - 130.6] p<0.001 
(N=61) (N=30) 
Professional 8 8 
Intermediate 28 10 
Some cells too 
Skilled: non-manual 3 7 small for X2 
Parental SES Skilled: manual 16 3 
Semi-skilled manual 4 1 
Unskilled manual 2 1 
Professional 36 18 21 = 0.01 x intermediate 
p=0.929 
Other 25 12 
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5.3.3 - Clinical characteristics 
Table 5.2 details clinical characteristics of the patients, including the SCID-P 
diagnosis and symptom ratings using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale 
(PANSS, Kay et al., 1987). The PANSS ratings were obtained by the same 
experienced psychiatrist who administered the SCID-P. He was blind to both the 
insight ratings and the neuropsychological test scores. 
TABLE 5.2: Clinical characteristics of the patient sample 
Characteristic N% of total 
Schizophrenia Paranoid 50 76.9% 
Catatonic 1 1.5% 
Disorganised 1 1.5% 
Diagnosis 
Undifferentiated 0 0.0% 
Residual 3 4.6% 
Schizoaffective disorder 6 9.2% 
Missing 4 6.2% 
Atypical antipsychotic 50 76.9% 
Medication Typical antipsychotic 14 21.5% 
Mood stabiliser 7 10.8% 
Mean SD Range 
Positive 16.8 4.9 7- 28 
PANSS Negative 18.3 5.0 7- 32 
symptoms 
General 32.5 6.5 18 -48 
Total 67.6 13.8 20- 108 
5.3.4 - Measures 
5.3.4.1 - Znsight measures 





3. Designed to be administered to individuals with schizophrenia 
Desirable 
1. Extensive published research on neuropsychological correlates 
2. Brief administration time 
Schedule for the Assessment of Insiqht - Exi)anded 
The SAI-E (Kemp et al., 1997, see section 2.2.4.1 and appendix 2.1) meets all 
three of the essential criteria listed in section 5.5.1. The original SAI measures the 
dimensions of re-labelling of unusual mental events as abnormal, awareness of 
illness and recognition of the need for treatment. The SAI-E adds items regarding 
awareness of psychological / emotional changes, awareness that there is something 
wrong, awareness of the negative effects of mental illness, and attribution of 
symptoms to a mental illness. Each item is scored using a set of criteria listed in 
the text of the response form completed by the interviewer. It is not clear from the 
published literature if and how these items should be incorporated into the original 
SAI dimensions, and studies have instead used the total SAI-E score. The SAI-E 
also meets the desirable criteria, having been used in five neuropsychological 
studies (Drake et al., 2003; Rossell et al., 2003; Upthegrove et al., 2002; Sanz et 
al., 1998; Kemp et al., 1996). The SAI, on which the SAI-E is based, has been used 
in a further six neuropsychological studies. The administration time for the SAI-E is 
approximately 10 minutes, considerably briefer than that of the SUMD, the other 
interview-based measure of insight that has been widely used in neuropsychological 
studies, which requires insight into up to 16 symptoms to be rated separately, each 
for current awareness, current attribution, past awareness and past attribution. 
Birchwood Insiaht Scale 
The BIS (Birchwood et al., 1994, see section 2.2.4.1 and appendix 2.2) meets all 
three of the essential criteria. Like the SAI-E, the BIS is based on David"s (1990) 
model of insight and measures the same three core dimensions of insight as the 
original SAI (see above). As all participants in this study were outpatients, item 4 
"'My stay in hospital is necessary " was excluded. The BIS thus comprised seven 
self-report items in this study and has an administration time of approximately two 
minutes. Each item is rated as 'agree, 'disagree' or 'unsure', giving an item score 
of I for unsure, and 0 or 2 for agree and disagree, depending on whether 
agreement with the statement indicates 
counterbalanced for response valence). 
good insight (the items are 
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The selection of two multidimensional insight scales based on David's (1990) model 
of insight caries advantages such as consistency of definition and convergent 
validity, but also the disadvantage that insight dimensions from other models of 
insight (such as retrospective insight from Amador's model) cannot be measured. 
Beck Coqnitive Insight Scale (BCIS) 
The BCIS (Beck et al., 2004b, see section 2.2.6 and appendix 2.3) meets all three 
of the essential criteria. The BCIS is a relatively new scale, and its 
neuropsychological correlates have not yet been explored in the literature. Recent 
data suggest that increases in cognitive insight are correlated with reductions in 
positive symptoms over the course of cognitive behaviour therapy (Granholm et al., 
2005), making the aetiology of cognitive insight an important area for research to 
address. The administration time of the BCIS is approximately three minutes. Each 
of its 15 self-report items are rated by the participant on a4 point scale from '*do 
not agree' to 'agree completely', with each item is scored from 0 to 3 (3 indicating 
complete agreement). The BCIS has two dimensions: self-certainty and self- 
reflectiveness. The self-certainty dimension is calculated as the sum of nine items 
(possible range 0 to 27), and measures decision-making regarding mental 
products: jumping to conclusions, certainty about being right, and resistance to 
correction (Beck et al., 2004b). Greater self-certainty indicates poorer cognitive 
insight (i. e. overconfidence in decision-ma king). The self- reflectiveness dimension 
is calculated as the sum of the remaining six items (possible range 0 to 18) and 
measures the expression of introspection and willingness to acknowledge fallibility 
(Beck et al., 2004b), with higher score indicating better cognitive insight. These 
dimensions were used as the dependent variables for the BCIS. The results for the 
'composite index' (self- reflectiveness minus self-certainty) are not reported because 
the focus of this study was on dimensions of insight, rather than total scores for 
insight scales'. 
PANSS G12 Insiqht Item 
This item has been used as the main measure of insight in a large number of 
neuropsychological studies. However, it is uni-dimensional and therefore does not 
meet this essential criterion. Nevertheless, this item was collected as part of the 
routine clinical assessment in this study and is therefore included to provide a 
rating of insight collected by a researcher blind to the neuropsychological data. The 
PANSS G12 item is scored on a scale of 1 (full insight) to 7 (maximal lack of 
insight) based on the scoring criteria describe in section 2.2.2. These data will be 
used to assess the convergent validity of the other insight measures. 
1 The neuropsychological correlates of the composite index were investigated, but any significant results 
simply reflected the influence of one of the dimensions. 
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5.3.4.2- Neuropsychological tests 
5.3.4.2.1 - Selection criteria 
Cognitive domains were selected based on the following desirability criteria: 
1. To have been investigated previously in relation to insight in schizophrenia. 
2. To be relevant to the neuropsychological mechanisms that have been 
hypothesised to be involved in insight in schizophrenia. 
Individual neuropsychological tests tapping these domains were selected based on 
the following desirability criteria: 
1. Brief administration time 
2. Reliable scoring protocol 
3. Existence of previous studies on individuals with schizophrenia 
4. Standardised on large sample of healthy participants 
5.3.4.2.2 - Selection of cognitive domains 
The cognitive domains selected based on the above criteria were: executive 
function, verbal fluency, sustained attention, memory, and social cognition. The 
relationship between the first four of these domains and insight has been 
investigated by a substantial number of studies (see section 3.3.2). providing the 
opportunity to compare the results for this sample with previous studies (criterion 
1). The relationship between social cognition and insight has only been investigated 
in one recent study (Goodman et al., 2005), which was published while the current 
investigation was in progress. 
In addition to these specific cognitive domains, general intellectual ability was 
selected as an additional neuropsychological measure. The relationship between 
insight and general cognitive ability has been investigated in a number of studies 
(see section 3.3.2.6), meeting criterion 1. The relationships between insight and 
specific neuropsychological domains may reflect an association with general 
intellectual ability rather than with specific cognitive domains (section 3.3.2.7). It is 
therefore essential to have a valid measure of general intellectual ability to test this 
hypothesis. General intellectual ability meets criterion 2 as a domain in and of 
itself. It is also important to measure general intellectual ability because of its 
relevance to whether relationships between insight and specific cognitive domains 
can be explained in terms of general cognitive impairment. 
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5.3.4.2.3 - Selection of neuropsychological tests 
5.3.4.2.3.1 - General intellectual ability 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) 
The WASI (Psychological Corporation, 1999) is designed to be a short test of 
general intellectual ability which, in its two-subtest version, yields a Full Scale IQ 
estimate in approximately 30 minutes. This is considerably quicker than would have 
been possible if the full Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition (WAIS-III, 
Psychological Corporation, 1997) had been administered. The two-subtest version 
of the WASI consists of the Vocabulary sub-test, a measure of verbal IQ, and the 
Matrix Reasoning sub-test, a measure of performance IQ. 
The WASI has been standardised on a large sample of healthy participants, has a 
brief administration time, and has a detailed scoring protocol to facilitate reliable 
scoring. WASI Full Scale IQ scores correlate very highly (r = 0.87 for the two 
subtest version) with the equivalent score on the longer WAIS-III (Psychological 
Corporation, 1999). 
The dependent variable for the WASI will be the full-scale IQ estimate. 
5.3.4.2.3.2 - Executive function 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
The WCST (computerised version, Heaton et al., 1993) assesses the ability to form 
abstract concepts, and flexibility of thinking. The participant is presented with a 
card at the bottom of a computer screen and is asked to match the card to one of 
the four cards at the top of the screen. To complete the test successfully, he or she 
must work out a sorting rule for the cards, which can be categorised by three 
dimensions: shape, colour and number of items on the card. After each attempted 
match, the participant is given feedback whether the decision was right or wrong. 
After 10 consecutive correct matches the sorting category shifts to a different 
dimension. This requires the participant to be flexible in his/her responses by 
abandoning a previously successful sorting rule and learning a new one. The first 
sorting category is colour, which then changes to shape and then to number and 
this sequence is repeated once. The test ends either when six categories have been 
completed, or the maximum of 128 cards have been administered. 
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The WCST requires a number of cognitive processes for a successful performance, 
including the ability to abstract and categorise stimuli, devise a strategy, shift 
mental set in response rule changes, inhibit the repetition of an established (pre- 
potent) response, sustain attention on the task, and remember the outcome of 
previous card selections. The WCST yields several scores, including categories 
completed, total number of errors, perseverative responses/errors, conceptual level 
responses and failures to maintain set. Perseverative errors occur when the 
participant continues to use a strategy which had previously been successful, but 
becomes unsuccessful due to a change in the sorting rule. Such errors therefore 
measure an individual's ability to shift from a previously successful strategy to a 
new Icognitive set' in response to feedback. The number of categories completed, 
perseverative responses and perseverative errors are the measures of WCST 
performance most commonly used in schizophrenia research. Perseverative 
responses / errors have been found to be the most sensitive and specific to the 
nature of executive dysfunction observed in individuals with schizophrenia (Koren 
et al., 1998). 
The percentage of perseverative errors (range 0% - 100%) and categories 
completed (range 0- 6) will therefore be used as dependent variables in this study. 
The percentage of non-perseverative errors (range 0% - 100%) will also be used 
as a dependent variable to distinguish whether any relationships between WCST 
performance and insight are specific to a perseverative response style, or reflect 
poor task performance in general. 
The WCST is by far the most frequently used test of executive function examined in 
relation to insight in schizophrenia (section 3.3.2.1.2). The administration time is 
approximately 20 minutes. Although this is relatively long, the use of the short 
version (64 cards) would have made the scores derived less directly comparable 
with previous research. The computerised version of the test provides reliable 
scoring, and has been standardised on large samples of healthy participants. 
Trail Making Test (TMT[I 
The TIVIT (Reitan, 1955) has two parts, A and B. To complete part A, the participant 
must draw a line to connect circles scattered on an A4 sheet containing the 
numbers from 1 to 25 in ascending order as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
Completing this part successfully depends primarily on psychornotor speed and 
efficiency of visual scanning (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). Part B of the TIVIT also 
requires the participant to join circles scattered on a piece of A4 paper, this time 
alternating between numbers in ascending order from 1 to 13, and letters in 
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alphabetic order from A to L. This part requires executive function in the form of 
metal flexibility, in addition to the abilities involved in part A. The time to complete 
each part is recorded in seconds. The difference score, subtracting the time for Part 
A from Part B, will be used as the dependent variable because it controls for the 
psychornotor speed (Buchanan et al., 1994), isolating the mental flexibility from 
psychornotor slowing, a known side effect of conventional antipsychotics in 
schizophrenia (Palmer & Heaton, 2000). 
The TIVIT is brief to administer (approximately 3 minutes) and has been used in a 
number of studies of insight in schizophrenia (section 3.3.2.1.3). Its scoring is 
straightforward and reliable. 
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (BSAT) 
The BSAT (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) is a test of concept formation in which the 
participant is presented with a sequence of 56 near-identical stimuli, each of which 
has 10 circles, one of which is coloured blue. The participant is instructed to point 
to the expected position of a coloured circle on the next page. The location of this 
coloured circle is determined by one of nine rules based on the previous position of 
the coloured circle. Participants are instructed that the location of the coloured 
circle will follow 'various patterns that come and go without warning'. As well as 
testing the formation of concepts in the identification of rules, the BSAT also 
requires working memory in order to recall the relationships between stimuli that 
have been presented (Lezak et al., 2004). Patients with frontal brain lesions have 
been found to make more errors on the BSAT than those with posterior lesions. 
The administration time for the BSAT is approximately five minutes. The total 
number of errors made is converted into a scaled score (range 1 to 10), which will 
be used as the dependent variable in this investigation. 
Hayling Sentence Completion Test (HSCT) 
The HSCT (Burgess et al., 1997) requires the participant to provide single-word 
completions to sentences, each of which has the last word missing. There are two 
conditions, response initiation (section A) and response suppression (section B). In 
the response initiation condition, participants must produce sensible completions as 
quickly as possible. In the response suppression condition, the participant must 
produce completions that are unrelated to the preceding sentence. 'Related 
completions' are scored as errors of two types: category A errors correspond to 
plausible completions (e. g. 'most cats see very well at ... night') and category 
B 
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errors correspond to completions which are semantically connected to the sentence, 
but are not the most plausible (e. g. 'the dough was put in the hot ... kitchen'). 
The HSCT manual provides a detailed set of criteria for part B errors, facilitating 
reliable scoring. The administration time is brief, with both parts taking a combined 
time of approximately five minutes. The time taken to complete part A, the time 
taken to complete part B, as well as the errors made in part B are converted into a 
scaled score (range 1 to 10) using criteria set out on the response form. This scaled 
score will be used as the dependent variable. 
Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) 
The BADS (Wilson et al., 1996; Wilson et al., 1998) is a neuropsychological test of 
executive functioning comprising six sub-tests: Rule Shift Cards, Action Program 
Test, Temporal 3udgement Test, Key Search Test, Zoo Map Test, and the Modified 
Six Elements. It has been argued that the BADS provides a more ecologically valid 
measure of executive function than more abstract tests such as the WCST (Wilson 
et al., 1998), and is a better predictor of competency in the role functioning of 
individuals with brain damage than standard executive functioning tests (Norris & 
Tate, 2000). It is particularly useful for detecting deficits in individuals whose 
general intellectual function is intact (Evans et al., 1997). 
Rule Shift Cards Test: This simple test examines the participant's ability to respond 
correctly to a rule and to shift from one rule to another. In the first part of the test 
participants are asked to say "Yes" to a red playing cards and "'No" to a black 
playing cards while a deck of 20 cards are turned over one at a time by the 
examiner. In the second part, participants are asked to respond "Yes" if the card 
that has just been turned over is the same colour as the previous card and "No" if it 
is a different colour. Participants must therefore ignore the first rule and 
concentrate on applying a new rule. 
Action Program Test: This test presents participants with a novel, practical task that 
requires the development of a plan of action in order to solve a problem. It differs 
from paper-and-pencil tests in that it requires the physical manipulation of a variety 
of materials such as plastic, water, cork, and wire in order to solve the problem. 
Participants are asked to get a small cork out of a thin transparent tube using the 
materials provided, but without breaking a number of rules which would make 
completing the task much easier (e. g. lifting up the tube with the cork in it). To 
solve the problem, participants must first deduce that the solution is to use the 
water to make the cork float to the top of the tall tube, and then work out how to 
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get the water out of the beaker and into this tube. This involves removing the lid 
with the metal hook, screwing the top onto the small container, filling the small 
container with water from the beaker, pouring it into the tube, and repeating this at 
least once until the cork floats to the top of the tube. There is no time limit for this 
task, but if a participant is unable to progress through any one of the five stages 
then a prompt is given, e. g. removing the lid with the wire hook. 
Key Search Test: Participants are presented with piece of paper with a 10cm square 
drawn in the centre and a small black dot 5cm below the square. They are told to 
imagine that the square is a large field in which they have lost their keys and are 
asked to draw a line, starting on the black dot, to show where they would walk to 
search the field to make absolutely sure that they would find their keys. The search 
pattern drawn is marked according to a number of criteria, with the most effective 
strategy judged to be entering the field in a corner and drawing parallel lines either 
horizontally or vertically, and finishing in a corner. 
Temporal Judgement Test: Participants are asked to estimate how long it takes to 
achieve four separate events. These events are commonplace and may take from a 
few seconds (How long does it take to blow up a party balloon? ) to several years 
(How long do most dogs live for? ). Participants are assured that they are not 
expected to know the exact answer to the four questions, instead they are being 
asked to make a sensible guess. 
Zoo Map Test: Participants are required to show how they would visit a series of 
locations on a map of a zoo. When planning the route certain rules must be obeyed, 
such as starting at the entrance and finishing at the picnic area. There are two trials 
which differ in the instructions given. In both trials, the subject is required to visit 6 
out of 12 possible locations. The first trial places a higher demand on the planning 
abilities of the participant as he/she must plan the order in which the locations will 
be visited in advance in order to minimise rule breaks. In the second trial, the 
participant is simply required to follow the (more explicit) instructions to produce 
an error-free performance. 
Modified Six Elements Test: This test is a simplified version of the original Shallice 
and Burgess (1991) test, and involves participants following instructions to do three 
tasks (dictation, arithmetic, and picture naming), each of which is divided into two 
parts (A and B), making six subtasks (elements) in total. The participant is required 
to attempt at least something from each of the six subtasks within a 10 minute 
period. In addition, participants are not allowed to do the two parts of the same 
task consecutively. 
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Each subtest of the BADS has a relatively brief administration time, and the battery 
as a whole takes approximately 30 minutes to administer. Each subtest has a range 
of scores of 0 to 4. The total score across all subtests (possible range 0 to 24) will 
be used as the dependent variable. 
Stroop Colour-Word Test (Stroo 
The Stroop test (Golden, 1978) consists of three conditions, represented by three 
different cards. On the first card, the 'word' card, the speed of word reading is 
measured: the participant is required to read rows containing three different colour 
words (red, green, and blue) printed in black ink and presented in random order. 
On the second card, the 'colour' card, the participant has to name the colour of the 
ink (red, green, or blue) that rows of four Xs are printed in, providing a measure of 
colour-naming speed. On the third card, the 'colour-word' card, the participant is 
again required to name colour of the ink, but in this condition the colour of the ink 
may not match the text of the words. For example, the word red may be presented 
in blue ink. 'Interference' occurs for such incongruent stimuli. On all three cards, 
the participant is timed for 45 seconds and the number of correct responses is 
counted. All stimuli are presented in a random order and the participant is required 
to name them as quickly as possible. A lower score on the colour-word card, in the 
presence of normal scores on the word and colour card, reflects the interference 
effect (Golden, 1978). 
The Stroop test has a brief administration time (approximately five minutes) and a 
simple scoring method. It has been used in previous studies of the neuropsychology 
of insight (see section 3.3.2.1.3). The dependent variable will be the interference 
score, which is the difference between the score achieved for the colour-word task 
and the time predicted by performance in the colour task and the word task. 
5.3.4.2.3.3 - Memory 
Letter-Number Sequencing Test (LN51 
The LNS (Gold et al.,, 1997) assesses the participant's ability to retain and mentally 
manipulate common verbal stimuli in working memory. The participant is presented 
with verbal strings comprised of randomly ordered numbers and letters. Their task 
is to listen to the string and to repeat it back in a certain order, putting the 
numbers first in ascending order followed by the letters in the alphabetic order. 
Increasingly longer strings are presented starting from two stimuli (one letter, one 
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number, e. g. D6) and finishing with the string of seven stimuli (three numbers and 
four letters, e. g. C7G4Q1S, or four numbers and three letters, e. g. 3T4P7M9). 
Each level of complexity is comprised of 4 different strings, bringing the total 
number of strings to 24. The test is discontinued if the participant fails all four 
trials at a given string length. 
This test has a simple scoring scheme and an administration time of approximately 
five minutes. The total number of strings reproduced correctly (possible range 0 to 
24) will be used as the dependent variable. 
Hoi)kins Verbal Learnina Test (HVLT) 
The HVLT (Shapiro et al., 1999) assesses free recall, an index of declarative 
(explicit) memory. The participant is verbally presented with a list of 12 nouns and 
asked to recall as many as possible (in any order). The list is presented a total of 
three times and the total number of correct responses recorded each time. The task 
also allows testing recognition memory, but the score for recognition was not used 
in the present investigation. The HVLT has an administration time of approximately 
five minutes. The total number of words recalled over the three trials (possible 
range 0 to 36) will be used as the dependent variable. 
5.3.4.2.3.4 - Verbal fiuency 
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT 
The COWAT (Milner, 1975) measures both phonological and semantic fluency using 
letter and category verbal fluency tests respectively. In letter fluency task, the 
participant is asked to produce as many words as possible in 60 seconds starting 
with a particular letter excluding proper nouns, numbers, and the same word with a 
different suffix, and avoiding repetitions. There are three sections, the first for the 
letter F, the second for A and the third for S. In categorical fluency task, the 
participant is asked to produce as many words belonging to three categories: 
animals, fruits and vegetables, avoiding repetitions. 
The administration time for the COWAT is approximately 8 minutes and the scoring 
is relatively straightforward. The correlations between insight and scores on these 
tests have been investigated in a number of previous studies (section 3.3.2.4). The 
dependent variables will be the total number of words produced for the three letters 
as a measure of phonological verbal fluency, and the total number of words 
produced for the three categories as a measure of semantic verbal fluency. 
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5.3.4.2.3.5 - Sustained Attention 
Continuous Performance Test, Identical Pairs Version (CPT-IP) 
The CPT-IP (Cornblatt et al., 1988) is a computerised test requiring the participant 
to identify pairs of identical stimuli within a continuous stream of four-digit 
numbers. These stimuli are presented on a laptop computer screen for 50ms each, 
at a rate of one per second. Participants are asked to hold down the left mouse 
button of the laptop computer continuously throughout the test, lifting the finger up 
quickly and putting it back again when a 'match" is identified. As well as the 'match' 
trials, there are a number of 'catch" in which the stimulus presented is similar to the 
preceding one, but not identical to it (e. g. 3 digits the same). There are 450 
numbers presented overall with 90 'match' trials and 90 'catch' trials. The scoring of 
the CPT-IP is automatic and the administration time relatively brief, at about 8 
minutes. 
Performance on the CPT-IP task is indexed by 'hits' (responses to match trials) and 
false alarms (responses to catch trials). These two scores yield the signal detection 
index 'd'Prime', which represents the signal to noise ratio by measuring sensitivity 
of the participant to discriminate targets from catch trials and will be used as the 
dependent variable. 
5.3.4.2.3.6 - Social cognition 
Emotion PerceDtion Task (EPT) 
The EPT was designed specifically for a study investigating the neuropsychological 
correlates of response to cognitive behavioural therapy for schizophrenia. 
Participants are presented with a series of 62 black-and-white 'Ekman' faces on a 
laptop computer screen depicting one of four emotions: happiness, anger, fear or a 
neutral expression. The face is presented for approximately 3 seconds, then 
disappears and is replaced by four buttons, one for each of the emotions the face 
could have been showing. The participant uses a mouse to move the pointer to the 
option he/she wants to select, and clicks the left mouse button to select it. This 
makes the next face appear, and so on until the end of the test. The faces 
displayed represent the "100%" emotion of that particular facial expression. The 
percentage of correctly identified faces for each of the four emotions (possible 
range 0% to 100%) will be used as the dependent variables. 
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Iowa Gamblinq Task (IGT 
Recent advances in clinical neuroscience indicate that the ventromedial and 
orbitofrontal regions of the prefrontal cortex play an important role in complex 
decision-making (Krawczyk, 2002). Patients with acquired damage to these areas 
exhibit deficits in real-life decision-making, particularly in the domains of social and 
emotional cognition, even when general intellectual function is preserved (Shurman 
et al., 2005). The IGT was developed by Bechara and colleagues (1994) as a 
measure of complex decision making. They found that performance on this task is 
poorer in individuals with damage to the orbitofrontal and ventromedial cortex, who 
may perform normally on other neuropsychological tests despite showing everyday 
deficits in emotional decision -ma king. The IGT will therefore be used in this study 
as a measure of decision-making which is relevant to a potential cause of poor 
social cognition: structural deficits in the orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. This is particularly relevant given that deficits in these areas have been 
associated with poor insight in structural neuroirnaging studies (section 3.3.4). 
In the computerised version of the IGT (Bechara et al., 2000) participants are told 
that they will be selecting cards, one at a time, from four decks (labelled A, B, C 
and D) presented on a laptop computer screen using a mouse. They are informed 
that all cards win money, but some lose money as well as win, that they may 
switch between decks as often as they wish, and that the overall goal of the game 
is to maximise profit on a loan of $2000 of 'play money. Participants are also 
informed that some decks are 'worse' than others, and they can win the game if 
they avoid the 'bad' decks. Every time the participant clicks a deck to pick a card, 
the computer generates a distinct sound (similar to a casino slot machine) and a 
message displays the amount of money the participant had won or lost. Once the 
money has been added or subtracted from the current play money level, there is a 
six second delay and the participant can then select another card. There are 100 
card picks in total. Choosing cards from decks A or B (the 'bad' decks) yields high 
gains, but also high losses (which increase as the task progresses), while choices 
from decks C or D (the 'good" decks) yield smaller gains, but also smaller losses. 
Individuals with schizophrenia have recently been shown to have a distinctive 
pattern of impairment on this task (Shurman et al., 2005). It is therefore a novel 
target for investigating the neuropsychological correlates of insight in schizophrenia 
which complements the inclusion of more established tasks. 
The administration time of the IGT is substantial at approximately 20 minutes, but 
its scoring is automatic. The dependent variables will be: (i) the total number of 
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cards picked from the 'good' decks (C and D) as a measure of overall task 
performance (possible range 0 to 100), and (ii) after dividing the task into five 
blocks of 20 trials, the (C+D)-(A+B) score in the fifth block subtracted from that 
score for the first block (higher scores indicating greater 'emotional learning' 
(Beninger et al., 2003), possible range -40 to 40). 
5.4 - Procedure 
5.4.1 - Neuropsychological tests 
The neuropsychological test battery was administered to all participants (patients 
and healthy participants) in the following order: 
Verbal fluency 







Iowa Gambling Task 
Hayling & Brixton 
Emotion Perception Test 
BADS 
These required approximately three hours for completion, generally divided into two 
or three sittings. Both patients and healthy participants were allowed to take breaks 
as required to ensure optimal performance. These tests formed the majority of a 
battery of tests for a larger project. 
Handedness was assessed using the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory, shortened 
version (Oldfield, 1971) prior to neuropsychological testing. The total number of 
right-handed and left-handed items were scored, and the laterality quotient was 
computed as (total right-total left)/(total right + total left). Laterality quotients 
could therefore range from 1.00 (all items right) to -1.00 (all items left). A 
laterality quotient of greater than . 70 was taken to indicate strong right-hand 
preference. 
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5.4.2 - Insight and clinical measures 
The order in which the insight measures were presented was randomised to control 
for any order effects. An experienced psychiatrist conducted the PANSS and SCID-P 
interviews separately. 
5.5 
- Data analysis methods 
5.5.1 - Preliminary data screening 
Before the associations between insight and neuropsychological variables were 
analysed, each variable was screened for missing values. Each analysis was 
evaluated separately to establish whether parametric statistics could be used. 
5.5.2 - Statistical analyses 
The statistical analyses addressed three questions: (i) whether patients differed 
from controls in their performance on the neuropsychological tests, (ii) whether 
there were linear associations between neuropsychological variables and insight 
measures, and (iii) whether there were curvilinear relationships between insight 
and neuropsychological measures. 
5.5.2.1 - Differences between patients and controls 
The performance of patients and controls was compared using a series of univariate 
analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs). Where variables were heavily skewed in either 
the patient and/or the control group, transformations were applied to render the 
data more normally distributed. A log transformation was applied to negatively 
skewed data, and a square root transformation was applied to positively skewed 
data. Age was entered as a covariate in these analyses as it differed significantly 
between the groups and is well-known to be related to neuropsychological 
functioning (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004). The effect sizes of the between groups 
differences, after controlling for age, were also reported. 
Where a neuropsychological variable remained unacceptably skewed after it had 
been transformed, Mann-Whitney U-tests were used to compare means. The 
criterion for a significant difference in these analyses was set at p<0.05. 
No correction for multiple comparisons was made for these analyses because 
previous data have shown the performance of individuals with schizophrenia to be 
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worse than controls in all the domains of neuropsychological functioning included in 
this study (review, Sharma & Antonova, 2003). 
5.5.2.2 - Linear and curvilinear relationships between insight and 
neuropsychological measures 
Following the methodology set out in Startup (1996), a series of hierarchical linear 
regression analyses were used to investigate the relationships between insight and 
neuropsychological variables, in which each neuropsychological measure was 
treated as the dependent variable, and each insight measure as a predictor 
variable. The insight measure was entered into the regression first to test for a 
linear relationship. The square of the insight score was then entered to test for a 
quadratic curvilinear relationship. In order for the quadratic relationship to be 
considered significant, the introduction of the squared insight term had to 
significantly increase the amount of variance explained by the model (i. e. the R 
change statistic had to be significant at the p<0.05 level), and the overall model 
had to be significant at the p<0.05 level. 
This analysis assumes that the residuals for both the dependent and independent 
variables are normally distributed. In order to establish whether the each analysis 
met this assumption, scatterplots of the regression standardised residuals against 
the stanclardised predicted residuals were inspected in conjunction with Dr Daniel 
Stahl from the Institute of Psychiatry Statistical Advisory Service. A log 
transformation was applied to the neuropsychological variable if it was negatively 
skewed. If it was positively skewed, the values were reflected and a log 
transformation applied. The residual plots were then re-inspected for suitability. If 
there were obvious outliers in the residual plots (either transformed or un- 
transformed), any significant results were re-analysed excluding these outliers. If 
the results of an untransformed analysis were significantly altered by the removal 
of outliers, the data were transformed and re-analysed. 
5.5.2.2.1 - Correction for multiple comparisons 
A large number of statistical tests were planned in this study. This leads to the 
problem of multiple comparisons - the need to apply different criteria for the 
acceptance of a significant difference when a large number of independent tests are 
being applied, compared to when a single test is done. Applying the Bonferroni 
method of adjusting the p value in this situation is likely to be overly conservative 
as the effect sizes of the relationships between insight and neuropsychological 
function are, in general, modest. This increases the likelihood of incorrectly not 
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rejecting the null hypothesis (false-negative / type II errors). An alternative method 
of correcting for multiple comparisons, the False Discovery Rate (FDR, Benjamini & 
Hochberg, 1995) allows the proportion (e. g. 5%) of false rejections of the null 
hypothesis (type I errors) to be controlled for, rather than attempting to control for 
even a single type I error occurring. Controlling for multiple comparisons using FDR 
is accomplished by entering the (uncorrected) p values for a number of tests into 
an algorithm, which then specifies which p values can be 'kept', under the 
assumption that 5% of these retained p values will be type I errors (as is the case 
with using the p<0.05 threshold in a single test). The FDR method thus gives 
greater power to detect significant differences than Bonferroni correction (Dr Daniel 
Stahl, personal communication 2). 
The neuropsychological tests were grouped into batteries according to the 
hypothesis being tested. Linear and curvilinear relationships were treated as 
separate hypotheses. 
There were three such batteries for each insight measure: 
1. Executive function (8 measures: three WCST scores, Stroop, Trails, Hayling, 
Brixton, BADS) 
2. Other standard cognitive domains (5 measures: phonological fluency, 
semantic fluency, CPT d'Prime, Letter-number test, Hopkins verbal learning 
test) 
3. Social cognition (6 measures: two IGT scores, four EPT scores) 
5.6 - Results 
5.6.1 - Preliminary data screening - neuropsychological variables 
Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the neuropsychological variables 
across the two groups. 
There were a number of missing datapoints due to a small number of participants 
withdrawing from the study before all assessments could be completed. In addition, 
one response file for the Iowa Gambling Test was corrupted and could not be 
analysed. The following variables were positively skewed in at least one of the 
groups, and were therefore log-transformed (for both groups) to facilitate the use 
of parametric between-groups statistics: Wisconsin Card Sort Test percentage 
Institute of Psychiatry Statistical Advisory Service 
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perseverative errors, Stroop interference score, Trails B-A score. The Wisconsin 
Card Sort Test categories completed test was negatively skewed in the control 
group, and was therefore square-transformed for the between-groups analyses. 
All four scores for the Emotion Perception Test were negatively skewed. Log 
transformations of these scores were not successful in normalising the distributions. 
Non-parametric statistics were therefore applied to this measure. 
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TABLE 5.3: Descriptive statistics for neuropsychological variables 
N (missing) Mean (SID) Range 
Cognitive measure Controls Patients Controls Patients Controls Patients 










Trails B-A score 
Hayling profile score 
Brixton profile score 
BADS total score 
Verbal Fluency 
Phonological fluency 




CPT d' prime 
Memory 
Letter Number Test 
Hopkins total correct 
Social Cognition 




EPT % neutral 
correct 
EPT % happy correct 
EPT % fear correct 
EPT % anger correct 
26 (4) 62 (3) 118.08 101.42 96- 137 67 - 133 (11.50) (16.17) 
28 (2) 64(1) 9.93 (5.20) 
21.73 
(14.61) 3- 24 5 -68 
28 (2) 64(1) 10.21 (7.84) 
19.78 
(13.27) 1- 38 1 -63 
28 (2) 64 (1) 5.61 (0.99) 
3.55 
(2.40) 2 -6 0 -6 
28 (2) 64 (1) 6.21 (13.28) 
-1.47 
(10.19) -10.1 -46.0 -18.8 -46.8 
27 (3) 64 (1) 32.70 (22.79) 
82.89 
(93.13) -4.2 - 98.9 2.3 -495.4 
29(1) 64(1) 7.14 5.38 4- 18 1-9 (2.56) (1.75) 
29(1) 65 (0) 6.83 5.06 3- 10 1- 10 (1.73) (2.24) 
27 (3) 62 (3) 18.59 15.98 12 - 22 2- 22 (2.53) (3.99) 
30 (0) 64(1) 49.27 36.69 29 - 103 5 -62 (16.15) (11.80) 
30(0) 64(1) 52.4 40.77 25 -89 18 - 75 (13.16) (11.60) 
26(4) 64 (1) 1.69 0" 86 0.5 - 3.5 -0.1 -2.4 (0.79) (0.60) 
30(0) 65 (0) ( 
16.7 12.72 12 - 22 2- 22 2.91) (3.92) 
29(1) 64(1) 27.69 20.45 17-36 8- 32 (4.1) (5.65) 
28 (2) 63 (2) 63.68 (16.84) 
52.56 
(13.87) 23 -95 20-81 
28 (2) 63 (2) 11.57 
4.41 
- 16 -28 -16 -34 (12.8) (11.71) 
28 (2) 63 (2) 
85.76 
(6.29) 
80 , 75 (15.2) 69.4-91.7 
2.8 - 95.5 




(6.06) 78.1 - 100 
71.9 - 100 
28 (2) 63 (2) 
95.42 
(6.58) 
8243 '00) (21. 73.3 - 100 
20- 100 
28 (2) 63 (2) 
88.52 
(9.57) 
77 " 84 (15.06) 56.7 - 
100 23.3 - 100 
WASI -Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
WCST - Wisconsin Card Sort Test 
CPT - Continuous Performance Test 
BADS - Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome 
EPT - Emotion perception task 
IGT - Iowa Gambling Task 
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5.6.2 - Preliminary data screening - insight measures 
All patients completed the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale, the Birchwood insight 
scale, and the Schedule for the Assessment of Insight - Expanded. However, one 
patient declined to complete the Birchwood insight scale questions relating to being 
prescribed medication because she was not prescribed any medication at the time, 
and eight patients did not have any symptoms into which insight could be rated 
(i. e. they were asymptomatic). These values were therefore recorded as missing 
data. 
5.6.3 - Factor analysis of "clinical' insight measures 
The SAI-E and the BIS both aim to measure David's (1990) three dimensions of 
insight: the ability to re-label psychotic symptoms as abnormal, awareness of 
illness, and treatment compliance (later clarified as meaning 'the informed 
acceptance by the patient that his or her symptoms or state is a medical condition 
that requires treatment and that there is a reasonable chance that the treatment 
offered may be of benefit', David et al., 1997). The SAI-E includes items on 
awareness of psychological and emotional changes, awareness that there is 
something wrong, awareness of the negative effects of mental illness, and 
attribution of symptoms to a mental illness, which were not present in the original 
SAL The way in which the items of the SAI-E should be combined into dimensions 
of insight is not clear and only the total score has been used in previous 
investigations of its relationship with neuropsychological variables. A factor analysis 
of the insight items in this study was therefore conducted in order to determine 
how the BIS and SAI-E could best be combined into meaningful dimensional scores. 
The items from the BCIS were not included in this analysis as this scale measures a 
different construct (cognitive insight) to the BIS and SAI-E. 
Data were available on all items of the BIS and SAI-E for 57 participants. Results of 
the factor analysis indicated that the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 




379.81 df = 105, p<0.001), indicating that all correlations tested 
simultaneously were significantly different from zero. 
In the principal components analysis, four factors with an eigenvalue greater than 
one accounted for 64.3% of the total variance were extracted and rotated to an 
orthogonal criterion. The Varimax solution converged in six iterations. Table 5.4 
shows these rotated factor loadings (loadings smaller than 0.5 are not displayed). 
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TABLE 5.4: Loadings for the rotated factor analysis solution for insight items 
Factor 
Insight item 1234 
SAI-E q4 
" How do you explain your condition / disorder 
. 844 illness" 
SAI-E q3 
" Do you think your condition amounts to a 
. 823 mental illness or mental disorder? " 
SAI-E q5 
" Has your condition (use patient's term) led to 
. 735 adverse consequences or problems in your life. 
BIS q8 
"None of the unusual things I experience are 
. 604 due to an illness" 
SAI-E q8 Attribution of symptoms . 577 
BIS q2 "I am mentally well" . 570 
BIS q7 
"If somebody said that I have a nervous or a 
. 551 mental illness then they would be right" 
BIS q5 
"The doctor is right in prescribing medication for 
. 824 me" 
BIS q3 "I do not need medication" . 769 
""Do you think your condition (use patient's 
SAI-E q6 term) or the problem resulting from it needs . 627 treatment? " 
SAI-E q2 
" Do you think this means there is something 
. 825 wrong with you? " 
"Do you think you have been experiencing any 
SAI-E q1 emotional or psychological changes or . 807 difficulties? " 
BIS q6 
"I do not need to be seen by a doctor or 
. 566 psychiatrist" 
BIS ql "Some of my symptoms are made by my mind" . 894 
SAI-E q7 Awareness of symptoms . 613 
SAI-E = Schedule for the Assessment of Insight - Expanded 
BIS = Birchwood Insight Scale 
Individual factor scores were developed based on the factor loadings and were used 
in all subsequent analyses of clinical insight data. For each item, the highest factor 
loading determined inclusion in a factor score. 
Factor 1 included the following four items relating to awareness of illness: 
9 SAI -E item 3 - ""Do you think your condition amounts to a mental illness or 
mental disorder? "' 
e SAI-E item 4- "'How do you explain your disorder" (maximum score for a 
plausible explanation such as family history) 
BIS item 2- "I am mentally well" (reverse scored) 
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BIS item 7- "If somebody said that I have a nervous or a mental illness they 
would be right" 
Three items relating to the attribution of problems in general as well as symptoms 
specifically to a mental illness also loaded on factor 1: 
0 SAI-E item 5- "'Has your nervous / emotional / psychological / psychiatric / 
mental condition (use patient's term) led to adverse consequences or problems 
in your life? " 
9 SAI-E item 8- ""How do you explain ... (hearing voices etc. )? " (maximum score 
given for'Part of my illness) 
BIS item 8- "None of the unusual things I experience are due to an illness" 
(reverse scored) 
Factor score 1, derived from these factor loadings, was therefore named 'awareness 
of and attribution to illness' (AAI) and has a potential range of 0 to 16. 
The following items relating to awareness of the need for treatment, specifically 
medication, loaded on factor 2: 
BIS item 5- "'The doctor is right in prescribing medication for me" 
BIS item 3- '"I do not need medication" (reverse scored) 
SAI-E item 6- "'Do you think your ... condition (use patient's term) or the 
problem resulting from it warrants (needs) treatment? " ("treatment' was, in 
almost every instance, interpreted by the patient being interviewed as meaning 
medication). 
Factor score 2, derived from these factor loadings, was therefore named 
Recognition of the Need for Medication (RNM) and has a potential range of 0 to 6. 
The items loading on factor 3 related to awareness of problems and the need to 
seek help: 
0 SAI-E item 1- "Do you think you have been experiencing any emotional or 
psychological changes or difficulties? " 
0 SAI-E item 2- ""Do you think there is something wrong with you? " 
0 BIS item 6- "I do not need to be seen by a doctor or psychiatrist" (reverse 
scored) 
Factor score 3, derived from these factor loadings, was therefore named Awareness 
of Problems (AP) and has a potential range of 0 to 6. 
Factor 4 comprised items relating to awareness of symptoms: 
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SAI-E item 7- "Rate the awareness of each symptom, e. g. 'do you think the 
voices you hear are actually real people talking, or is it something arising from 
your own mind? " 
BIS item 1- "Some of my symptoms are made by my mind". 
Factor score 4, derived from these factor loadings, was therefore named Symptom 
Re-labelling (SR) and has a potential range of 0 to 6. 
5.6.3.1 - The insight factors derived from factor analysis 
The insight items for all participants were combined according to the loadings 
derived from the factor analysis. All 65 participants had the data necessary for 
deriving the awareness of problems (AP) factor score. One participant declined to 
answer one of the questions relating to the need for medication (see section 5.6.2), 
and so a score for recognition of the need for medication (RNM) could not be 
derived, leaving 64 participants with a score for this factor score. Eight participants 
could not be rated for either the awareness or attribution of symptoms on the SAI-E 
(because they were asymptomatic, see section 5.6.2), preventing scores from 
being derived for the awareness of and attribution to illness (AAI) and symptom re- 
labelling (SR) factors for these patients. Table 5.5 presents the descriptive statistics 
for the insight factors derived from the factor analysis, together with the descriptive 
statistics for the BCIS. 
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics for insight measures 
Clinical insight factors BCIS dimensions 
Self- Self- Composite AAI RNIVI AP SR 
certainty* reflectiveness index 
N 57 64 65 57 65 65 65 
Mean 9.86 4.78 4.38 3.37 7.35 14.12 6.77 
Std. Dev. 4.95 1.69 1.95 1.95 3.83 5.07 7.19 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 1 6 -9 
Maximum 16 6 6 6 16 25 25 
Inter- 
quartile 8 2 3 3 6 8 9 
range 
Skewness -0.56 -1.41 -0.86 -0.31 -0.83 -0.77 -0.30 
AAI - Awareness of and attribution to illness 
RNM - Recognition of the need for medication 
AP - Awareness of problems 
SR - Symptom re-labelling 
BCIS - Beck Cognitive Insight Scale 
Higher scores indicate poorer cognitive insight 
The AAI and SR factor scores met the criteria for the use of parametric statistics. 
Inspection of the histograms for the RNM and AP factors indicated that the data for 
both factors were not normally distributed, with the mode being the maximum 
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score (6), which had a frequency of over three times any of the other scores for 
both factors. Both the RNM and AP factors provided too little variance to examine 
quadratic relationships, even when log transformed. Non-parametric Spearman's 
rho correlations were therefore used to examine the correlations of these factors. 
5.6.4 - Convergent validity of insight measures 
In order to test convergent validity, the clinical insight factor scores were correlated 
with the PANSS G12 insight item. All four sub-scales were significantly correlated 
with the PANSS G12 item (p<0.05). The AAI factor score showed the strongest 
correlation (r = -0.547, p<0.001), closely followed by the RNM factor score (rho = 
-0.503, p<0.001). The AP and SR factor scores showed significant, but slightly 
weaker associations (rho = -0.307, p<0.05) and (r = -0.293, p<0.05) 
respectively. 
The PANSS G12 insight item was significantly correlated with the Beck Cognitive 
Insight Scale dimensions of self-certainty (r = 0.375, p<0.005) and self- 
reflectiveness (r = -0.296, p<0.02), as well as the composite index (r = -. 4061 p 
< 0.001). All correlations were in the expected direction, with higher PANSS G12 
item scores associated with scores indicating poorer cognitive insight. 
5.6.5 - Differences between patients and controls on neuropsychological 
tests 
Between-groups analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs), controlling for age, were used 
to test for differences between patients and controls in neuropsychological function 
(see section 5.5.2.1). 
As expected (see section 1.7), the patients with schizophrenia performed 
significantly worse than controls across almost all cognitive domains (see table 
5.6). One exception was the Stroop test. The mean Stroop interference score was 
lower in the patients than controls, suggesting a greater effect of interference in 
controls compared to patients, although this difference did not reach significance (p 
> 0.05). Analysis of the (log transformed) raw scores showed that the patients 
were significantly slower than the controls (controlling for age) for the 'word card' 
(p < 0.005), the 'colour' card (p <0.001) and the 'colour-word' card (p <0.001). 
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TABLE 5.6: Differences between groups in neuropsychological test scores 
Cognitive measure 
Univariate ANOVA between groups F test based on estimated 
marginal means (controlling for age) 
F df P value Effect Size* 
WASI IQ 24.52 1,86 p<0.001 0.22 
WCST % perseverative 
errors * 
22.99 1,89 p<0.001 0.21 
WCST % non- 
perseverative errors 
9.93 1,89 p=0.002 0.10 
WCST categories A 12.30 1,89 p=0.001 0.12 
Stroop Interference 5.84 1,89 p=0.062 0.06 
Trails B-A time * 9.51 1,88 p=0.003 0.10 
Hayling profile score 9.82 1,90 p=0.002 0.10 
Brixton profile score 8.85 1,91 p=0.004 0.09 
BADS total score 6.42 1,86 p=0.013 0.07 
Phonological fluency 
(FAS total) 14.12 1,91 p<0.001 0.13 
Semantic fluency 
(categories total) 15.23 1,91 p<0.001 0.14 
CPT d'Prime 23.85 1,87 p<0.001 0.22 
Letter-Number test 21.21 1,92 p<0.001 0.19 
Hopkins total 30.71 1,90 p<0.001 0.25 
IGT CID total 7.29 1,88 p=0.008 0.08 
IGT emotional learning 5.08 2,88 p=0.027 0.06 
* Partial Eta squared, ilp 
Log transformed 
Square root transformed 
- Patients performed better than controls 
WASI -Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
WCST - Wisconsin Card Sort Task 
CPT - Continuous Performance Task 
BADS - Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome 
IGT - Iowa Gambling Task 
The scores on Emotion Perception Task were analysed using non-parametric Mann- 
Whitney U-tests (see table 5.7). Patients correctly identified significantly fewer 
fearful and angry faces compared to controls. They also identified fewer 'happy' 
faces correctly, but only at the trend level (p = 0.053). The identification of happy 
faces appeared to suffer from a ceiling effect in the both groups. The mean for the 
correct identification of happy faces in the patient group was 94.69% correct, and 
97.06% in the controls, leaving little variance for a difference in performance to be 
identified. There was no difference between patients and controls in the correct 
identification of neutral faces. 
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TABLE 5.7: Differences between groups in Emotion Perception Test scores 
Non-parametric between-groups 
Mann-Whitney U-tests 
Measure N U z P value 
EPT % neutral correct 91 775.5 -0.925 p=0.355 
EPT % happy correct 91 668.0 -1.934 p=0.053 
EPT % fear correct 91 486.5 -3.456 p=0.001 
EPT % anger correct 91 483.0 -3.442 p=0.001 
EPT - Emotion perception task 
5.6.6 - Regression analyses of clinical insight and neuropsychological 
functioning 
Regression analyses were undertaken for the Awareness of and Attribution to 
Illness (AAI) and Symptom Recognition (SR) clinical insight factors. These analyses 
could not be applied to the Recognition of the Need for Medication (RNM) or the 
Awareness of Problems (AP) factors because of the distribution of the data for these 
factors (see section 5.6.3.1). Parametric analyses could not be applied to the 
Emotion Perception Task due to the distribution of the data (see section 5.6.1). 
5.6.6.1 - Regression analyses for the awareness of and attribution to 
illness factor 
Sixteen regression analyses were computed for the AAI factor, each comprising two 
models: one testing for a linear relationship with the neuropsychological variable, 
and a second testing for a curvilinear relationship (see section 5.5.2.2). Appendices 
5.1 and 5.2 detail the results of these regressions. 
The linear regressions were significant for two variables: the Hayling sentence 
completion task profile score (R 2=0.07, F=4.29, df = 55,1, p<0.05), and the 
(transformed) BADS total score (R 2=0.07, F=4.05, df = 53flf p<0.05). In 
addition, the linear regression for the Brixton spatial anticipation task approached 
significance (R 2=0.07, F=3.86, df = 55,1, p=0.06). All three regressions 
reflected a relationship between higher test scores and better insight. 
In order to determine whether a particular aspect of the Hayling sentence 
completion task was driving the significant relationship between the AAI factor and 
the profile score, a number of exploratory post-hoc correlations were examined. 
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The relationship between AAI factor score and the following components of the 
Hayling profile score were examined: Part A time, Part B time, and Part B raw error 
score. None of these correlations was significant (all p>0.05), indicating that the 
AAI factor score was associated with the combination of these measures rather 
than any in isolation. 
Similarly, in order to examine whether a particular component of the BADS was 
driving the linear relationship with AAI score, the correlations between the six BADS 
profile scores and AAI score were examined. None of these relationships was 
significant (ps > 0.05). 
Three quadratic regressions were significant (i. e. both the change in R2 and the 
overall model were significant at p<0.05) Wisconsin Card Sort Test categories 
completed (R 2 change = 0.09, F=3.50, df 5412, p<0.05), (transformed) BADS 
total score (R 2 change = 0.09, F=5.13, df 5212, p<0.01), and semantic fluency 
(R 2 change = 0.12f F=3.79, df = 55,2, p<0.05). Inspection of scatterplots for 
these relationships (with fitted quadratic curves) indicated that the shape of all 
three relationships was similar to that illustrated in figure 5.1 - i. e. high cognitive 
ability was associated with both high insight and low insight. The quadratic 
regression for phonological fluency approached significance (R 2 change = 0.10, F= 
3.08, df = 55,2, p=0.06), and conformed to the same shape as the quadratic 
regressions that reached significance. 
5.6.6.2 - Regression analyses for the symptom re-labelling factor 
As with the AAI factor, 16 regression analyses were computed for the SR factor, 
each comprising a linear and a quadratic (curvilinear) model (see appendices 5.1 
and 5.2). 
No significant linear relationships were detected in these analyses. A quadratic 
relationship between the SIR factor and the percentage of non-perseverative errors 
on the WCST was found (R 2 change = 0.14, IF = 5.04, df = 54,2, p<0.01), with 
the overall model accounting for 15.7% of the variance. However, inspection of a 
scatterplot with the quadratic relationship fitted indicated that the shape of this 
relationship was the inverse of that hypothesised in figure 5.1 - i. e. high errors 
(low cognitive ability) was associated with both high insight and low insight. 
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5.6.7 - Non-parametric analyses of clinical insight factors and 
neuropsychological functioning 
Non-parametric correlations were used to examine all relationships involving the 
'recognition of the need for medication' and 'awareness of problems' clinical insight 
factors due to their non-normal distribution (see section 5.6.3.1). Additionally, 
relationships between all clinical insight factors and the emotion perception task 
were investigated using non-parametric correlations due to the distribution of data 
for this test (see section 5.6.1). The analyses of the relationships between 
neuropsychological functioning and RNM and AP clinical insight factors are 
summarised in Table 5.8. There were no significant relationships in these data (all 
ps > 0.05). 
The correlations between the Emotion Perception Test scores and all four clinical 
insight factors are summarised in Table 5.9. There was a significant relationship 
between correctly identifying a greater percentage of fearful faces and the AAI 
clinical insight factor (rho = 0.296, p<0.05). The relationship between this EPT 
measure and the SR clinical insight factor also approached significance (r = 0.254, 
p=0.059). In order to examine whether the relationship between the AAI factor 
reflected a particular pattern of the misattribution of fearful faces, non-parametric 
correlations between the AAI factor and the attribution of fearful faces to 'happy', 
"neutral' and 'anger' were analysed post-hoc. None of these relationships was 
significant (ps > 0.05), although the small number of misidentifications for each of 
these emotions may have made it difficult to detect a relationship. 
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TABLE 5-8: Non-parametric correlations between clinical insight factors and 
neuropsychological functioning domains 
Domain Insight factor 
Neuropsychological Recognition of Awareness of 
measure 
the need for problems medication 
General intellectual 
ability 
WASI IQ Spearman's rho . 104 . 034 
n 62 63 
Executive function 
WCST % Spearman's rho . 065 . 084 
perseverative errors n 63 64 
WCST % non- Spearman's rho . 160 . 214 
perseverative errors n 63 64 
WCST categories Spearman's rho -. 144 -. 138 
n 63 64 
Stroop interference Spearman's rho . 112 -. 029 
n 63 64 
Trails B-A score Spearman's rho . 112 -. 093 
n 63 64 
Hayling profile score Spearman's rho . 033 -. 029 
n 63 64 
Brixton profile score Spearman's rho . 090 . 160 
n 64 65 
BADS total score Spearman's rho . 084 . 120 
n 61 62 
Verbal Fluency 
Phonological fluency Spearman's rho -. 061 . 059 
(letters F, A, S) n 63 64 
Semantic fluency Spearman's rho -. 050 -. 015 
(categories) n 63 64 
Sustained attention 
CPT d'Prime Spearman's rho . 059 . 
171 
n 63 64 
Memory 
Letter-number test Spearman's rho -. 132 . 000 
n 64 65 
Hopkins total correct Spearman's rho -. 145 . 088 
n 63 64 
Social cognition 
IGT total picks from Spearman's rho -0.138 0.106 
decks C and D n 62 63 
IGT emotional Spearman's rho -0.145 0.093 
learning n 62 63 
WASI - Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
WCST - Wisconsin Card Sort Task 
BADS - Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome 
CPT-IP - Continuous Performance Task - Identical Pairs version 
IGT - Iowa Gambling Task 
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TABLE 5.9: Non-parametric correlations between clinical insight factors and the 
emotion perception test 














Neutral Spearman's rho 0.146 0.017 -0.081 0.193 
n 56 63 63 56 
Happy Spearman's rho 0.063 0.072 0.131 0.037 
n 56 63 63 56 
Fear Spearman's rho 0.296* 0.112 0.203 0.254 
A 
n 56 63 63 56 
Anger Spearman's rho 0.039 0.014 0.125 0.147 
n 56 63 63 56 
*p<0.05 
Ap=0.06 
5.6.8 - Regression analyses of cognitive insight dimensions and 
neuropsychological functioning 
The relationship between the two cognitive insight dimensions and 
neuropsychological functioning were investigated using two sets of regressions, one 
set examining linear relationships, a nd the other examining curvilinear (quadratic) 
relationships. For each of the BCIS dimensions (self-certainty and self- 
reflectiveness), 16 linear regressions and 16 quadratic regressions were computed. 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 detail the results of these regressi ons. 
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TABLE 5.10: Regression analyses of the BCIS dimensions and the domains of 
general intellectual ability and executive function 
Domain Self-certainty Se If -reflectiveness 




















BADS total score 
R2 change (sig) 0.02 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.03 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 1.15 (ns) 0.60 (ns) 0.06 (ns) 0.81 (ns) 
Model df 61,1 60,2 61,1 60,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 0.07 (ns) 0.32 (ns) 0.66 (ns) 0.44 (ns) 
Model df 62,1 61,2 62,1 61,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.04 (ns) 0.02 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 2.37 (ns) 1.90 (ns) 0.15 (ns) 0.09 (ns) 
Model df 62,1 61,2 62,1 61,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.03 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.02 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 0.00 (ns) 1.09 (ns) 0.67 (ns) 0.48 (ns) 
Model df 62,1 61,2 62,1 61,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.05 (p 0.08) 0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.02 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 3.21 (p 0.08) 1.71 (ns) 0.11 (ns) 0.79 (ns) 
Model df 62,1 61,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.01 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.03 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 0.39 (ns) 0.34 (ns) 0.85 (ns) 1.33 (ns) 
Model df 62,1 61,2 62,1 61,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.05 (p = 0.09) 0.04 (p = 0.10) 0.01 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 2.99 (p = 0.09) 2.96 (p = 0.06) 0.82 (ns) 0.65 (ns) 
Model df 62,1 61,2 62,1 61,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.07 (p < 0.05) 0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.03 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 4.60 (p < 0.05) 2.27 (ns) 0.17 (ns) 0.95 (ns) 
Model df 63,1 62,2 63,1 62,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.13 0.01 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.05 (p = 0.08) (p < 0.005) 
Model F (sig) 8.75 4.74 (p < 0.05) 0.15 (ns) 1.72 (ns) (p < 0.005) 
Model df 60,1 59,2 60,1 59,2 
* Log transformed 
A Data reflected then log transformed 
WASI - Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
WCST - Wisconsin Card Sort Task 
BADS - Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome 
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TABLE 5.11: Regression analyses of the BCJS dimensions and the domains of verbal 
fluency, sustained attention, memory and social cognition 
Domain Self-certainty Self - reflectiveness 
Neuropsychological Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic measure 
Verbal fluency 
Phonological R2 change (sig) 0.01 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.05 (ns) 
fluency (F, A, S) Model F (sig) 0.66 (ns) 0.33 (ns) 0.32 (ns) 1.53 (ns) 
Model df 62,1 61,2 62,1 61,2 
Semantic fluency R2 change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 
(categories) Model F (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.22 (ns) 0.49 (ns) 0.37 (ns) 
Model df 62,1 61,2 62,1 61,2 
Sustained attention 
CPT d'Prime R2 change (sig) 0.03 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.06 (p < 0.05) 
Model F (sig) 2.19 (ns) 1.09 (ns) 0.03 (ns) 2.08 (ns) 
Model df 62,1 61,2 62,1 61,2 
Social cognition 
Iowa Gambling R2 change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.06 (p = 0.06) 0.02 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 
Task total picks Model F (sig) 0.02 (ns) 1.86 (ns) 0.94 (ns) 0.69 (ns) 
from C and D Model df 61,1 60,2 61,1 60,2 
Iowa Gambling R2 change (sig) 0.04 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.05 (P = 0.08) 0.00 (ns) 
Task emotional Model F (sig) 2.28 (ns) 1.19 (ns) 3.18 (p = 0.08) 1.66 (ns) 
learning score Model df 62,1 61,2 61,1 60,2 
Memory 
Letter-number test R2 change (sig) 0.05 (P 0.08) 0.01 (ns) 0.03 (ns) 0.03 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 3.19 (P 0.08) 1.79 (ns) 1.95 (ns) 2.02 (ns) 
Model df 63,1 62.2 63,1 62.2 
Hopkins verbal R2 change (sig) 0.01 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.02 (ns) 
learning test total Model F (sig) 0.85 (ns) 0.44 (ns) 0.10 (ns) 0.59 (ns) 
score Model df 62,1 61,2 62,1 61,2 
* Log transformed 
A Data reflected then log transformed 
CPT - Continuous Performance Test 
5.6.8.1 - Regression analyses for the self-certainty BUS dimension 
The linear regression for the relationship between the Brixton spatial anticipation 
test profile score and the self-certainty scale was significant (R 2=0.07, F=4.60, 
df = 6311, p<0.05), with a beta value indicating a relationship between lower 
scores on this dimension (i. e. less overconfidence in decision-making, which 
indicates higher cognitive insight) and higher Brixton profile score. In order to 
investigate whether poor cognitive insight was specifically associated with a 
particular type of error on the Brixton test, errors were divided according to 
whether they were perseverative or non-perseverative. Perseverative errors were 
defined as any error in the 'current block' which followed the previous spatial 
presentation pattern. For example, if the previous pattern had been 1,2,3,4,5 and 
then switched to 4,3,2,1 for the current block, any error where the participant 
pointed to a dot with a number one higher than the dot on display was marked as a 
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perseverative error. All other errors were marked as non-perseverative. 
Approximately one third of the errors were marked as perseverative by this 
definition. Self-certainty was significantly associated with non-perseverative errors 
(r = 0.364f p<0.005), but not perseverative errors (r = . 007, ns). Defining 
perseverative errors more narrowly (as per Drake et al., 2003) as 'incorrect 
responses in a continuous series clearly continuing a previously correct pattern' led 
to a similar result (r = . 040, ns). 
There was also a significant relationship between self-certainty and the BADS total 
score (R 2=0.13, F=8.75, df = 60,1, p<0.005), again reflecting an association 
between higher cognitive insight and higher BADS total score. Post-hoc correlations 
indicated that the only BADS subtest to show a significant relationship with self- 
certainty was the modified six elements test (r = -0.364, p<0.005). Specifically, it 
was the number of times that the rules were broken (up to a maximum score of 3, 
as per the scoring manual) which were associated with SC score (r = -0.332, p< 
0.01), rather than the number of tasks attempted (r = -0.060, ns). This suggests 
that it was not perseveration on tasks for too long which was associated with high 
self-certainty, but rather the inability to follow the rules of the task. 
There were no significant quadratic relationships between self-certainty and 
neuropsychological test scores. 
5.6.8.2 - Regression analyses for the self-reflectiveness BUS dimension 
No significant linear or quadratic relationships were detected between self- 
reflectiveness and neuropsychological test scores (all p, > 0.05). 
5.6.9 - Non-parametric analyses of BCIS dimensions and 
neuropsychological functioning 
The non-parametric correlations between the dimensions of the Beck Cognitive 
Insight Scale and the Emotion Perception Test scores are presented in Table 5.12. 
No signiflcant relationships emerged from these analyses. 
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TABLE 5.12: Non-parametric correlations between cognitive insight dimensions and 
neuropsychological functioning domains 
Beck Cognitive Insight Scale dimension 
Emotion Perception 
Test measure Self-certainty Self - reflectiveness 
(% correctly identified) 
Neutral Spearman's rho -0.145 0.200 
n 63 63 
Happy Spearman's rho -0.072 -0.064 
n 63 63 
Fear Spearman's rho -0.140 -0.016 
n 63 63 
Spearman's rho -0.090 -0.043 Anger 
n 63 63 
All correlations non-significant (p > 0.05) 
5.6.10 - Correction for multiple comparisons 
The False Discovery Rate (FDR, Benjamini et al., 1995) approach was used to 
address multiple comparisons in this study (see section 5.5.2.2.1). 
Neuropsychological tests and insight measures were grouped into batteries 
according to the hypothesis being tested. Each hypothesis had a set of comparisons 
that were made for a linear relationship, and a set of comparisons for a curvilinear 
relationship. For example, for the hypothesis that clinical insight has a linear 
relationship with executive function, there were six neuropsychological tests 
yielding eight comparisons for each of the clinical insight factors. 
Clinical insight and executive functioning - linear 
The six executive function tasks yielded eight comparisons for each of the clinical 
insight factors. Neither the relationship between AAI factor Score and the Hayling 
sentence completion task profile score, nor the relationship between AAI score and 
the (transformed) BADS total score survived FDR correction. 
Clinical insight and executive functioning - curvilinear 
There were also eight comparisons made when examining the curvilinear 
relationships between clinical insight factors and executive function. Of the three 
quadratic regressions found: AAI factor and WCST categories completed, AAI score 
and (transformed) BADS total score, and SR factor and % WCST non-perseverative 
errors, none survived FDR correction. 
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Clinical insight and other standard cognitive domains (curvilinearl 
A total of five comparisons were made for each clinical insight factor across the 
verbal fluency, sustained attention and memory domains. The curvilinear 
relationship between semantic fluency and AAI factor score did not survive FDR 
correction. 
Clinical insight and social cognition (linear) 
The two social cognition tasks gave a total of six comparisons for each of the 
clinical insight factors. The relationship between higher AAI factor score and 
correctly identifying a greater percentage of fearful faces did not survive FDR 
correction for this set of comparisons. 
Cognitive insight and executive function (linearl 
There were eight comparisons with executive function measures for each of the 
cognitive insight dimensions. The relationship between Brixton spatial anticipation 
test profile score and self-certainty did not survive this correction. However, the 
significant relationship between self-certainty and the (transformed) BADS total 
score did survive. 
5.6.11 - Can significant relationships between insight and 
neuropsychological function be explained by IQ? 
The linear relationship between higher BADS total score and lower self-certainty 
(which indicates better cognitive insight - see section 5.3.4.1) was the only result 
to survive FDR for multiple comparisons. In order to determine whether this result 
could be explained in terms of general cognitive ability, a further regression was 
computed where WASI current IQ was entered first, followed by BCIS self-certainty 
score. The first model was significant, indicating a strong relationship between 
BADS total score and WASI IQ (R 2=0.478, F= 53.146, df = 5811, p<0.001). The 
addition of self-certainty in the second model improved the model significantly (R 2 
change = 0.065, F change = 8.166, p=0.006) indicating that the relationship 
between self-certainty and BADS score is not entirely mediated by IQ. 
5.7 - Discussion 
A substantial body of literature suggests that poor insight in schizophrenia is 
associated with impaired neuropsychological functioning, particularly in the domains 
of executive functioning and general intellectual ability. However, methodological 
issues have limited the ability of previous studies to address the degree of 
specificity of these relationships. This investigation aimed to extend the literature 
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on the neuropsychological model of insight by examining linear and curvilinear 
relationships between measures of a wide range of cognitive domains and 
dimensions of both clinical and cognitive insight. 
5.7.1 - Differences between patients and controls in neuropsychological 
functioning 
As expected, the sample of individuals with schizophrenia performed worse than 
controls on the majority of neuropsychological tests. This confirms that this patient 
sample showed the characteristic generalised cognitive deficits which have been 
widely reported in this population (meta-analysis, Fioravanti et al., 2005). While the 
patient group also had a significantly lower premorbid IQ, the majority of the 
differences in neuropsychological test scores remained significant after controlling 
for premorbid IQ. 
5.7.2 - Clinical insight factors 
Two clinical insight scales (the BIS and the SAI-E) were administered in this 
investigation, and a factor analysis was undertaken to determine how best to 
combine the items from these scales. Four orthogonal factors were derived from 
this analysis, and the loadings on these factors were used to combine items into 
four factor scores. The first encompassed items relating to both awareness of 
illness, and the attribution of symptoms and other problems to a mental illness and 
was labelled 'awareness of and attribution to illness' (AAI). This factor combines 
two aspects of insight that are separated in the SUMD (see section 2.2.4.2), 
awareness of illness and the attribution of symptoms to an illness. It is perhaps not 
surprising that these components loaded on the same factor in this study. It is 
unlikely that an individual would attribute symptoms to an illness if they did not 
believe themselves to be unwell. Nevertheless, an individual may acknowledge that 
they have an illness, but attribute their symptoms to other factors. The combination 
of these elements in the AAI factor score suggests that the latter situation may 
occur only rarely. 
Items relating to awareness of the need for treatment, specifically medication, 
loaded on the second factor, 'recognition of the need for medication' (RNM). Factor 
three, 'awareness of problems' (AP), included items related to awareness of 
problems and the need to seek help (BIS item 6- "I do not need to be seen by a 
doctor or psychiatrist"). It is noteworthy that this final item loaded on the AP factor 
rather than the RNM factor. Seeking help may be more closely related to 
being 
aware that there is 'something wrong' than seeking medication. A fourth factor was 
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made up of items relating to the awareness of symptoms (but not their attribution 
to an illness) and was named "symptom re-labelling' (SR) to fit with the terminology 
of David's (1990) framework, which was used to design the BIS and SAI-E. 
All four clinical insight factor scores were negatively correlated with the PANSS G12 
insight item (which is reverse-scored), demonstrating the convergent validity of 
these measures. The AAI and RNM factor scores showed the strongest relationships 
with the PANSS G12 item, consistent with the emphasis of the PANSS G12 item 
scoring criteria on awareness of illness and acceptance of treatment (see section 
2.2.2). 
5.7.3 - Clinical insight and neuropsychological functioning 
It was hypothesised that there would be a linear or a curvilinear relationship 
between general intellectual ability and clinical insight (hypothesis 1). However, no 
significant relationships (either linear or curvilinear) were found between clinical 
insight factors and the WASI full-scale IQ estimate. This negative finding is in fact 
in line with the majority of studies (21 out of 29) which have examined whether 
there is a linear relationship between clinical insight measures and IQ (see section 
3.3.2.6). This suggests that poor clinical insight in schizophrenia may not be 
associated with a general intellectual impairment, but may instead be related to 
more specific cognitive deficits. 
Hypothesis 2a predicted that these would be either linear or a curvilinear 
relationships between clinical insight and executive functioning. This investigation 
found some evidence to support such relationships, in both linear and curvilinear 
forms. Specifically, linear relationships were found between higher AAI factor scores 
and better performance on the Hayling and BADS tests. Although these 
relationships are consistent with a role for impaired executive function in the 
aetiology of poor clinical insight (specifically in the awareness of illness dimension), 
they do not address the question of how such deficits might be involved. Post-hoc 
tests were carried out to try to identify which sub-processes of executive function 
might be implicated, paying particular attention to the hypothesis 2b, that 
measures of perseveration would be associated with poor insight. However, no 
relationships with such sub-processes were found, suggesting that the relationship 
between AAI factor score and executive function was a non-specific one. This 
finding suggests that poor insight, at least as measured by the AAI factor score, 
may not be related specifically to any of the sub-processes which could be 
examined using the measures employed in this investigation. 
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Few previous studies have found linear relationships between insight and the 
cognitive domains of sustained attention, verbal fluency or memory. Consistent 
with this literature and hypothesis 3, this study also found no significant linear 
relationships between tests indexing these standard cognitive domains and the 
clinical insight factors. These data, combined with the negative finding for IQ, 
suggests that clinical insight in this sample was not associated with a generalised 
cognitive deficit which extended to multiple standard cognitive domains. There thus 
appears to be a degree of specificity in the linear relationships between the AAI 
factor score and executive function. 
This study was one of the first to examine the relationship between insight and 
measures of social cognition. A relationship was found between AAI factor score 
and the correct identification of fearful faces on the EPT. This finding supports 
hypothesis A and suggests that social cognition may play a role in this aspect of 
clinical insight. It highlights the potential importance of looking beyond standard 
cognitive domains in searching for the neuropsychological basis of insight in 
schizophrenia. 
Based on a small number of studies that have examined non-linear relationships 
between insight and neuropsychological functioning (Startup, 1996; Lysaker et al., 
2003), it was predicted that there may be curvilinear relationships between insight 
and cognitive ability, with high cognitive ability associated with both high insight 
and low insight (as per figure 5.1). Significant curvilinear relationships of this type 
were found between the AAI factor and two executive functioning measures: WCST 
categories achieved and BADS total score, as well as one verbal fluency measure: 
semantic fluency. This relationship phonological fluency approached significance (p 
= 0.06), suggesting that the latter relationship is not specific to the semantic 
fluency aspect of verbal fluency. These findings support the view that the 
relationship between insight and cognitive functioning may not be a simple linear 
one, but may be modulated by other factors, leading to the curvilinear shape of the 
observed relationships. In terms of the way tests were grouped into cognitive 
domains in this study, the relationships found were not specific to executive 
function. However, it is worth noting that some researchers consider verbal fluency 
to be an aspect of executive functioning (e. g. Mohamed et al., 1999). Whether or 
not verbal fluency is considered a measure of executive function, there was no clear 
cognitive process (executive or otherwise) which was common to the three tasks 
for which a curvilinear relationship was found. 
curvilinear relationship was also found between WCST non-perseverative errors 
and the SR factor score. However, the shape of this curve was the inverse of that 
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hypothesised, with poor performance (rather than good performance) associated 
with high insight and low insight. This finding is very difficult to explain and should 
be considered a chance/spurious observation until replicated. 
All of the relationships between clinical insight and neuropsychological functioning 
that were consistent with the hypotheses were found for the AAI factor. Only one 
relationship emerged for the SR factor score, which was not consistent with the 
hypotheses. These data do not support hypothesis B, which suggested that the 
relationships would be strongest for aspects of insight related to the awareness of 
symptoms. 
Although the findings described above were significant at the single test level, none 
of these relationships remained significant after the FDR correction for multiple 
comparisons had been applied. Independent verification in future studies is 
necessary to determine whether findings represent true effects of small size, or are 
spurious results which emerge from making a large number of comparisons in a 
study employing a substantial battery of neuropsychological tests. 
5.7.4 - Cognitive insight and neuropsychological functioning 
Cognitive insight has recently emerged as an important aspect of research on 
insight in schizophrenia, in part due to data suggesting that it may be moderator of 
response to cognitive therapy (Granholm et al., 2005). This is the first study to 
investigate the neuropsychological correlates of the BCIS, the only measure of 
cognitive insight currently available. A linear relationship was found between lower 
scores on the BCIS self-certainty dimension and higher scores on both the Brixton 
spatial anticipation test and the BADS. Lower scores on this BCIS dimension 
indicate better decision-making regarding mental products, and the relationships 
found therefore indicate that higher cognitive insight was associated with better 
executive functioning. Post-hoc analyses examined whether a specific pattern of 
errors was driving the relationship with the Brixton profile score, but did not find a 
relationship with perseverative errors. Further post-hoc analyses showed that, of 
the six BADS subtests, the relationship with self-certainty was strongest for the 
'modified six elements' subtest, specifically the number rule breaks, again offering 
no evidence of a specific relationship with perseveration. As was the case for the 
AAI clinical insight factor, the relationship between the self-certainty dimension of 
cognitive insight and executive function does not appear to be driven by a specific 
cognitive process such as perseveration. 
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No relationships were found between BCIS scores and either the standard cognitive 
domains (general intellectual ability, verbal fluency, sustained attention, memory), 
or measures of social cognition. This supports a degree of specificity in the 
relationship between executive function and the self-certainty dimension of 
cognitive insight. This finding if further reinforced by the fact the relationship with 
BADS total score survived FDR correction for multiple comparisons. These data 
suggest that the self-certainty dimension of cognitive insight may have a 
neuropsychological basis which is specific to executive function. Poor executive 
functioning may lead to individuals with schizophrenia making over-confident 
decisions. Indeed, recent data suggest that general intellectual ability is related to 
the 'jumping to conclusions' bias (Van Dael et al., 2006), one of the components of 
decision making which makes up the self-certainty dimension of the BCIS (e. g. item 
4, '1 have jumped to conclusions too fast'). Future research which examines the 
neuropsychological correlates of decision making in schizophrenia more closely may 
shed further light on the neuropsychological basis of cognitive insight. 
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CHAPTER 6: STUDY 2: INSIGHT AND STRUCTURAL BRAIN 
MEASURES 
6.1 - Introduction 
There is an extensive literature supporting a relationship between poor insight in 
schizophrenia and neuropsychological impairments (section 3.3.2 and chapter 5). 
This has led to the hypothesis that poor insight is caused by specific 
neuropsychological impairments which are secondary to brain deficits (Young et al., 
1993; Lysaker et al., 1994b). The relationships which have been found between 
specific domains of neuropsychological ability and specific regional structural brain 
volumes (review, Antonova et al., 2004) supports the view that neuropsychological 
impairments in schizophrenia may indeed be secondary to specific brain deficits. 
An analogy is often made between poor insight in schizophrenia and anosognosia, 
the unawareness of deficits in individuals with organic neurological disorders 
(section 3.3.1). Given that anosognosia has been found to be associated with both 
bilateral and right-sided lesions to the frontal, parietal and temporal lobes (meta- 
analytic review, Pia et al., 2004), this analogy does not lead to a clear regionally- 
specific hypothesis about which brain deficits might be particularly associated with 
poor insight in schizophrenia. It is important to note that drawing an analogy 
between poor insight and anosognosia does not necessarily exclude aetiological 
factors which are not currently thought to have a strong structural brain basis, such 
as coping style. Indeed, the use of denial as a coping style continues to be 
highlighted as a factor which may play a role in anosognosia (Vuilleumier, 2004). 
Interestingly, anosognosia is generally thought to arise directly from brain damage, 
rather than via specific cognitive impairments, which have not been found to differ 
between anosognosic and non-anosognosic individuals with acquired brain damage 
(Vuilleumier, 2004). 
Initially, theories regarding the possible brain basis of insight in schizophrenia were 
developed by making inferences from neuropsychological tests which are held to be 
sensitive to damage to different brain regions. The use of modern neuroimaging 
methods has allowed the correlates of structural brain measures to be investigated 
more directly, circumventing the criticism that each neuropsychological test is 
unlikely to have a one-to-one mapping to the integrity of a specific brain region. 
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Early neuroirnaging studies of insight tended to use global brain measurements 
(see section 3.3.2.1). A relationship between ventricular enlargement, as judged by 
expert raters blind to insight level, and poorer insight was found in one study (Takai 
et al., 1992), but was not replicated in another (David et al., 1995). Likewise, 
smaller total brain volume was related to poorer insight in one study, (Flashman et 
al., 2000), but not another (Rossell et al., 2003). Cortical atrophy, again as judged 
by expert raters, has been found to be related to poorer insight (Laroi et al., 2000). 
The authors of this study commented that the atrophy that they were rating was 
mainly localised in the frontal lobe, although they do not provide any quantitative 
data to support their impression. 
More recently, two approaches have been taken to localising the structural brain 
correlates of insight. The first approach involves manually tracing pre-selected 
"regions of interest' (ROIs) on each slice of a structural brain image. The areas 
traced are then converted into a volumetric measurements, and these volumes are 
then correlated with insight measures (section 3.3.2.2). The second approach, 
voxel-based morphometry (VBM), uses automated algorithms to examine the 
correlates of grey matter volume across every voxel (three-dimensional pixel) in 
structural brain images (section 3.3.4.3). Both between-groups (e. g. patients vs. 
controls) and within-groups relationships (e. g. correlations with insight score) 
analyses can be undertaken with VBM. 
ROI studies have found a number of relationships between frontal brain regions and 
insight. One study found poor insight to be related to smaller volume of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), but not the hippocampus (Shad et al., 
2004). Two studies have found relationships between frontal lobe sub-regions and 
specific dimensions of insight. Flashman and colleagues (2001) found that lower 
awareness of mental disorder was correlated with smaller volumes of three regions: 
bilateral middle frontal gyrus, right gyrus rectus and left anterior cingulate gyrus. 
Lower awareness of symptoms was correlated with smaller superior frontal gyrus 
volume. Shad and colleagues (2006) found that lower awareness of symptoms was 
correlated with smaller right DLPFC volume, while 'incorrect' attribution of 
symptoms was correlated with larger right medial orbitofrontal cortex volume. 
These studies suggest that there may be a degree of specificity in the relationships 
between dimensions of insight and the volumes of specific frontal lobe sub-regions, 
and highlight the merit in examining the neural correlates of dimensions of insight, 
rather than total insight scores. One limitation of the ROI approach is the possibility 
of missing important relationships with regions which are not being measured (e. g. 
the parietal, occipital and temporal lobes in Flashman et al. 2001). Manually 
measuring multiple ROIs is also very labour intensive, restricting the number of 
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regions that are measured in each study. This can also restrict the sample size of 
ROI studies, with the Flashman et al (2001) and Shad et al (2006) having sample 
sizes of 15 and 14 respectively. 
Studies using VBM have found relationships between the grey matter volume of the 
cingulate and both a global insight measure (Ha et al., 2004), and the dimensions 
of awareness of illness and recognition of symptoms (preliminary abstract, Morgan 
et al., 2002). Relationships have also been found between recognition of symptoms 
and inferior frontal gyrus grey matter (Morgan et al., 2002), and between a global 
insight measure and left inferior temporal grey matter (Ha et al., 2004). The latter 
finding highlights one of the advantages of VBM analyses, namely that it covers the 
whole brain, allowing relationships with brain regions which are seldom selected as 
ROIs to be identified. However, as the study of Ha and colleagues (2004) used a 
uni-dimensional measure of insight (the PANSS G12 item), it is not clear which 
aspects of insight are related to the grey matter availability in this area. 
There is some convergence in the results of these two approaches to the brain 
correlates of insight in schizophrenia. Two VBM studies (Ha et al., 2004; Morgan et 
al., 2002) and one ROI study (Flashman et al., 2001) have found positive 
relationships between cingulate volume and clinical insight, with relationships with 
both awareness of illness and awareness of symptoms emerging when dimensions 
of insight were analysed separately. Two studies (one ROI, one VBM) have also 
found relationships between lower awareness of symptoms and smaller volumes of 
lateral frontal regions: one in a superior region (Flashman et al., 2001), and the 
other in an inferior region (Morgan et al., 2002). Furthermore, two studies (one 
ROI, one VBM) have identified relationships between medial frontal regions and 
clinical insight. However, these findings were in different directions: one was 
between poor insight (general measure) and smaller medial frontal volume (Ha et 
al., 2004), and one was between poorer attribution of symptoms to mental disorder 
and larger medial frontal volume (an aspect of insight which forms part of the AAI 
factor in this study - see section 5.7.3). These findings are difficult to reconcile, 
and deserve further research attention. 
6.2 - Aims and hypotheses 
This study aims to examine the associations between regional grey matter volumes 
and both clinical insight factors and cognitive insight dimensions using VBM. 
Specific hypotheses are given for insight dimensions for which there are previous 
data. The analyses of the brain basis of cognitive insight are novel in nature as they 
had not previously been examined. 
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6.2.1 - Hypotheses replicating previous findings 
1. Lower total grey matter availability will be correlated with poorer clinical 
insight (all factors). 
2. Greater grey matter availability in the cingulate will be correlated with the 
AAI and SR clinical insight factors. 
3. Lower scores on the SR clinical insight factor will be associated with lower 
grey matter availability in lateral frontal regions. 
4. Grey matter availability in medial frontal regions will be either positively or 
negatively correlated with the AAI clinical insight factor. 
5. Greater grey matter availability in the temporal lobe will be correlated with 
greater clinical insight (all factor scores). 
6. There will be no relationship between clinical insight factors and the volume 
of occipital brain regions. 
6.2.2 - Novel hypothesis 
A. Clinical insight will be associated with the availability of grey matter in brain 
regions implicated in anosognosia - i. e. the frontal, temporal and parietal 
lobes, particularly in the right hemisphere. 
B. Cognitive insight dimensions will be associated with grey matter availability 
in the frontal and / or temporal lobes, but not in the occipital or parietal 
lobes. 
6.3 - Method 
6.3.1 - Participants 
The sample for this study was a sub-sample of the study I sample (see section 
5.3.1). Thirteen participants of the study 1 sample were excluded, all in the patient 
group. One participant withdrew from the study before a structural MRI could be 
completed. One participant felt claustrophobic in the scanner and had to come out 
before the structural scan could be completed. Two participants moved during the 
scan, rendering the images unusable. Two participants had done welding work 
without goggles and therefore could not safely have an MRI scan. One participant 
had extensive delusions about having metal objects inserted into his body at 
various points in his life. Given that he could not give a reliable answer to the MRI 
safety questions, it was not possible for him to have an MRI scan. Three 
participants were too large to fit comfortably into the MRI scanner. Visual inspection 
of the images after the segmentation stage of the analysis indicated that the 
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segmentation and normalisation process had clearly failed for three patients. These 
images were therefore removed from the statistical analyses. 
The sample for this investigation thus comprised 52 individuals with schizophrenia 
and 30 healthy controls. 
6.3.2 - Demographics characteristics 
The demographic characteristics for the study 2 sample are shown in table 6.1. As 
in study 1, the patient group as a whole was significantly older than the healthy 
participants (mean difference 6.21 years, t (80) = 2.49, p<0.05). This difference 
was again greater amongst the female participants (mean difference = 10.08 
years) than the male participants (mean difference = 5.26 years), although neither 
difference was significant in when analysed separately (both p>0.05). Overall, the 
demographic characteristics of the sample for study 2 were very similar to those of 
study 1. There was no evidence that the groups differed in terms of parental SES 
(X2 
,5=0.13, p>0.05), 
but they did differ in terms of ethnicity, with a greater 
number of non-white participants in the patient group (X21 = 14.62, p<0.001). 
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TABLE 6.1: Participant demographics 
Patients (n=52) Controls (n=30) 
Characteristic 
























































Some cells too 
small for X' 
Non-white 32 6 x21= 14.62 
p<0.001 
White 20 26 
Edinburgh 
Handedness handedness 8.76 (2.27) 8.55 (1.31) 
T77 0.472 
inventory 0.5 - 10.0 5.5 - 10.0 p 
0.638 
Premorbid IQ NART-R 100.38 (13.30) 112.75 
(13.22) T77 4.354 
[68.6 - 120.7] [95.9 - 130.6] p<0.001 
(N = 50) (N=30) 
Professional 7 8 
Intermediate 25 10 
Some cells too 
Skilled: non-manual 3 7 small for X2 
Parental SES Skilled: manual 12 3 
Semi-skilled manual 1 1 
Unskilled manual 2 1 
Professional 32 18 x20.13 intermediate 
Other 18 12 
p 0.721 
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6.3.3 - Clinical characteristics 
Table 6.2 lists clinical characteristics of the patients who participated in study 2, 
including the SCID-P diagnosis and symptom ratings using the Positive and 
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS, Kay et al., 1987). 
TABLE 6.2: Clinical characteristics of the patient sample for study 
Characteristic N % of total 
Schizophrenia Paranoid 39 75.0% 
Catatonic 1 1.9% 
Disorganised 1 1.9% 
Diagnosis 
Undifferentiated 0 0.0% 
Residual 3 5.8% 
Schizoaffective disorder 5 9.6% 
Missing 3 5.8% 
Atypical antipsychotic 40 76.9% 
Medication Typical antipsychotic 10 19.2% 
Mood stabiliser 5 9.6% 
Mean SID Range 
Positive 16.48 4.91 7- 28 
PANSS 
Negative 18.00 4.90 7- 32 
symptoms 
General 31.81 6.26 18 -48 
Tota 1 66.29 13.67 39- 108 
6.3.4 - Measures 
6.3.4.1 - Insight 
Clinical insight was measured by the four factor scores derived from the factor 
analysis of the Birchwood Insight Scale (Birchwood et al., 1994) and Schedule for 
the Assessment of Insight - Expanded (Kemp et al., 1997): Awareness of and 
Attribution to Illness (AAI), Recognition of the Need for Medication (RNM), 
Awareness of Problems (AP) and Symptom Re-labelling (SR) (see section 5.7.3). 
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Cognitive insight was measured using the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (Beck et al., 
2004b, see section 2.2.6). The dimensions of Self-Certainty and Self- Reflectiveness 
were used as the dependent variables. Greater self-certainty indicates 
overconfidence in decision-making and therefore poorer cognitive insight, while 
self- reflectiveness reflects willingness to acknowledge fallibility and higher scores 
indicate better cognitive insight (see section 2.2.6). 
6.3.4.2 - MRI Data Acquisition 
Structural MRI brain scans were acquired using a 1.5 Tesla GE N/Vi Signa system 
(General Electric, Milwaukee WI, USA) at the Maudsley Hospital, London. A 
quadrature birdcage head coil was used for RF transmission and reception. Head 
movement was limited by foam padding within the head coil and a restraining band 
across the forehead. Initially, a series of sagittal and axial fast gradient echo scout 
images were acquired in order to correct for head tilt and to orient subsequent 
images relative to the anterior-commissure/ posterior- commissure line and the 
interhemispheric fissure (TR=200ms, TE=4.2ms, theta=90 degrees, field of 
view=24 cm, slice thickness=5mm, slice gap=2.5mm, 256x192 acquisition matrix, 
one data average). The whole brain was then scanned with a 3-D inversion 
recovery prepared fast spoiled GRASS Tl-weighted dataset. These TI-weighted 
images were obtained in the axial plane with 1.5mm contiguous sections. TR was 
18 ms, TI was 450 ms, TE was 5.1 ms and the flip angle was 20 degrees with one 
data average and a 256x256xl28 pixel matrix. Image contrast for all datasets was 
chosen with the aid of a software tool for optimizing image contrast (Simmons et 
al., 1996). 
6.3.4.3 - MRI Data Pre-processing: overview 
Put simply, 'standard' voxel-based morphometry (VBM) (Ashburner & Friston, 
2000; Good et al., 2001) comprises the following four steps: 
1. Spatial normalisation (linear transformation and non-linear warping) of MRI 
brain images to a standardised anatomical space (template). This discounts 
large scale differences in gross brain anatomy and position, allowing local 
differences in the composition of brain tissue to be identified. 
2. Segmentation of images into grey matter (GM), white matter (WM) and 
cerebro-spinal fluid (CSF). 
3. Smoothing of these images to make the data more normally distributed, 
reduce the effective number of comparisons being made, and account for 
differences in local gyral shape. 
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4. Comparison of local GM intensities across the whole brain. 
Optimised VBM improves this procedure in two main ways: (i) it includes additional 
steps to automatically remove non-brain tissue from segmented images, and (ii) it 
uses the parameters derived from normalising segmented GM images to a GM 
template for the normalisation of the brain as a whole. The latter helps to overcome 
normalisation problems which arise when there are systematic differences between 
a group of brains and the whole brain template, such as ventricle size, which is well 
known to be enlarged in many individuals with schizophrenia (Shenton et al., 
2001). Given the improvements that optimised VBM offers over the standard 
protocol (Ashburner et al., 2000; Good et al., 2001), the optimised protocol was 
chosen for the analysis of MRI data in this study. 
The pre-processing stages in the optimised VBM analyses used in this study (i. e. 
before statistical comparisons between / within groups are made) are illustrated in 
figure 6.1. 
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FIGURE 6.1: Voxel-based morphornetry pre-processing stages 
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6.3.4.3.1 - Zmage reorientation 
Structural images were converted from the UNC format into the ANALYZE format 
(ANALYZE software, BRU, Mayo Foundation, Rochester, MN) and pre-processed 
using Statistical Parametric Mapping - version 2 (SPM2, Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, London; http: //www. fil. ion. ucl. ac. uk/spm), running in 
MATLAB 6.5 (MathWorks, Natick, MA). All images were manually realigned (three 
translations: right, forward and up; and three rotations: pitch, roll and yaw) to the 
anterior commissure - posterior commissure (AC-PC) line and the intra-hemispheric 
fissure to maximise the likelihood that SPM2 would be able to correctly register and 
normalise the images (see section 6.3.4.3.3). Table 6.3 details the translations and 
rotations that were necessary for this realignment for two groups. Independent 
samples t-tests revealed no significant differences between the groups for these 
variables (all p, > 0.05). 
TABLE 6.3: Translations and rotations of MRI images 
Mean Std Dev Range 
Controls 0.67 2.81 -5 -8 Right (mm) 
Patients -0.04 2.74 -9-4 
Controls -7.27 6.54 -20-4 Forward (mm) 
Patients -9.67 6.62 -27-0 
Controls -0.97 5.37 -12 - 13 Up (mm) 
Patients 0.13 5.51 -10- 18 
Controls 0.15 0.12 -0.05 -0.30 Pitch (rad) 
Patients 0.13 0.15 -0.25-0.50 
Controls 0.00 0.05 -0.14-0.08 Roll (rad) 
Patients -0.01 0.05 -0.13 -0.10 
Controls 0.01 0.04 -0.06-0.10 Yaw (rad) 
Patients 0.00 0.05 -0.10-0.12 
6.3.4.3.2 - Customised template creation 
The use of study-specific, customised templates rather than those inherent to SPM2 
minimises any scanner-specific biases and provides a template appropriate to 
characteristics of the sample (Good et al., 2001). Customised templates of the 
whole brain, grey matter (GM), white matter (WM) and cerebro-spinal fluid (CSF) 
were created from the whole sample (patients and controls) using an automated 
script written by Dr Christian Gaser (http: //dbm. neuro. uni-jena. de/vbm. html). For 
the creation of the custornised whole brain (T1) template (see figure 6.2), each 
structural MRI image was registered to the standard SPM2 T1 template using a 12 
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parameter affine transformation. The 12 parameters comprise four functions 
(translation, rotation, zoom and shear), each in three planes (x, y and z) - see 
figure 6.2. These normalised images were then smoothed with an 8mm full width at 
half maximum (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel, and averaged to create 
custornised T1 template. 
FIGURE 6.2: Affine transformations for the normalisation of structural MRI images 
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translation 
(e. g. shift up) 
rigid body transform 
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rigid body transform 
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The (unsmoothed) normalised T1 images were then segmented into their GM, WM 
and CSF components using the GM, WM and CSF probability maps 
(templates) 
inherent to SPIV12. Each individual segmented image was then automatically cleaned 
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Input 
to remove non-brain tissue and smoothed with an 8mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian 
kernel. The smoothed images were then averaged to create custornised GM, WM 
and CSF templates in standard stereotactic space (Good et al., 2001). The 
segmented images used to create these templates were not used in any further 
analyses as they were normalised to the standard SPM2 template rather than the 
study-specific template. 
6.3.4.3.3 - Optimised voxel-based morphometry procedure 
The pre-processing of brain images was done using an automated script written by 
Dr Christian Gaser (http: //dbm. neuro. uni-jena. de/vbm. html), based on code 
published on the official SPM support forum by Dr John Ashburner 
(http: //www. fil. ion. ucl. ac. uk/spm/support/). The manually realigned original T1 
brain images were normalised to the custornised T1 template (see section 
6.3.4.3.2) and then segmented into GM, WM and CSF components using the 
custornised GM, WM and CSF templates. After automatically cleaning these 
segmented images to remove non-brain tissue, each GM image was re-normalised 
to the study-specific GM template using (i) a 12 parameter affine transformation 
(see figure 6.2) and (ii) a non-linear transformation comprising a combination of 
smooth spatial basis functions (Ashburner & Friston, 1999) to account for global 
non-linear shape differences (16 iterations, 25mm cut-off, medium regularisation). 
The parameters used to normalise each segmented GM image are then applied to 
the corresponding T1 image, to derive a whole brain image which is normalised to 
standardised stereotactic space. Using the parameters from the normalisation of 
the cleaned segmented GM image to the GM template prevents non-brain voxels 
(such as the skull, which is present in T1 images) from contributing to errors in 
spatial normalisation, 'optimising' the process. It also means that the normalisation 
of the T1 images is most accurate for grey matter present in them, which is the 
most important tissue type for this study. 
The initial normalisation of the T1 images to the TI template prior to segmentation 
can be influenced by non-brain voxels (as the cleaning of these voxels from brain 
images can only be done once the images have been segmented, which must itself 
be preceded by an initial normalisation). The optimally normalised T1 images were 
therefore re-segmented into GM, WM and CSF, again using the custornised GM, WM 
and CSF templates. These images are then cleaned to remove non-brain tissue to 
derive the optimally normalised segmented images for each subject, and smoothed 
with a 12mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian kernel. Smoothing creates a local weighted 
average of the signal level from surrounding voxels, and the width of the smoothing 
kernel therefore determines the scale at which morphological differences are most 
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sensitively detected (matched filter theorem, Rosenfeld & Kak, 1982). The use of 
12-mm kernel is recommended by Ashburner and Friston (2000) to ensure that the 
data are valid for the use of parametric statistical tests. Smoothing also reduces the 
multiple comparisons problem (see section 6.3.5.2) by reducing the effective 
number of comparisons that are made across the brain. 
6.3.4.3.4 - Concentration, volume and modulation 
When structural brain images are normalised using non-linear transformations, 
volumetric changes are inevitably introduced (Ashburner & Friston, 2001). For 
example, if brain X has a temporal lobe which is half the size of the template's 
temporal lobe, then normalising brain X to the template will cause the size of its 
temporal lobe to double. Differences in GM signal intensity between (normalised) 
brain X and the template therefore reflect differences in the average 'concentration' 
of GM relative to other tissue types in the region of each voxel (with the region 
defined by the size of the smoothing kernel) (Ashburner et al., 2000). Such 
differences do not reflect differences in volume, because normalisation removes 
global differences in brain shape (and therefore volume). 
If the non-linear spatial normalisation of every GM image to the template was 
precise enough to match the size and shape of every gyrus, there would be no 
detectable differences between the images in a VBM analysis of GM concentration. 
However, the spatial normalisation used in SPM2 only removes global differences in 
brain shape, and VBM analyses can therefore be thought of as examining 
differences in the concentration of GM relative to other tissue types (Ashburner et 
al., 2000). Nevertheless, Ashburner (2004, SPM support forum) points out that the 
results of concentration analyses are difficult to interpret because it is often unclear 
whether they reflect 'genuine' differences in GM concentration, or normalisation 
errors. 
In order to examine differences in the absolute amount of GM in particular brain 
structures (their volume), an additional 'modulation' processing step is required. 
When the T1 images are optimally normalised according to the parameters derived 
from matching the segmented GM image to the GM template, the extent of the 
volume change at each voxel is encoded as a 'relative volume' - i. e. the post- 
normalisation volume relative to the pre-normalisation volume (more formally 
known as the Jacobian determinants of the deformation field). In other words, the 
relative volume encodes the extent to which each structure has been stretched or 
compressed to remove global differences in brain shape to achieve the 
best 
possible match to the template. 
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The modulation processing step involves multiplying the relative volume by the 
intensity value at each voxel in the (unsmoothed) optimally normalised, cleaned 
and segmented GM image. The intensity of GM areas which have been stretched in 
the normalisation process will therefore be decreased, and the intensity in the 
compressed areas will be increased. The total amount of GM signal in the 
modulated image is therefore the same as in the original pre-normalisation GM 
image. Differences between images in modulated intensities therefore reflect 
regional differences in the absolute amount (volume) of GM (Good et al., 2001), 
while also achieving a good registration to the template (Ashburner et al., 2001). 
In the present study, the modulation step was applied to the optimally normalised, 
cleaned and segmented GM, WM and CSF images, which were then smoothed with 
a 12mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian kernel. 
A uniformly smaller brain will have uniformly lower grey matter intensities after 
modulation. Any detected differences will therefore be less regionally specific 
(Ashburner et al., 2001), and an additional step can be included to model this 
confound by including a 'global' measure of GM volume in analyses of modulated 
data - see section 6.3.5.2. 
6.3.5 - Data analysis methods 
Given the advantages of modulated data in the analysis of regional volumetric 
differences, two sets of modulated analyses were undertaken in preference to 
I concentration' analyses of unmodulated data. In the first set of analyses, data 
were analysed without controlling for global GM volume (see section 6.3.5.2); in 
the second set the global GM volumes were entered as a covariate. 
6.3.5.1 - Preliminary insight data screening 
Before the associations between insight and brain structure were analysed, each 
insight score was screened for missing values. 
6.3.5.2 - Extraction of grey matter'globals' 
The total grey matter volume for each individual was calculated from the 
unsmoothed modulated segmented images (which have the same grey matter 
volume as the segmented images in native space) using the '*get-integrals' function 
in SPIV12. These volumes were used as 'globals' to control for variation in total tissue 
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availability in voxel-wise comparisons of modulated images. Analysing modulated 
images without controlling for global GM allows variation in regional absolute GM 
volume to be examined. Controlling for GM volume allows the differences in 
regional GM volume relative to total GM volume to be analysed. This difference is 
analogous to region of interest studies which compare regional brain volumes with 
and without controlling for total brain volume, respectively. 
These data were also examined for differences between patients and controls in 
total GM volume, controlling for age and gender. They were further used to 
examine the correlations between total GM volume and insight measures. 
6.3.5.3 - Statistkal VBM analyses 
There are three main stages in the statistical analysis of VBM pre-processed 
structural brain images. These stages are similar for the analysis of between-groups 
differences and within-groups correlations. First, statistics are computed 
independently for each voxel (voxel-wise analyses) to determine whether the 
intensity values for each voxel differ significantly from the null hypothesis. Second, 
neighbouring voxels which reach the threshold for significance are combined into 
clusters. Third, correction for the large number of multiple comparisons is applied 
to the most significant voxel in a cluster (know as the local maxima) to determine 
the likelihood of the significant voxel-wise result arising by chance. 
The first stage of statistical analysis (when each voxel is treated independently) 
employs the general linear model. This flexible framework allows a variety of 
between-groups and within-groups tests to be applied to GM images. When 
specifying a model for these analyses in SPM2, it is also possible to enter covariates 
which can be controlled for in these analyses, or treated as variables of interest. 
For example, given that age and gender are known to have a significant influence 
on brain structure (Coffey et al., 1998), these effects can be controlled for. Grey 
matter volume can also be treated as a covariate at this point when modulated 
images are being analysed. 
SPM2 then calculates aT statistic for size of the statistical effect at each voxel 
independently, together with the associated level of significance (p value) and aZ 
score which equates to the number of standard deviations away from the expected 
mean intensity value that each voxel is. The results of these voxel-wise statistics 
are encoded in a statistical parametric map. For example, the statistical parametric 
map for the T scores would encode the result of the general linear model calculation 
for every voxel, expressed as aT score. 
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Given the large number of voxels in a typical GM image, the first stage obviously 
involves a very large number of statistical tests. With this comes the problem of 
multiple comparisons - it is inappropriate to apply the same criterion for the 
acceptance of a significant difference (e. g. p<0.05) to a large number of 
independent tests as would be used for a single test. As the number of comparisons 
that are made increases, so does the likelihood of some of those tests reaching the 
acceptance criterion by chance (a false-positive or 'type Y error). The number of 
comparisons is reduced somewhat by applying a threshold for the inclusion of a GM 
voxels in the analysis (e. g. the intensity of voxels must be at least 0.05 in all 
images) to create a mask which excludes voxels which are unlikely to be grey 
matter from the analyses. However, a large number of voxels (approximately 2 
million) remain in the analysis. The Bonferroni method of adjusting the acceptance 
criterion (dividing ap value of 0.05 by the number of comparisons made) is not 
appropriate because the comparisons that are being made are not independent, as 
T scores of neighbouring voxels are likely to be correlated with each other (Mechelli 
et al., 2005). Applying the Bonferroni correction would therefore be overly 
conservative and lead to fa Ise- negatives. SPM2 instead uses Random Field Theory 
to address the multiple comparisons problem. 
The Random Field Theory correction is based on two image characteristics: the 
number of resolution e/ements (resels) in the image, and the Euler characteristic 
(EC) of the image. In smoothed images, a resel is defined as block of voxels that is 
the same size as the FWHM of the average smoothness of the images. This 
smoothness is calculated separately for each analysis, but is approximately the 
same as the FWHM of the smoothing kernel that has been applied (in this study 
giving a block size of 12m M31 or about 500 resels in a GM image). The number of 
resels in an image approximates the number of independent observations in the 
image, but is not equivalent to it. The EC of an image is the number of spatially 
contiguous clusters of voxels in a statistical parametric map which are above a 
certain Z-score threshold. The higher the threshold, the lower the EC of an image 
will be. If the number of resels in an image is known, it is possible to calculate the 
expected EC for that image at a number of thresholds - i. e. the number of clusters 
that would exceed the threshold by chance. Therefore, if x is the Z score threshold 
that gives an expected EC of 0.05, then the probability of the EC of an actual 
dataset being greater than one when thresholded at a Z-score of x is less than or 
equal to 0.05. Thresholding the actual dataset at aZ score of x is therefore 
equivalent to setting an acceptance criterion of p<0.05, corrected for multiple 
comparisons. In SPM2, this is implemented as a 'familywise error rate' (FWE) - the 
probability of a result being a false-positive in across the 'family' of comparisons 
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being made, as opposed to the 'uncorrected' p value, which is the probability of an 
individual comparison being a false-positive, ignoring the number of comparisons 
that are being made. 
SPM2 also provides a set of statistics which use the spatial extent of a cluster to 
determine the likelihood of it being a false-positive (cluster-level statistics). 
However, these statistics are not appropriate for VBM analyses because they 
assume that the smoothness of images is the same across the entire brain. This is 
highly unlikely to be the case in 12mm FWHM smoothed structural images due to 
the non-stationary nature of the underlying neuroanatomy (Mechelli et al., 2005). 
The threshold for statistical parametric maps in this study was set at p<0.001, 
uncorrected (using the T statistic in voxel-wise analyses). The threshold for local 
maxima to be considered significant was set at p<0.05, FWE-corrected. The 
procedure for correction for multiple comparisons in SPM2 was originally designed 
for the analysis of functional data, and is overly strict when applied to structural 
data (Sowell et al., 1999). In the between groups analyses, clusters with a FWE- 
corrected p value of less than 0.1 were therefore treated as trends. In the within- 
group analyses of insight and brain structure, clusters with an extent of at least 100 
voxels with a local maxima reaching T>4.50 were treated as being of interest. If 
these clusters were in a region which was hypothesised in advance to be related to 
insight, small volume correction (SVC) was applied. This procedure can be used to 
determine whether a cluster is significant correcting for multiple comparisons within 
a locally defined volume rather than the whole brain. A 10mm radius sphere 
centred on the maxima voxel was used in SVC analyses, which equates to 
approximately one resel (depending on the actual smoothness of the data). 
In order to exclude voxels which are unlikely to be grey matter from the analyses 
and reduce the number of comparisons being made, only voxels which had an 
absolute intensity of at least 0.05 (5%) in all GM images being analysed were 
included in each analysis of modulated images. 
6.3.5.4 - Anatomkal localisation 
SPM2 localises voxels using the same system of coordinates as the Talairach and 
Tournoux (1988) brain atlas, where the anterior commissure is located at x= Of y 
= 0, z=0, and the AC-PC line defines the plane where z=0. However, the T1 
template used by SPM2 (from the Montreal Neurological Institute, known as the 
MNI brain) which was used to develop the study-specific custornised T1 template is 
larger than the Talairach and Tournoux brain in all dimensions, with differences of 
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up to 10mm. In order to localise significant voxels, the native MNI coordinates were 
converted to Talairach and Tournoux space using a non-linear transformation 
developed by Matthew Brett (http: //www. mrc-cbu-cam. ac. uk/Imaqinq/CoMmon 
/mnispace. shtml). The Talairach and Tournoux atlas (1988), the Talairach Daemon 
software (Lancaster et al., 2000) and the Talairach Space utility 
(http: //www. ih b. spb. ru/- pet lab/TSU/TSUMain. html) were then used to identify 
the anatomical location of these converted coordinates. 
6.4 - Results 
Figures showing MRI slices are presented with significant clusters overlayed onto an 
unsmoothed average of all the normalised T1 images (patients and controls). All 
figures are presented in the neurological convention - i. e. left is left and right is 
right. Any SPIV12 outputs which are usually in the radiological convention (left is 
right) have been flipped to conform to the neurological convention. 
6.4.1 - Preliminary data screening 
Table 6.4 presents the descriptive statistics for all insight variables in the patient 
group. These values were very similar to those in study 1 (see table 5.5). 
TABLE 6.4: Descriptive statistics of insight measures for study 2 
Clinical insight factors I BCIS dimensions 
AAI RNM AP SR I Self-certainty* Self-reflectiveness 
N 45 51 52 45 52 52 
Mean 9.86 4.78 4.31 3.39 7.37 14.48 
Std. Dev. 4.98 1.78 2.02 1.93 3.73 5.25 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 1 6 
Maximum 16 6 6 6 16 25 
AII - Awareness of and attribution to illness 
RNM - Recognition of the need for medication 
AP - Awareness of problems 
SR - Symptom re-labelling 
BCIS - Beck Cognitive Insight Scale 
* Higher scores indicate poorer cognitive insight 
6.4.2 - Between-groups analyses 
Patients had significantly smaller global grey matter volume (in litres) than healthy 
controls (patients' mean = 0.716, sd = 0.066; controls" mean = 0.762, sd = 0.070) 
(IF = 9.299, df = 1,80, p=0.003). This difference remained significant after 
controlling for age and gender (F = 6.607, df = 1,78, p=0.012). 
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6.4.2.1 - Differences in absolute regional grey matter volume 
Regional differences between patients and controls in absolute GM volume were 
examined by analysing differences in modulated GM images. Both age and gender 
were controlled for in these analyses due to their known influence on brain 
structure (Coffey et al., 1998). 
Reductions in patients relative to controls 
Table 6.5 describes the local reductions in absolute GM in patients relative to 
controls. Absolute GM volume was significantly reduced in two regions: the first had 
its maxima voxel in the right brainstern [(9, -28, -8), T(78) --= 5.54, p=0.004 FWE 
corrected] and extended into the dorsal thalamus, see figure 6.3, and the second 
was located in the left middle occipital gyrus [BA 19, maxima voxel (-53, -82, -1), 
T(78) = 4.80, p=0.012 FWE corrected], see figure 6.4. There was a trend towards a 
reduction in absolute GM volume in the right superior temporal gyrus [STG, BA 38, 
maxima voxel (55,16f -8), T(78) = 4.34f p=0.079 FWE corrected], see figure 6.5. 
TABLE 6.5: Absolute grey matter reductions in patients 
Brodmann Cluster Maxima voxel p value p value Brain Region Area size *T value uncorrected 
FWE 
(voxels) xyz corrected 
Right 
brainstem 8540 9 -28 -8 5.07 < 0.001 0.004 dorsal 
thalamus 
-53 -82 -1 4.80 < 0.001 0.012 Left middle BA 19 24468 -48 -78 10 4.60 < 0.001 0.029 occipital gyrus 
-45 -80 17 4.53 < 0.001 0.039 
Right STG BA 38 17680 55 16 -8 4.34 < 0.001 0.079 
* Cluster size at the uncorrected threshold of p=0.001 
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FIGURE 6.3: Absolute grey matter reduction in the right brainstern and dorsal 
thalamus 










FIGURE 6.5: Trend towards absolute grey matter reduction in the right superior 
temporal gyrus 
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Increases in patients relative to controls 
There were no significant increases in absolute GM volume in patients relative to 
controls (no voxels reached significance at the p<0.001 uncorrected level). 
6.4.2.2 - Differences in regional grey matter volume relative to total 
volume 
Regional differences between patients and controls in GM volume were re-analysed 
controlling for global GM volume to examine differences between groups relative to 
total GM volume (see section 6.3.4.3.4). Both age and gender were again 
controlled for in these analyses. 
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Reductions in patients relative to controls 
The pattern of reductions was broadly similar to those observed in absolute GM 
volume. However, controlling for GM volume reduced the magnitude of these 
differences. The right brainstern / dorsal thalamus cluster emerged in the same 
location, but was reduced to a trend [maxima voxel (9, -28f -8), T(77) = 4.70, p= 
0.098 FWE corrected]. The left middle occipital gyrus cluster was also present in 
the uncorrected map, but was not significant [BA 19, maxima voxel (-53, -82, -1), 
T(77) = 4.09, p=0.266 FWE corrected]. The right STG cluster was also present in 
the uncorrected map, but was not significant [BA 38, maxima voxel (56,17, -9), 
T(77) = 3.87, p=0.699 FWE corrected]. 
Increases in patients relative to controls 
Controlling for global GM volume led to two clusters emerging where patients had 
greater GM volume relative to controls. The fact that these clusters did not emerge 
in the previous analysis suggests that these regions are not larger in patients in 
absolute terms, but may have a greater relative volume - i. e. occupy a greater 
proportion of the (on average smaller) brains of individuals with schizophrenia. 
Table 6.6 describes these clusters. The larger cluster is in the superior frontal gyrus 
(SFG) [BA 9, maxima voxel (35,39,33), T(77) = 5.66, p=0.004 FWE corrected]. In 
the second cluster, there was a significant local maxima in the left posterior 
cingulate [BA 26, maxima voxel (-5, -16,33), T(77) = 5.00, p=0.008 FWE 
corrected]. A second local maxima in the cluster was centred on the tail of the 
caudate in the left hemisphere, but only reached the trend level of significance 
[maxima voxel (-15,, -32,27), T(77) = 4.45, p=0.078 FWE corrected]. 
TABLE 6.6: Increases in GM in patients compared to controls, relative to global GM 
volume 










Right STG BA 9 13856 35 39 33 5.66 < 0.001 0.004 42 39 29 5.59 < 0.001 0.005 
Left posterior BA 26 -5 -16 33 5.00 < 0.001 0.008 cingulate 9947 
Left caudate -15 -32 27 4.45 < 0.001 0.078 
* Cluster size at the uncorrected threshold of p=0.001 
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6.4.3 - Relationships between insight and grey matter volume 
6.4.3.1 - Correlations with total grey matter volume 
Pearson's correlations were used to examine the correlations between global grey 
matter volume and normally distributed insight measures. Spearman's rank 
correlations were used when insight measures were not normally distributed. 
6.4.3.1.1 - Clinkal insight 
Greater global GM volume was significantly associated with higher SR scores (r = 
0.315, p<0.05) and higher AP scores (rho = 0.275, p<0.05). The AAI and RNM 
factors also showed positive associations with GM volume, but were not significant 
(r = 0.151 and r=0.186 respectively, ps > 0.1). 
6.4.3.1.2 - Cognitive insight 
Self-certainty was negatively correlated with global GM volume (r = -0.310, p< 
0.05), indicating an association between greater GM volume and less 
overconfidence in decision-making (better cognitive insight). Self-reflectiveness was 
not associated with global GM volume (r = 0.111, p>0.1) and the correlation with 
the composite index neared significance (r = 0.239, p=0.089), presumably driven 
by the self-certainty dimension. 
6.4.3.2 - Correlations between insight and absolute regional grey matter 
volume 
Each within-group analysis of modulated GM images comprised two contrasts: one 
to test for positive correlations between regional absolute GM volumes and insight 
measures, and another to test for negative correlations. 
6.4.3.2.1 - Clinical insight 
Positive correlations 
The associations reported in the next section are all positive correlations - i. e. 
relationships between greater GM volume and higher insight. 
AAI factor 
Four clusters emerged with uncorrected T-values of more than 4.5, see table 6.7 
and figure 6.6. There was an association between higher AAI score and greater 
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absolute GM volume in the left superior temporal gyrus [BA 21, maxima voxel (-67, 
1,6), T(43) = 4.83, p=0.115 FWE corrected], and a more posterior cluster in the 
left middle temporal gyrus [BA 21, maxima voxel (-73, -42f -4), T(43) = 4.52, p= 
0.242 FWE corrected]. In the right hemisphere, AAI score was associate with the 
volume of the right inferior temporal gyrus [BA 21, maxima voxel (71, -5, -23), 
T(43) = 4.68, p=0.166 FWE corrected] and a large lateral parietal cluster with two 
local maxima: one in the right inferior parietal lobule [BA 40, maxima voxel (72, - 
3 81 3 2), T(43) = 4.63, p=0.166 FWE corrected] and another in the right 
supramarginal gyrus [BA 40, maxima voxel (63, -58,34), T(43) = 4.50, p=0.251 
FWE corrected]. 
TABLE 6.7: Associations between larger absolute GM volume and higher AAI score 













Left STG 21 2214 -67 1 6 4.83 < 0.001 0.115 < 0.001 
Left MTG 21 1487 -73 -42 -4 4.52 < 0.001 0.242 0.001 
Right ITG 21 709 71 -5 -23 4.68 < 0.001 0.166 0.001 
Right inferior 
parietal lobule 




63 -58 34 4.50 < 0.001 0.251 0.001 
BA - Brodmann area 
FWE - Family-Wise Error 
* Cluster size at the uncorrected threshold of p=0.001 
A Small Volume Correction - FWE corrected for 10mm radius sphere search volume 
STG - Superior temporal gyrus 
MTG - Middle temporal gyrus 
ITG - Inferior temporal gyrus 
STG superior temporal gyrus 
ITG inferior temporal gyrus 
MTG middle temporal gyrus 
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FIGURE 6.6: Association between AAI score and absolute volume of the left 
superior temporal gyrus, right inferior temporal gyrus, and right inferior parietal 
lobule / supramarginal gyrus 
All five local maxima with t scores > 4.50 were significant at at least the p=0.001 
level after small volume correction had been applied - see table 6.7. 
AP factor 
There was a significant association between higher AP score and greater absolute 
GM volume in the left precuneus [BA 7, maxima voxel (-2, -65,66), T(50) = 5.01, p 
= 0.049 FWE corrected], see table 6.8 and figure 6.7. 
TABLE 6.8: Associations between larger absolute GM volume and higher AP score 
Brodmann Cluster Maxima voxel p value p value Brain Region Area size *T value uncorrected 
FWE 
(voxels) Xyz corrected 
Left Precuneus BA 7 1581 -2 -65 66 5.01 < 0.001 0.049 
* Cluster size at the uncorrected threshold of p=0.001 
FIGURE 6.7: Association between greater absolute grey matter volume in the left 
precuneus and the awareness of problems insight factor 








There were no significant correlations between RNM score and local absolute GM 
volume (all voxels T<4.5 and p>0.3, FWE corrected). 
SR factor 
One cluster emerged with an uncorrected t-value of more than 4.5. There was an 
association between higher SR score and greater absolute GM volume in the right 
STG [BA 21, maxima voxel (66, -71 -8), T(43) = 4.56, p=0.224 FWE corrected], 
see table 6.9 and figure 6.8. 
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TABLE 6.9: Associations between larger absolute GM volume and higher SIR score 
Brain Brodmann Cluster Maxima voxel Tp value p value p value 
Region Area size * value un- 
FWE SVC A 
(voxels) Xyz corrected corrected corrected 
Right 
STG BA 21 3775 66 -7 -8 4.56 < 0.001 0.224 0.001 
* Cluster size at the uncorrected threshold of p=0.001 
STG - Superior temporal gyrus 
ASmall Volume Correction - FWE corrected for 10mm radius sphere search volume 
This voxel was significant (p = 0.001) after small volume correction had been 
applied - see table 6.9. 
FIGURE 6.8: Association between greater absolute grey matter volume in the right 
middle temporal gyrus and the symptom re-labelling insight factor 






STG = Superior temporal gyrus 
Negative correlations 
There were no significant negative correlations between the AAI, AP, RNM or SR 
factors and any absolute regional GM volume at either the p<0.001 uncorrected or 
p<0.05 corrected thresholds (i. e. greater GM volume being associated with poorer 
insight). 
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STG = Superior temporal gyrus 
6.4.3.2.2 - Cognitive insight 
There were no significant positive or negative correlations between regional GM 
volume and the self-certainty or self- refl ectiven ess dimensions of the BCIS at the p 
< 0.05 FWE corrected threshold (all voxels T<3.60). 
6.4.3.2 - Correlations between insight and regional grey matter volume 
relative to total volume 
Each within-group analyses of modulated GM images comprised two contrasts: one 
to test for positive correlations between relative regional GM volumes and insight 
measures, and another to test for negative correlations. Global GM volume was 
controlled for in both contrasts in this set of analyses. 
6.4.3.3.1 - Clinical insight 
AAI factor 
Controlling for global GM volume led to the same four clusters emerging for 
association between higher AAI score and greater relative regional volume (with T 
value of greater than 4.50) as were found in the absolute GM volume analysis, see 
tables 6.7 and 6.10. There was an association between higher AAI score and 
greater relative GM volume in the left medial temporal gyrus [BA 21, maxima voxel 
(-711 -43, -3), T(42) = 4.92, p=0.152 FWE corrected], and in the right inferior 
parietal lobule / supramarginal gyrus [BA 40, two local maxima: (63, -53,31), T(42) 
= 4.87, p 0.173 FWE corrected, and (58, -39,32),, T(42) = 4.78, p=0.212 FWE 
corrected] see figures 6.9 and 6.10. The left STG cluster which emerged in the 
absolute volume analysis for the AAI factor was also present in the relative volume 
analysis (BA 21, maxima voxel (-67, 1,6), T(42) = 4.68, p=0.298 FWE corrected]. 
TABLE 6.10: Associations between larger relative GM volume and higher AAI score 










Left STG 21 1702 -67 1 6 4.63 < 0.001 0.298 
Left MTG 21 1835 -71 -43 -3 4.92 < 0.001 0.152 
Right ITG 21 524 71 -5 -23 4.52 < 0.001 0.374 
Right inferior 63 -53 31 4.87 < 0.001 0.173 parietal lobule 40 6999 
Right supra- 58 -39 32 4.78 < 0.001 0.212 marginal gyrus 
* Cluster size at the uncorrected threshold of p=0.001 
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FIGURE 6-9: Association between insight and relative left medial temporal gyrus 
volume 










MTG - middle temporal gyrus 









Red area indicates cluster associated with AAI score, pink area indicates this area mirrored in the 
opposite hemisphere (Talairach atlas is only drawn in one hemisphere in each diagram). 
AP factor 
The positive association between AP factor score and the left precuneus cluster 
again emerged in the uncorrected statistical parametric map, but was no longer 
significant after correction for multiple comparisons over the whole brain [BA 7, 
maxima voxel (-2, -65,66), 
T(49) = 4.50, p=0.291 FWE corrected]. 
RNM factor 
There were no significant correlations between RNM and local relative GM volume 
(all voxels T<4.50). 
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SR factor 
There were no significant correlations between SR score and local relative GM 
volume (all voxels T<4.50). 
6.4.3-3.2 - Cognitive insight 
As was the case for the analyses which did not control for global GM volume, there 
were no significant correlations between regional GM volume and the self-certainty 
or self- reflectiveness dimensions of the BCIS (all voxels T<4.50). 
6.5 - Discussion 
A number of studies have suggested that insight in schizophrenia has a structural 
brain basis. Frontal brain regions have been particularly implicated, although ROI 
studies have rarely examined regions outside of the frontal lobes. This investigation 
aimed to extend the literature by using VBM, an automated approach which covers 
the whole brain, to examine the structural brain correlates of both clinical insight 
and, for the first time, cognitive insight. 
6.5.1 - Differences between patients and controls 
As expected, the patient group had a significantly smaller total GM volume 
compared to controls, a difference which survived controlling for age and sex. This 
result is consistent with the global reduction in grey matter volume in individuals 
with schizophrenia found in a meta-analysis (Wright et al., 2000). Global deficits in 
GM volume are compatible with both the neurodevelopmental hypothesis, where 
brain deficits in individuals with schizophrenia are thought to reflect abnormal early 
brain development, and the neurodegenerative hypothesis, which suggests that 
there is a progressive destruction of neural tissue associated with schizophrenia 
(Weinberger & McClure, 2002). However, as a cross-sectional study with a diverse 
sample, this investigation does not offer evidence which favours either hypothesis. 
This finding does, however, suggest that patient sample in this study is comparable 
to other samples where a global GM volume deficit has been found relative to 
healthy controls. 
Regionally, there were significant GM reductions in patients in a right brainstern / 
dorsal thalamus cluster and the left middle occipital gyrus (BA 19), as well as a 
trend towards a reduction in the right superior temporal gyrus (BA 38). These 
findings are consistent with those of a number of previous VBM studies. Four 
studies have found reductions in GM in the right thalamus in patients with 
168 
schizophrenia compared to controls (Marcelis et al., 2003; Hulshoff Pol et al., 2001; 
Salgado-Pineda et al., 2003; Salgado-Pineda et al., 2004), while left middle 
occipital gyrus reductions have been found in one previous study (Moorhead et al., 
2004). Reductions in the right STG are one of the most replicated VBM findings 
(Honea et al., 2005), having been found in seven previous studies (Spalletta et al., 
2003; Sigmundsson et al., 2000; Hulshoff Pol et al., 2001; Moorhead et al., 2004; 
Job et al., 2002; Kubicki et al., 2002). The STG finding concords with ROI studies 
which have also found reductions in this area (Shenton et al., 2001). Reductions in 
the right STG in schizophrenia are thought to be particularly important in the 
aetiology of auditory hallucinations, as STG volume has been found to correlate 
with the severity of such experiences (Barta et al., 1990). 
6.5.2 - Clinical insight 
It was hypothesised that all four clinical insight factors would be correlated with 
total GM volume. This hypothesis was supported by the significant correlations 
between total GM volume and both the SR and AP factors. These findings suggest 
that total neural recourses available may have a relationship with these aspects of 
insight, but that total neural resources may be less important for the AAI and RNM 
clinical insight factors. 
A number of previous (mainly ROI) studies have found relationships between 
dimensions of insight and the volume of specific frontal lobe regions. However, the 
specific relationships between frontal regions and the SR and AAI factors 
hypothesised on the basis of these studies were not found in this investigation. 
Indeed, no significant relationships were found between the clinical insight factors 
and frontal lobe regions. Instead, this investigation found correlations between 
clinical insight factors and a number of temporal and parietal lobe areas. Previous 
ROI studies have not measured parietal or temporal lobe regions, making it 
impossible for them to identify correlations between the volume of these regions 
and insight. Furthermore, anosognosia, which is held to be the neurological 
analogue of poor insight (Amador et al., 1994), is associated with lesions to 
subcortical, parietal lobe and temporal lobe structures, as well as with frontal 
lesions (meta-analytic review, Pia et al., 2004), suggesting that it is not a purely 
frontal phenomenon. 
The strongest relationship found in this investigation was between the AP clinical 
insight factor and the absolute volume of the left precuneus, located in the medial 
parietal lobe. This relationship survived FWE correction for multiple comparisons 
without the need for small volume correction. A network involving the precuneus 
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and medial prefrontal regions has been proposed as the mechanism through which 
personal identity and past personal experiences are interlinked, allowing a person 
to move between representation and awareness of the self (Andreasen et al., 
1995a). Furthermore, a number of recent functional neuroirnaging studies have 
shown precuneus activation in comparing self to non-self representations, including 
judging whether psychological / personality trait adjectives were self- referenti aI in 
fMRI tasks (Kircher et al., 2000; Kircher et al., 2002). PET studies have also shown 
precuneus activation when participants reflect about their own personality traits 
and physical appearance (Kjaer et al., 2002), and a linear relationship between 
precuneus activation and the degree to which the retrieval of previous retrieval of 
psychological traits was self- referenti aI (Lou et al., 2004). These findings suggest 
that the precuneus is either involved in assigning first-person perspective (e. g. 
awareness of one's own mental states) (Vogeley & Fink, 2003), or more generally 
in internal representation through mental imagery (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). 
These data from healthy controls could explain why the volume of the left 
precuneus was associated with the AP clinical insight factor in this study. If an 
individual with schizophrenia has a deficit in an area of the brain which mediates 
the ability to access representations of his own mental states, he may not be able 
to identify that these mental states are problematic, and may therefore be unaware 
that there is 'something wrong. 
The relationship between left precuneus volume and the AP factor was weakened 
when global GM volume was controlled for in the analysis, but was still significant if 
small volume correction was applied. This finding is perhaps expected given that 
total GM volume was significantly correlated with AP factor score. It may therefore 
be the case that both total neural resources and GM availability in the left 
precuneus are important in the aetiology of the AP insight factor. 
A large cluster in a different parietal lobe region was correlated with AAI factor 
score. This cluster had maxima voxels in the right inferior parietal lobule and right 
supramarginal gyrus, and was significant after small volume correction had been 
applied. This area of the parietal cortex has a well-established role in visual 
attention in healthy people (review, Culham & Kanwisher, 2001). It is plausible that 
that as well as being involved in awareness of sensory information, the right inferior 
parietal cortex is involved in awareness of illness in patients with schizophrenia. It 
is also interesting to note that damage to the right parietal cortex has frequently 
been linked to anosognosia in neurological disorders (Pia et al., 2004; Vuilleumier, 
2004). 
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The present investigation found relationships between the volume of a number of 
temporal lobe regions and the AAI insight factor. Such findings are consistent with 
the VBM study of Ha and colleagues (2004), which found that insight (as measured 
by the PANSS G12 item) was correlated with a temporal lobe GM cluster. In the 
present investigation, two clusters in the left temporal lobe were significant after 
small volume correction had been applied: one with a maxima voxel in the left 
superior temporal gyrus (STG), and another more posterior cluster with a maxima 
voxel in the left middle temporal gyrus. A further cluster in the right inferior 
temporal gyrus was also significant after applying small volume correction. A 
cluster with its maxima voxel in the right middle temporal gyrus which extended 
into the right STG was also associated with the SR insight factor and was significant 
after small volume correction had been applied. Functional neuroirnaging studies 
have demonstrated the role of the STG in the cortical network subserving the 
interpretation, production and self-monitoring of speech and language in healthy 
people (review, Pearlson, 1997). Activation of this region has been found to 
correlate with severity of auditory hallucinations in people with schizophrenia (Barta 
et al., 1990), supporting the view that auditory hallucinations reflect impaired self- 
monitoring of internal speech (Frith, 1992). The correlations found in this study 
suggest that the self-monitoring deficits in schizophrenia, which associated with the 
STG, may extend beyond an inability to monitor internal speech, to an inability to 
monitor whether mental experiences are abnormal, and whether one is 
experiencing a psychiatric illness. 
6.5.3 - Cognitive insight 
The brain basis of cognitive insight has not been investigated previously. In the 
present investigation, total GM volume was found to be negatively correlated with 
scores on the self-certainty dimension of the BCIS. This indicates an association 
between greater over-confidence in decision-making (poorer cognitive insight) and 
smaller total GM volumes. Making good decisions regarding mental products (good 
cognitive insight), by not being over-confident in decision-making (e. g. not jumping 
to conclusions), may therefore rely partly on total GM tissue availability. This 
finding fits well with recent data suggesting that IQ (which is itself related to total 
GM tissue availability, Antonova et al., 2004) is lower in individuals with 
schizophrenia who show a greater 'jumping to conclusions' bias (Van Dael et al., 
2006). The absence of regional findings for self-certainty suggests that this may be 
a global rather than a regional ly-specific relationship. 
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CHAPTER 7: STUDY 3: INSIGHT, DISTRESS AND COPING STYLE 
7.1 - Introduction 
Schizophrenia is a highly stigmatising disorder, and many individuals with this 
diagnosis are devalued and discriminated against as a result (Dickerson et al., 
2002). It is viewed by many as a chronic, debilitating condition which individuals 
have little chance of recovering from, a conceptualisation which can be threatening 
and distressing to those given the diagnosis. Indeed, this view is likely to contribute 
to the high level of depression experienced by many people with schizophrenia 
(Mulholland & Cooper, 2000). 
One way in which individuals cope with distressing illnesses is denial, which can be 
viewed as adaptive if it reduces distress (review, Goldbeck, 1997). A link between 
denial and poor insight was suggested shortly after schizophrenia was first 
delineated, when Mayer-Gross (1920) identified 'denial of the psychotic experience' 
as one of the four defensive strategies adopted by patients with schizophrenia, in 
which they were typically unaware of the symptoms of the illness (i. e. lacked 
insight). More recently, poor insight in schizophrenia has been hypothesised to 
reflect the use of a psychological defence mechanism in the form of denial of illness 
(Moore et al., 1999). This aetiological model was named '*Denial of illness: the 
psychological coping mechanism or defence' in Amador and colleagues' (1991) 
seminal review which stimulated the renaissance in insight research. It is referred 
to as the 'psychological denial model' in this thesis (see section 3.4). Implicit in this 
model is the concept that denial serves a defensive function to protect the 
individual from the distress which acknowledging the presence of illness would 
cause (Moore et al., 1999). 
The psychological denial model predicts that those who deploy denial as a coping 
strategy will have poorer insight, but will suffer less distress. A number of cross- 
sectional studies support a relationship between higher insight and greater distress, 
including depression (meta-analysis, Mintz et al., 2003), hopelessness (Carroll et 
al., 2004), and suicidality (Schwartz et al., 2004). Longitudinal studies support 
relationships between increasing insight and both worsening depression 
(Carroll et 
al., 1999), and worsening suicidal ideation (Cunningham Owens et al., 
2001). 
These studies led Schwartz (2001) to hypothesise that there is a chain of causality 
from insight, to demoralisation, to depression, to suicidality. A study using 
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structural equation modelling (Drake et al., 2004) has found evidence for the 
direction of causality proceeding from increasing insight to greater depression. 
Although these relationships between insight and distress are consistent with the 
psychological denial model, they do not test the model directly. To test the 
hypothesis that use of denial is directly related to poor insight, it is necessary to 
measure coping styles (including denial) directly. A number studies have addressed 
this question, and have found associations between coping styles and insight in 
schizophrenia. Greater 'Self-Deceptive Positivity' (the tendency to give self-reports 
that are honest but positively biased) has been linked to lower awareness of illness, 
while greater 'Impression Management' (deliberate positive self- presentation to an 
audience) has been linked to lower past awareness of illness, its social 
consequences, and the effects of medication (Moore et al., 1999). This suggests 
that clinical insight is, at least in part, a function of denial (Moore et al., 1999). 
More recently, Lysaker and colleagues (2003a) found relationships between specific 
dimensions of insight and preference for particular coping styles in schizophrenia. A 
preference for using '*escape-avoidance' as a coping style was related to lower 
awareness of the consequences of illness, while greater preference for 'positive 
reappraisal' was correlated with lower awareness of symptoms (Lysaker et al., 
2003a). Awareness of symptoms is encompassed in the symptom re-labelling (SR) 
factor derived in study 1, and it is this component that one would expect to be 
linked to preference for positive reappraisal of problems, which has an equivalent 
subscale in the COPE measure used in this study. Although awareness of the 
consequences of illness forms part of the awareness of and attribution to illness 
(AAI) factor derived in study 1 (see section 5.7.3), the COPE does not have an 
equivalent subscale to the "escape-avoidance' subscale of the Ways of Coping 
Questionnaire used by Lysaker and colleagues. It includes items dealing with 
substance use, sleeping, social withdrawal, hoping the situation will change, and 
'refusing to believe it has happened', each of which falls into a different COPE 
subscale. 
Overall, few studies have investigated the relationships between coping style and 
clinical insight, and none have examined its relationship with cognitive insight. This 
is in contrast to the large number of studies which have examined the relationships 
between insight and cognitive functioning (section 3.3). The findings of Lysaker and 
colleagues (2003a) suggest that examining a number of coping styles rather than a 
narrow definition of 'denial" may be informative in understanding the aetiology of 
insight in schizophrenia. 
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7.2 - Aims and hypotheses 
This study aimed to examine the associations between insight in schizophrenia and 
(i) measures of distress, and (ii) coping style. 
7.2.1 - Hypotheses replicating previous findings 
1. Clinical insight, as measured by the factor scores (AAI, RNM, AP and SR) will 
be positively associated with distress. 
2. A preference for denial as a coping style will be negatively associated with 
all four clinical insight factors. 
IA preference for positive reappraisal as a coping style will be negatively 
associated with the SR clinical insight factor. 
7.2.2 - Novel hypotheses 
A. Greater cognitive insight will be associated with greater distress. 
B. A preference for denial as a coping style will be associated with poorer 
cognitive insight. 
7.3 - Method 
7.3.1 - Participants 
The sample for this study comprised the same patient group as took part in study 1 
(see section 5.3.1, n= 65). The demographic and clinical characteristics of this 
sample are described in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 respectively. 
7.3.2 - Measures 
7.3.2.1 - Insight 
Clinical insight was measured by the four factor scores derived from the factor 
analysis of the Birchwood Insight Scale (Birchwood et al., 1994) and Schedule for 
the Assessment of Insight - Expanded (Kemp et al., 1997): Awareness of and 
Attribution to Illness (AAI), Recognition of the Need for Medication (RNM), 
Awareness of Problems (AP) and Symptom Re-labelling (SR) (see section 5.7.3). 
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Cognitive insight was measured using the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (Beck et al., 
2004b, see section 2.2.6). The dimensions of Self-Certainty and Self- Reflectiveness 
were used as the dependent variables. 
7.3.2.2 - Distress 
Beck Depression Inventory - 2nd edition (BDI-IIJ 
The BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996) is a widely used 21-item self-report questionnaire 
which includes minor revisions of the original BDI (Beck et al., 1961) to bring it into 
line with the current (DSM-IV) diagnostic criteria. It measures the severity of 
depression in clinical populations, including schizophrenia (Drury et al., 2000). Each 
item is rated on a four-point scale, with higher scores indicating greater depression. 
The total score (possible range 0 to 63) was used as the dependent variable. 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAIJ 
The BAI (Beck et al., 1988) is a 21-item self-report questionnaire which has been 
widely used as a measure of anxiety in adults. Each item consists of a symptom of 
anxiety (e. g. feeling shaky) which the participant rates on a four-point scale for the 
extent to which it has been bothering them in the past week. The total score 
(possible range 0 to 63) was used as the dependent variable. 
Beck Scale for Suicide Ideation (BSS) 
The BSS (Beck et al., 1979) is a 21-item self-report measure which assesses the 
severity of suicidal ideation. It includes items concerning an individual's thoughts, 
attitudes and intentions regarding suicide. Each item is rated on a three point scale. 
If the first five items are all rated zero, the remaining items are skipped. The total 
score (possible range 0 to 42) was used as the dependent variable. 
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSEJ 
The RSE (Rosenberg, 1965) consists of 10 statements related to overall feelings of 
self-worth or self-acceptance, which are self-rated on a four-point scale (strongly 
agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). The items are counterbalanced such 
that agreement with half of the items indicates high self-esteem, and agreement 
with the other half indicates low self-esteem. The total score (range 10 - 40) was 
used as the dependent variable, with higher scores indicating poorer self-esteem. 
7.3.2.3 - Coping style 
The COPE (Carver et al., 1989, see appendix 7.1) is a multidimensional coping 
inventory which assesses the ways in which individuals respond to stress. For this 
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study, each item (e. g. 'I've been trying to get emotional support from friends or 
relatives') was answered in terms of how much the participant had been doing what 
was described since they had been told that they had a mental health problem, 
ignoring whether it was successful or not, on a four-point scale (not at all, a little, a 
medium amount, a lot). The wording was chosen to elicit coping strategies in those 
who had been told that they had a mental health problem, but did not agree (i. e. 
had poor insight). 
The COPE scale is made up of 60 items, from which 15 subscales (four items each) 
can be derived. 
1. Positive reinterpretation 
2. Mental disengagement 
3. Venting of emotions 
4. Use of instrumental social support 
5. Active coping 
6. Denial 
7. Religious coping 
8. Humour 
9. Behavioural disengagement 
10. Restraint 
11. Use of emotional social support 
12. Substance use 
13. Acceptance 
14. Suppression of competing activities 
15. Planning 
Carver (http: //www. psy. miami. edu/facuIty/ccarver/scICOPEf. htmI) recommends 
examining the relationship between each subscale and other variables separately, 
rather than attempting to create higher-order factors. 
The raw scores for each coping subscale (possible range 0 to 12) are likely to be 
influenced by each individual's response bias for the questionnaire (i. e. overall 
tendency to agree or disagree with the statements). Following Lysaker and 
colleagues (2003b), relative preference for each COPE subscale (i. e. the tendency 
to endorse items for that subscale relative to overall endorsement level) was 
calculated by dividing the score for each COPE subscale by the total COPE score. 
Each relative preference score was then multiplied by 15 to give a set of relative 
preference scores for each individual which had an overall mean of 1.00. 
The 15 relative preference scores were used as the dependent variables for this 
measure. 
7.3.3 - Data analysis 
7.3.3.1 - Preliminary data screening 
Data were initially screened for missing values. The missing data for insight 
variables were the same as those for study 1 (see section 5.7.3.1). 
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Coping data were initially collected using the brief COPE (28 items, Carver, 1997). 
At the request of the Psychology Department PhD committee (at the time of 
upgrade from MPhil to PhD), this was changed to the full COPE measure (60 items, 
Carver et al., 1989). As a result, ten participants did not complete the full COPE 
(section 7.3.2.3), and full COPE data were therefore available for 55 participants. 
7.3.3.2 - Statistkal analyses 
Correlations 
Parametric statistics were applied to variables which approximated normal 
distributions. This was judged by the inspection of histograms and examination of 
skewness statistics. Where variables were judged to be suitable for parametric 
statistics but included extreme values, any significant relationships were re- 
examined excluding extreme values, which were defined by a minimum score three 
times the inter-quartile range below the first quartile, and a maximum score three 
times the inter-quartile range above the third quartile. Additional extreme values 
were identified from the inspection of Q-Q plots. Where variables were not 
distributed normally, a log transformation was applied to positively skewed data, 
while a square transformation was applied to negatively skewed data. Where these 
transformations were not successful in rendering the data normally distributed, 
non-parametric correlations (Spearman's rho) were used. Extreme values have 
much less effect on non-parametric correlations and significant relationships were 
therefore not re-examined excluding these datapoints. 
Correction for multiple comparisons 
The wide range of coping styles measured by the COPE together with the 
dimensional approach to insight taken in this study led to a substantial number of 
statistical comparisons being planned. As was the case in study one (see section 
5.5.2.2.1), the false discovery rate (FDR, Benjamini et al., 1995) method was used 
to control for multiple comparisons. This allows the average proportion (e. g. 5%) of 
false rejections of the null hypothesis (type I errors) to be controlled without being 
as overly conservative as the Bonferroni method, which would increase the 
likelihood of making type II errors by incorrectly not rejecting the null hypothesis 
(false-negative / type II errors). 
Relationships between insight and measures of distress were not corrected for 
multiple comparisons because they were hypothesised a priori and have been found 
in a substantial number of previous studies (Carroll et al., 1999; Cunningham 
Owens et al., 2001; Schwartz, 2001; Mintz et al., 2003; Carroll et al., 2004; 
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Schwartz et al., 2004; Drake et al., 2004). Furthermore, relationships between 
coping styles and clinical insight which had been hypothesised a priori on the basis 
of previous studies (primary hypotheses 2 and 3) were not corrected for multiple 
comparisons. 
Tests were grouped into batteries according to the hypothesis being tested. There 
were six batteries of tests for relationships with coping style (15 tests per battery): 
four for clinical insight (one for each factor score), and two for cognitive insight 
(one for each dimension). 
7.4 - Results 
7.4.1 - Descriptive statistics 
Insight 
The descriptive statistics for the clinical insight components (AAI, RNM, AP and SR) 
and the cognitive insight dimensions (self-certainty and self- reflectiveness) were as 
presented in study 1 (section 5.7.3.1). As in study 1, non-parametric statistics were 
applied to the AP and RNM components. 
Distress measures 
Table 7.1 details the descriptive statistics for the four measures of distress included 
in this study. The BSS was highly negatively skewed (skewness = 3.13), while 
inspection of the histogram indicated that the data were not normally distributed. A 
log transformation was applied to these data, but the transformed data were not 
normally distributed. Non-parametric statistics were therefore applied to the BSS, 
while parametric statistics were applied to the remaining three measures. 
The mean score of 15.12 on the BDI-II indicated mild depression, while the mean 
score of 14.46 on the BAI indicated mild-to-moderate anxiety. The mean score of 
22.78 on the Rosenberg self-esteem scale indicated a moderate level of self- 
esteem. 
Coping 
Table 7.1 details the descriptive statistics for relative preference for each of the 
COPE subscales. The 'substance use' subscale was highly positively skewed 
(skewness = 2.25) and inspection of the histograms indicated that the data were 
not normally distributed. A log transformation was applied to this variable, but did 
not lead to it being normally distributed. Non-parametric statistics were therefore 
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applied to this subscale, while parametric statistics were applied to the remaining 
14 subscales. 
7.4.2 - Correlations between insight and distress 
7.4-2.1 - Clinical insight 
As hypothesised, a number of clinical insight factor scores were positively 
associated with distress. The SR factor was positively correlated with BDI-II 
depression (r = 0.273, p=0.042, n=56) and a positive association with poor self- 
esteem approached significance (r = 0.257, p=0.054, n 0.054) The AP factor 
was positively correlated with both BDI-II depression (rho 0.308, p=0.013, n= 
64) and BAI anxiety (rho = 0.293, p=0.018, n= 65). 
The AAI and RNM factors were not significantly correlated with measures of 
distress. See appendix 7.2 for a full table of correlations. 
7.4.2.2 - Cognitive insight 
Greater self-certainty reflects greater overconfidence in decision-making (jumping 
to conclusions, resistance to correction), and therefore indicates poorer cognitive 
insight. The self-certainty dimension of the BCIS was negatively correlated with 
scores on the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (r = -0.291f p=0.019, n=65), 
indicating a relationship between greater cognitive insight and poorer self-esteem. 
The self- reflectiveness dimension of the BCIS was not significantly correlated with 
measures of distress. See appendix 7.2 for a full table of correlations. 
7.4.3 - Correlations between insight and coping style 
The correlations between insight and preference for the COPE subscales are 
surnmarised below. See appendix 7.3 for a full table of correlations. 
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TABLE 7.1: Descriptive statistics for measures of distress and coping 
Extreme 
values 
N Mean SD Range Skewness High Low (missing) 
Distress 
Beck Depression 64(l) 15.12 11.87 0- 54 0 72 Inventory - II . 
Beck Anxiety 
Inventory 65 14.46 11.70 0- 52 1.07 
Beck Scale for Suicide 65 2.94 6.73 0- 37 3 13 Ideation . 
Rosenberg Self- 
Esteem Scale 64(l) 22.78 6.73 10-36 -0.05 
Coping * 
Positive 55 (10) 1.31 0.53 0-2.39 -0.48 reinterpretation 
Mental 
disengagement 55 (10) 1.24 0.64 0-3.33 0.69 
Venting of emotions 55 (10) 0.93 0.73 0-3.75 1.41 1 
Use of instrumental 55 (10) 1.14 0.45 0-2.39 -0.16 social support 
Active coping 55 (10) 1.15 0.57 0-2.18 -0.65 
Denial 55 (10) 0.64 0.61 0 -3.06 1.69 
Religious coping 55 (10) 1.26 0.95 0-4.86 0.94 
Humour 55 (10) 0.70 0.66 0 -3.21 1.12 
JA 
Behavioural 55 (10) 0.56 0.50 0- 1.86 0.43 disengagement 
Restraint 55 (10) 0.86 0.54 0-2.14 0.16 
Use of emotional 55 (10) 1.19 0.64 0- 2.78 0.33 - social support 
Substance use 55 (10) 0.61 0.99 0-4.19 2.25 2 
Acceptance 55 (10) 1.51 0.63 0-2.95 -0.06 - 
Suppression of 55 (10) 0.89 0.50 0- 1.89 -0.33 
competing activities 
Planning 55 (10) 1.02 0.55 0-2.02 -0.26 
*- Relative preference for COPE sub-scales 
Less than 3 times (2.51 times) IQR above Q3, but the only value to deviate from normal on Q-Q plot 
180 
7.4-3.1 - Clinical insight 
Awareness of and attribution to illness 
Scores on the AAI insight factor were positively correlated with preference for two 
COPE subscales: 'use of instrumental social support' (r = 0.458, p=0.001, n= 47) 
and 'planning' (r = 0.317f p=0.030, n= 47). As hypothesised, AAI score was 
negatively correlated with preference for 'behavioural disengagement' (r = -0.301, 
p=0.040, n= 47). It was also negatively correlated with 'humour' (r = -0.311, p 
= 0.033, n= 47), but this relationship became non-significant when the high score 
extreme value was excluded (r = -0.220, p=0.141, n= 46). 
The correlation between the AAI component and preference for the use of 
instrumental social support survived FDR correction for multiple comparisons and 
explained 21% of the variance (see figure 7.1). This relationship was also the only 
one to emerge from a post-hoc regression analysis, indicating that the other 
relationships do not explain significant variation in AAI score beyond that accounted 
for by preference for the use of instrumental social support. 
FIGURE 7.1: Scatterplot showing the relationship between relative preference for 
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Awareness of 12robleMs 
AP insight factor scores were negatively correlated with preference for ' mental 
disengagement' (rho = -0.346, p=0.010, n= 55). This relationship did not survive 
FDR correction for multiple comparisons. 
Symptom re-labelling 
As hypothesised, scores on the SR insight factor were negatively correlated with 
preference for 'positive reinterpretation and growth' (r = -0.323, p=0.027, n= 
47). They were also positively correlated with "suppression of competing activities' 
(r = 0.305, p=0.037, n=47), but neither relationship survived the FDR correction 
for multiple comparisons. In a post-hoc regression analysis, preference 'suppression 
of competing activities' did not explain a significant amount of variance beyond that 
accounted for by preference for "positive reinterpretation and growth'. 
Recouition of the need for medication 
There were no significant correlations between preference for any COPE subscale 
and scores on the RNM insight factor. 
7.4.3.2 - Cognitive insight 
The self- reflectiveness dimension of the BCIS was positively correlated with 
preference for 'planning' (r = 0.335, p=0.012, n= 55). This relationship did not 
survive False Discovery Rate correction for multiple comparisons. No significant 
relationships were found between the self-certainty dimension of the BCIS and 
preference for any of the COPE subscales. 
7.5 - Discussion 
Previous literature suggests that poor insight in schizophrenia is associated with the 
use of denial as a coping style, and that better insight is associated with greater 
distress. However, the relationships between insight and coping styles beyond 
denial have seldom been investigated. This investigation aimed to extend the 
literature on the psychological denial model of insight by examining the 
relationships between insight (both clinical and cognitive), measures of distress, 
and a comprehensive measure of coping style. 
7.5.1 - Insight and distress 
The relationships found between the SR and AP clinical insight factors and 
depression, together with the correlation between the AP factor and anxiety, 
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support the hypothesis that better clinical insight is associated with greater 
distress. This is consistent with the psychological denial model as it suggests that 
possessing good clinical insight is something which is distressing, which individuals 
may have a motivation to avoid or deny. Furthermore, higher scores on the self- 
certainty dimension of BCIS were correlated with better self-esteem, indicating that 
poorer cognitive insight is associated with better self-esteem, as greater self- 
certainty indicates poorer decision-making (e. g. jumping to conclusions, over- 
confidence about being right). 
7.5.2 - Insight and coping style 
As hypothesised, a significant relationship was found between preference for 
'positive reinterpretation and growth' as a coping style and the SR insight factor. 
This replicates Lysaker and colleagues' (2003a) finding of an association between 
preference for 'positive reinterpretation' (from the WCQ) and awareness of 
symptoms (from the SUMD). It therefore appears possible to detect this specific 
relationship using different measures of insight and different measures of coping 
style. Given the stigma attached to schizophrenia (and its symptoms), interpreting 
unusual mental experiences as psychotic could be seen as a 'negative' 
interpretation - one which, however plausible, is psychologically threatening. 
Indeed, such an interpretation is consistent with the finding that preference for 
positive reinterpretation and growth was highly negatively correlated with both 
depression (r = -0.439, n= 55, p<0.001) and poor self-esteem (r = -0.350, p< 
0.01). It therefore appears that adopting a positive reinterpretation style of coping 
may help to protect against distress,, but at the cost of reducing awareness of 
symptoms. 
An unexpected relationship was found between the AAI clinical insight factor score 
and preference for the 'use of instrumental social support' as a coping style. This 
relationship survived FDR correction, and therefore is unlikely to be a statistical 
artefact of the number of comparisons made. The items for this COPE sub-scale 
address discussing 'the problem' (in this case a mental health problem) with other 
people in order to gather information and decide what to do about it. This 
relationship suggests that people who are aware that they have a mental illness are 
more likely to talk to others about their mental health problems, and concords with 
previous findings linking poor insight to poor interpersonal functioning (Lysaker et 
al., 1998b). The direction of causality in this relationship is unclear. It may be that 
people have better insight because they discuss their mental health problems with 
others, or it may be that people who accept that they have a mental health 
problem are more likely to seek support for it. In either case, getting external input 
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about a mental health problem appears to be associated with better insight, making 
it a potential avenue for interventions which aim to improve outcome by boosting 
insight (Dolder et al., 2003). 
A negative association was found between preference for 'behavioural 
disengagement' and the AAI clinical insight factor. The items which make up this 
subscale deal with 'giving up', such as I admit to myself that I can't deal with it, 
and quit trying' (see appendix 7.1). This subscale was correlated with a number of 
measures of distress, including depression (r = 0.457, p<0.001), anxiety (r = 
0.382, p<0.005), and poor self-esteem (r = 0.386, p<0.005). This suggests that 
adopting this dysfunctional coping style may lead to both increased distress, and 
decreased insight. However, the direction of causality cannot be established from 
this cross-sectional study. Significant correlations were also found between the AAI 
factor score and preference for 'planning', between SR factor score and 
'suppression of competing activities, and between AP factor score and 'mental 
disengagement'. However, these relationships did not survive FDR correction for 
multiple comparisons, and therefore need to be replicated in future studies before 
they can be considered firm findings. 
The hypothesised relationships between poor insight and preference for denial as a 
coping style was not found. This hypothesis was based on the findings of previous 
studies which used different coping style scales, which often only measured denial 
(Moore et al., 1999; Young et al., 1998; Lysaker et al., 2005b), rather than the 
wide range of coping styles measured by the COPE. It may therefore be that the 
COPE does not measure the concept of 'denial' in sufficient depth for relationships 
with insight to be detected, or differences in the way the concept is operationalised 
in different scales may lead to the discrepant findings. 
In conclusion, the findings of this investigation support the position that possessing 
good insight is associated with greater distress in schizophrenia. Preference for 
positive reinterpretation as a coping style appears to be adaptive, as it was 
associated with lower distress. However, it was also associated with lower insight 
(SR factor), suggesting that this better psychological well-being comes at the cost 
of reduced clinical insight. In contrast, preference for mental disengagement was 
associated with both lower clinical insight (AAI factor) and greater 
distress, 
suggesting that this coping style is dysfunctional in both regards, and may 
therefore be considered a target for psychological interventions. Unexpectedly, a 
strong relationship was found between better clinical insight 
(AAI factor) and 
preference for a social support-seeking coping style, suggesting 
that discussing a 
mental health problem with others is associated with 
having better insight into it. 
184 
However, the hypothesised relationships between insight and the use of denial as a 
coping style were not found, which may be due in part to the measure of denial 
that was used. 
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CHAPTER 8: STUDY 4: INTEGRATING MODELS OF INSIGHT 
8.1 - Introduction 
Three aetiological models dominate the literature on insight in schizophrenia 
(Carroll et al., 1999; Laroi et al., 2000, see also chapter 3). The clinical model of 
insight has little empirical support, partly because it does not generate testable 
hypotheses, restricting its utility (section 3.2). Studies 1,2 and 3 of this thesis 
focussed on the remaining two models: the neuropsychological model and the 
psychological denial model. The neuropsychological model contends that poor 
insight reflects a neuropsychological deficit (study 1) which is secondary to a brain 
lesion (study 2). The psychological denial model holds that poor insight serves a 
defensive function to protect the individual from the distress which acknowledging 
the presence of illness would cause (study 3). These models are not mutually 
exclusive, and so far no model in isolation has offered a full explanation of insight in 
schizophrenia. 
Integrating multiple models of poor insight offers the opportunity to explain insight 
more fully than single models alone, furthering our understanding of the 
phenomenon (Startup, 1996). Recent theoretical and experimental work has 
focussed on integrating the neuropsychological and psychological denial models. 
Green and colleagues (2000b) hypothesised that insight in schizophrenia reflects an 
interaction between neuropsychological functioning and coping style. They contend 
that good neuropsychological functioning is required for good insight, implying that 
those with poor cognitive functioning will have poor insight, but giving those with 
good cognitive functioning the 'potential' for possessing good insight. However, 
within this group, some individuals may have a motivation for positive self- 
evaluation, and thus manifest poor insight despite having intact neuropsychological 
functioning. 
A recent study by Lysaker and colleagues (2003b) integrated measures of: insight 
(PANSS G12 item), coping style (Ways of Coping Questionnaire) and executive 
function (WCST perseverative errors). In a k-cluster analysis, they found three 
clusters: poor executive function and poor insight (group 1), average executive 
function and good insight (group 2) and average executive function and poor 
insight (group 3). Comparing the two groups with poor insight, the group with 
average executive function (group 3) showed a significantly greater preference 
for 
endorsement of distancing (denial) (but not positive-reappraisal or escape- 
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avoidance) as a coping style compared to the group with poor executive function 
(group 1). While this finding does not directly support the hypothesis of Green and 
colleagues (which would predict a greater preference for denial in group 3 
compared to group 2), this result supports the notion that integrating the 
neuropsychological and coping style data can offer a better explanation of insight in 
schizophrenia than either on its own. 
There are two main ways in which the data from studies 1,2 and 3 can be 
combined. Firstly, coping style data can be integrated with the curvilinear 
relationships that were found between insight and neuropsychological functioning in 
study 1, to examine whether coping style differs between those with relatively 
intact cognitive functioning and good insight, and those with relatively intact 
cognitive functioning but poor insight (c. f. Green et al., 2000b). Secondly, where 
linear relationships have been found between insight and variables from more than 
one domain (neuropsychological, brain structure, coping style), these variables can 
be entered into a regression to determine whether they explain common or 
different variance in insight. 
8.2 - Aims and hypotheses 
This study aimed to integrate the results of the studies 1,2 and 3, in order to 
examine whether integrating the findings can offer a more complete explanation of 
insight in schizophrenia. 
8.2.1 - Hypotheses 
1. Where quadratic relationships between insight and neuropsychological 
measures had been found in study 1, those with low insight but high 
neuropsychological functioning may endorse denial as a coping style more 
than those with high insight. 
2. Where relationships with variables in two or more of the three domains 
(neuropsychological, brain structure, coping style) were found, these 
relationships will explain separate variance in insight, and combining them 
will explain greater variance in insight than variables from a single domain in 
isolation. 
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8.3 - Method 
8.3.1 - Participants 
The sample for this study comprised the same patient group used for study 1 (see 
section 5.3.1, n= 65). The demographic and clinical characteristics of this sample 
are described in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 respectively. 
8.3.2 - Measures 
8.3.2.1 - Insight 
As in studies 1,2 and 3, clinical insight was measured using the four factor scores 
derived from the factor analysis in study 1: Awareness of and Attribution to Illness 
(AAI), Recognition of the Need for Medication (RNM), Awareness of Problems (AP) 
and Symptom Re-labelling (SR) (see section 5.7.3). 
Cognitive insight was measured using the Self-Certainty and Self- Reflectiveness 
dimensions of the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (Beck et al., 2004b, see section 
2.2.6). 
8.3.2.2 - Neuropsychological functioning 
Neuropsychological function was assessed using the measures listed in study 1 (see 
section 5.3.4.2.3), with appropriate transformations applied to allow the use of 
parametric statistics where necessary (see section 5.5). 
8.3.2.2 - Brain measures 
Global grey matter volume was measured using 'get_integrals' function in SPM2 
(see section 6.3.5.2). Values for significant regional relationships between insight 
measures and clusters of grey matter were extracted from the most significant 
voxel in the cluster (the local maxima) using SPM2. 
8.3.2.2 - Coping style 
Coping style was assessed using the COPE (Carver et al., 1989, see section 
7.3.2.3). Relative preference scores for each of the 15 COPE subscales were 
calculated by dividing the subscale score by the total COPE score to control for 
overall response bias. 
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8.3.3 - Data analysis 
8.3.3.1 - Missing values 
Studies 1,2 and 3 each had slightly different samples, in addition to different 
profiles of missing data. The need for integrative analyses to have data for every 
measure included in a regression therefore unavoidably reduced the sample size of 
some analyses. For the regression analyses incorporating all significant 
relationships, the sample sizes were 36 for the AAI and SR clinical insight factors, 
43 for the AP clinical insight factor, and 52 for the self-certainty dimension of 
cognitive insight. 
8.3.3.2 - Statistical analyses 
8.3.3.2.1 - Coping styles in curvilinear relationships between insight and 
neuropsychological functioning 
Three curvilinear relationships between insight and neuropsychological functioning 
were found in study I which followed the pattern hypothesised, with high 
neuropsychological functioning being associated with both high insight and low 
insight. The influence of coping style on these relationships was examined by 
splitting the patient sample at the median of the neuropsychological test score, and 
examining whether, within those with neuropsychological functioning in the upper 
half, those with good insight differed from those with poor insight in terms of 
coping style preference. The 'good insight' and "poor insight" groups were 
determined by a median split of the relevant insight score within the good 
neuropsychological functioning group. 
In order to confirm that any differences in coping style between the 'high insight' 
and 'low insight' groups were specific to those in the high cognitive functioning 
group, the same relationships were also examined in the low cognitive functioning 
group. 
8.3.3.2.2 - Integrating linear relationships between insight, 
neuropsychological functioning,, coping style and structural brain measures 
Where both coping style and neuropsychological functioning variable were 
significantly related to insight, these variables were entered into a stepwise linear 
regression to determine which variables explained shared variance, or whether 
including additional variables explained greater variance. 
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VBM analyses involve making a substantially larger number of comparisons than 
either the neuropsychological or coping style analyses, hence the greater need to 
control for multiple comparisons. These correction procedures ensure that only 
maxima voxels that are highly significant are deemed meaningful. However, these 
highly significant associations are likely to explain a greater amount of variance in 
insight than the other measures. Given that these large effects could dwarf smaller 
effects found for neuropsychological or coping style variables, stepwise linear 
regressions incorporating VBM findings were included as separate analyses (i. e. in 
addition to an analysis including only neuropsychological and coping style 
variables). 
8.4 - Results 
8.4.1 - Coping styles in curvilinear relationships between insight and 
neuropsychological functioning 
Table 8.1 summarises the results of studies 1,2 and 3. Curvilinear relationships 
were found between the AAI clinical insight factor and three neuropsychological 
variables: BADS total score, WCST categories achieved and categorical (verbal) 
fluency. The sample was dichotomised into high and low AAI factor score at the 
group median of 11 (with those equal to the median being assigned to the high 
insight group). The total patient sample was also divided at the medians for each of 
the three neuropsychological variables for which a curvilinear relationship was 
found (with those equal to the median being assigned to the high test score group): 
16 for BADS total score, 4 for WCST categories achieved, and 40 for categorical 
fluency. 
The hypothesis that individuals with relatively intact cognitive ability and poor 
insight use different coping styles to those with relatively intact cognitive ability and 
good insight was tested separately for each of the neuropsychological variables 
where a curvilinear relationship with AAI score was found. For each 
neuropsychological variable, t-tests were used to compare scores for each of the 15 
preferred coping style scores between the good-insight, good-cognition group and 
the poor-insight, good-cognition group. These data are presented in appendices 
8.1,8.3 and 8.5. The good-insight, good-cognition group had a significantly greater 
preference for 'use of instrumental social support' as a coping style compared to the 
poor-insight, good-cognition group in the analyses for all three neuropsychological 
variables: BADS total score (t 3.05, df = 26, p=0.005), WCST categories 
completed (t = 2.65, df = 22, p 0.015) and categorical fluency (t = 2.64, df = 
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21, p=0.015). The good-insight, good-cognition group also had a significantly 
greater preference for the 'use of emotional social support' compared to the poor- 
insight, good-cognition group in the analyses for all three neuropsychological 
variables: BADS total score (t 2.38, df = 26, p=0.025), WCST categories 
completed (t = 2.63, df = 22, p 0.015) and categorical fluency (t = 2.42, df = 
21f p=0.025). In addition, the good-insight, good-cognition group had a greater 
preference for 'active coping' compared to the poor-insight, good-cognition group in 
the WCST categories completed analysis (t = 2.54, df = 22f p=0.019). 
In order to examine whether these findings were specific to individuals with 
relatively intact cognitive ability, differences in preferred coping style were also 
examined for those scoring below the patient median for these neuropsychological 
variables. The differences between the good-insight, poor-cognition and poor- 
insight, poor-cognition groups are presented in appendices 8.2,8.4 and 8.6. 
Individuals in the good-insight, poor-cognition showed a significantly greater 
preference for the 'use of instrumental social support' compared to the poor-insight, 
poor-cognition group in both the WCST categories completed analysis (t 2.11, df 
= 21, p=0.047), and the categorical fluency analysis (t = 2.29, df 21, p 
0.032). 
8.4.2 - Integrating linear relationships between insight,, 
neuropsychological functioning and coping style 
Table 8.1 summarises the results of studies 1,2 and 3. Relationships were found 
between both coping style and neuropsychological functioning for the AAI clinical 
insight factor. The six variables (three neuropsychological, three coping style) 
which were significantly associated with AAI factor score were entered into a 
stepwise linear regression. Only preference for 'use of instrumental social support' 
as a coping style entered the resulting model (F = 11.98, df = 45,1, p=0.001), 
which accounted for 21.0% of the variance in AAI factor score. This indicates that 
the other variables did not explain a significant amount of variance in AAI factor 
score over and above that explained by the relationship with "use of instrumental 
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8.4.3 - Integrating linear relationships between insight, structural brain 
measures, neuropsychological functioning and coping style 
Significant relationships were found between the AAI clinical insight factor and 
neuropsychological variables, structural brain measures, and coping style. 
Significant relationships were also identified between both the AP and SR clinical 
insight subscales and structural brain measures and coping style. The cognitive 
insight dimension of self-certainty had significant relationships with 
neuropsychological and brain structure variables. 
AAI clinical insight factor 
Significant linear relationships were found between the AAI clinical insight factor 
and both neuropsychological and coping style variables (see section 8.4.2), as well 
as structural brain measures (left STG, left MTG, Right ITG, right inferior parietal 
lobule and right supramarginal gyrus, see study 3). All 11 variables (three 
neuropsychological, three coping style, five regional brain volumes) were entered 
into a stepwise linear regression. Right inferior parietal lobe volume entered the 
model first, explaining 40% of the variance in AAI score (F = 21.35, df = 3211, p< 
0.001). Preference for the use of instrumental social support as a coping style 
entered the second model ( R2 change = 0.149, F change = 10.24, df = 31,1, p= 
0.003), with the second model explaining a total of 54.9% of the variance (F = 
18.87, df = 3112, p<0.001). This indicated that it explained variance in AAI factor 
score that was different to that explained by the volume of the right inferior parietal 
lobule, and that the other structural brain measures did not explain a significant 
proportion of additional variance. 
SR clinical insiaht factor 
Significant relationships were found between both structural brain measures and 
coping style for the SR clinical insight factor. These significant variables (total grey 
matter volume, right middle temporal gyrus volume, preference for positive 
reinterpretation and growth, and suppression of competing activities) were entered 
into a linear regression with SR factor score as the dependent variable. Only the 
right middle temporal gyrus (MTG) volume entered the resulting model (F = 16.46, 
df = 34,1, p=0.001), which accounted for 32.6% of the variance in SR factor 
score. The fact that no other variables entered the equation indicates that they did 
not account for a significant proportion of the variance in SR factor score over and 
above that explained by the right MTG volume relationship. 
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AP clinical insight factor 
The AP insight factor was not normally distributed, therefore a logistic regression 
was performed in order to evaluate the contributions of the variables with which it 
had been found to be significantly associated (global GM volume, left precuneus 
volume and preference for mental disengagement as a coping style). AP factor 
score was dichotomised into 'high' (score of 5 or 6) versus 'low' (score of 0 to 4). 
Of the 43 individuals included in this analysis, 20 were in the 'low' AP group and 23 
were in the "high" AP group. In a forward Wald logistic regression analysis, left 
precuneus volume entered the model in the first step (B = 34.7, Wald = 7.76, p 
0.005) and preference for mental disengagement entered in the second step (B = 
1.37, Wald = 3.52, p=0.061). This indicated that 'high' AP score was associated 
with a higher left precuneus volume and a lower preference for mental 
disengagement as a coping style. The addition of the coping style variable improved 
the percentage of correctly classified cases from 62.8 % to 76.7% and yielded a 
Cox & Snell R square (an estimate of variance explained) of 32.8%. 
Self-certainty dimension of cognitive insight 
Two neuropsychological variables (Brixton profile score and BADS total score) as 
well as total grey matter volume were significantly associated with the self- 
certainty dimension of the BCIS. In a stepwise multiple regression of all three 
variables, only the (transformed) BADS total score entered the model (F = 8.37, df 
= 5011, p=0.006), explaining 14.3% of the variance and suggesting that the other 
variables did not explain a significant amount of additional variance. 
8.5 - Discussion 
Recent literature has suggested that integrating models of insight by combining 
measures of neuropsychological functioning and coping style within a single study 
can help to explain variance in insight in schizophrenia more fully than investigating 
single models in isolation. However, no previous study has integrated these both 
neuropsychological functioning and coping style with structural brain measures. The 
present study aimed to extend the literature on integrating models of insight by 
integrating the findings of studies 1,2 and 3, drawing together neuropsychological, 
brain structure and coping style data. 
8.5.1 - Integrating curvilinear relationships between insight and 
neuropsychological functioning with coping style 
One way in which models of insight can be integrated is to examine whether, 
among individuals with intact cognitive ability, those with high insight differ from 
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those with low insight in terms of preferred coping style. This allows testing of 
Green and colleagues' (2000b) hypothesis that motivation for positive self- 
evaluation contributes to whether those with intact cognitive function have high or 
low insight. Three curvilinear relationships between the AAI clinical insight factor 
and measures of neuropsychological functioning were found in study 1, whereby 
high cognitive ability was associated with both high insight and low insight. For 
each of these neuropsychological tests, (BADS total score, WCST categories 
achieved and categorical fluency), those performing above the median score were 
divided into a 'high insight' and a 'low insight' group based on the overall group 
median for the AAI insight factor. Preference for different coping styles was then 
compared between these groups. The hypothesised difference in preference for 
denial as a coping style was not found. However, a number of unhypothesised 
findings emerged. For all three neuropsychological tests, individuals in the high- 
insight, high-cognition group had a significantly greater preference for both 'use of 
instrumental social support' and 'use of emotional social support' compared to 
those in the low-insight, high-cognition group. This finding suggests that, for those 
with relatively intact neuropsychological functioning, the use of social support 
coping styles may contribute to level of insight. Such coping styles were not 
measured by Lysaker and colleagues (2003b), which may explain why such 
differences have not previously been found. 
Startup (1996) hypothesised that the ability to maintain illusions about oneself 
decreases as cognitive deficits increase, suggesting that those with greater 
neuropsychological impairment would be less able to use denial as a coping style 
because it would be more obvious that there was something wrong. An additional 
set of analyses was therefore undertaken to examine whether this was the case for 
the coping styles identified in the above analyses - i. e. were differences in coping 
style specific to those with relatively intact performance on the neuropsychological 
tests in question. In these analyses, the good-insight, low-cognition group showed 
a preference for use of instrumental social support as a coping style compared to 
the poor-insight, low-cognition group for two of the three neuropsychological 
variables (WCST categories and categorical fluency). No significant differences in 
coping style were found for the BADS total score, and the differences in 'use of 
emotional social support' found between the high-cognition groups were also not 
found. These data suggest that differences in coping style are not entirely limited to 
those with relatively intact cognitive abilities. Such a finding is not unexpected 
given that, unlike denying that there is something wrong, there seems 
little reason 
why those who are more cognitively impaired would not be able to gain 
from using 
social support coping styles in the same way as individuals with relatively 
intact 
neuropsychological function. While it may be the case that maintaining 
illusions 
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about oneself (using denial as a coping style) becomes more difficult as cognitive 
impairment increases (c. f. Startup, 1996), this may not be the case for other 
coping styles, including seeking social support. 
These data point towards a slightly different theoretical integration of 
neuropsychological ability and coping style than that proposed by Startup (1996) 
and Green and colleagues' (2000b). It appears that the degree to which individuals 
use social support coping styles may help to explain why some individuals have 
poor insight despite intact cognitive ability, and may also contribute to the level of 
insight in those with more impaired cognitive ability as well. The nature of the U- 
shaped relationships found between AAI score and neuropsychological functioning 
may explain why more significant differences in coping style were found in those 
with relatively intact neuropsychological functioning - the more extreme values are 
at the top of the U-shaped curve and thus offer the greatest contrast between high 
insight and low insight. When these insight scores are dichotomised in order to 
analyse the influence of coping style, the range of insight scores in the low 
cognitive ability group are compressed, making it more difficult to find significant 
differences. 
8.5.2 - Integrating linear relationships between insight and 
neuropsychological functioning, brain structure and coping style 
Given the recent focus on the neuropsychological basis of insight in schizophrenia 
(e. g. Amador & Kronengold, 2004), it is interesting to note that when 
neuropsychological variables were integrated with coping style variables in the AAI 
factor score regression analyses, it was a coping style subscale (preference for 'use 
of instrumental social support') which emerged as the only significant predictor. . 
When the brain structure variables were added to the regression, it was a brain 
structure variable (right inferior parietal lobe volume) and the same coping style 
variable which remained in the model. This suggests that the neuropsychological 
variables which had linear relationships with AAI score did not explain a significant 
amount of variance above that accounted for by coping style and brain structure 
variables. Multiple variables also significantly contributed to AP factor score, where 
a combination of less preference for "mental disengagement' as a coping style and 
greater left precuneus volume differentiated those with high AP 
factor scores from 
those with low AP factor scores. 
In contrast, in the SR factor score analysis, a structural brain measure 
(right middle 
temporal gyrus (MTG) volume) was the only variable to enter the model. 
This 
suggested that total grey matter volume and coping style variables 
did not explain 
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a further significant proportion of the variance beyond that accounted for by the 
relationship with right MTG volume. Within the present sample, there may be some 
aspects of clinical insight which are more aetiologically 'multi-dimensional' than 
others in terms of whether variables relevant to multiple models contribute. Finally, 
only a neuropsychological variable, the BADS total score, contributed to explaining 
variance in the cognitive insight dimension of self-certainty. This suggests that it 
may be cognitive insight rather than clinical insight in which neuropsychological 
variables are most important. 
Overall, these data demonstrate that different aspects of insight in schizophrenia 
have relationships with variables from different domains of investigation 
(neuropsychological, brain structure, and coping style). Furthermore, combining 
measures relevant to multiple models of insight in integrative analyses explained a 
greater proportion of variance in the both the AAI and AP clinical insight factor 
scores than examining measures from a single model in isolation. 
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Part III 
CHAPTER 9: GENERAL DiscUSSION 
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CHAPTER 9: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
9.1 - Chapter overview 
This chapter reviews the theoretical basis for conducting the four experimental 
investigations and summarises their findings. It discusses their implications for 
understanding the aetiology of insight in schizophrenia in the context of previous 
research. The potential limitations of the studies are considered and directions for 
future research in the area are identified. 
9.2 - Overview of aims and hypotheses 
This thesis aimed to investigate and integrate the relationships between insight in 
schizophrenia and (i) domains of neuropsychological functioning using a battery of 
psychometric tests, (ii) structural brain correlates using voxel-based morphometry 
(VBM), and (iii) preferred coping style using the COPE questionnaire. To these ends, 
four experimental studies were conducted. The hypotheses and results of each 
study are surnmarised in table 9.1. 
9.2.1 - Study 1: The neuropsychology of insight 
The neuropsychological model contends that poor insight in schizophrenia reflects 
either a general (Keshavan et al., 2004) or specific (Lysaker et al., 1998a) cognitive 
deficit. Over 50 studies have investigated the relationships between 
neuropsychological test performance and measures of insight based around the 
medical model of schizophrenia (referred to here as 'clinical' insight), while the 
neuropsychological correlates of "cognitive insight" (Beck et al., 2004b) have not 
previously been investigated. The neuropsychological domain most investigated in 
relation to clinical insight (and the domain for which a relationship has most often 
been found) is executive function (section 3.3.2.1). However, clinical insight has 
also been found to relate to general cognitive ability in some studies, and other 
domains in others (section 3.3.2), questioning the specificity of the relationship 
with executive function. Recent data also suggest that the relationship between 
insight and neuropsychological functioning may be curvilinear, with high cognitive 
functioning associated with both good insight and poor insight. 
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TABLE 9.1: Summary of ma n hypotheses and 
Hypothesis Prediction Finding 
Study 1 
1 Linear or curvilinear relationship between 
clinical insight and IQ. 
2a Linear or curvilinear relationship between 
clinical insight and executive function. 
No relationship found 
Linear relationships between AAI factor 
and both Hayling and BADS scores. 
Curvilinear relationship between AAI 
and WCST categories and BADS score. 
2b Relationships with executive function will be 
strongest for perseveration measures. 
Relationships not specific to 
perseveration 
2c Controlling for IQ will weaken relationships The only relationship to survive 
with executive function. correction for multiple comparisons 
(between self-certainty and BADS total 
score) remained significant after 
controlling for IQ 
3 No association between insight and other 
standard cognitive domains (i. e. verbal 
fluency, attention, and memory). 
Curvilinear relationship found between 
AAI score and (categorical) verbal 
fluency. 
A There will either be a linear or curvilinear Linear relationship found between AAI 
association between better insight and higher score and identification of fearful faces. 
scores on measures of social cognition. 
B There will be stronger relationships between No hypothesised relationships found 
measures of cognitive function and the with the symptom re-labelling (SR) 
awareness of symptoms dimension of insight factor. 
than with other dimensions of insight 
C There will be either linear or curvilinear 
associations between cognitive insight and 
domains of cognitive functioning. 
Study 2 
1 Lower total grey matter availability will be 
correlated with poorer clinical insight (all 
factors). 
Linear relationships found between 
lower self-certainty and two executive 
function tests - the BADS and the 
Brixton spatial anticipation test 
Total GM volume significantly correlated 
with SIR and AIR clinical insight factors. 
2 Grey matter volume in the cingulate will be No relationships found in the cingulate 
correlated with the AAI and SIR clinical insight 
factors. 
3 Lower scores on the SR clinical insight factor No frontal lobe relationships found 
will be associated with lower grey matter 
volume in lateral frontal regions. 
4 Grey matter volume in medial frontal regions No frontal lobe relationships found 
will be either positively or negatively 
correlated with the AAI clinical insight factor. 
5 Greater grey matter availability in the AAI factor score correlated with volume 
temporal lobe will be correlated with greater of three temporal lobe clusters (left 
clinical insight (all factor scores). STG, left MTG, right ITG). SR factor 
score correlated with one temporal lobe 
cluster (right MTG) 
6 There will be no relationship between clinical No occipital lobe relationships found 
insight factors and the volume of occipital 
brain regions. 
A Clinical insight will be associated with the In addition to the temporal lobe 
availability of grey matter in brain regions findings, AAI factor score correlated 
implicated in anosognosia - i. e. the frontal, with the volume of a large right parietal 
temporal and parietal lobes, particularly in the lobe cluster, and AP factor score 
right hemisphere. correlated with left precuneus volume. 
B Cognitive insight dimensions will be No regional brain structure relationships 
associated with frontal, but not non-frontal, found. 
grey matter volumes. 
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Hypothesis Prediction Finding 
Study 3 
Clinical insight will be positively associated 
with distress. 
SR and AP factors both positively 
correlated with depression. AP factor 
correlated with depression and anxiety. 
2A preference for denial as a coping style will No relationship found with denial. A 
be negatively associated with clinical insight. strong unhypothesised relationship 
between the AAI insight factor and 
preference for use of instrumental social 
support was found. 
3A preference for positive reappraisal as a 
coping style will be negatively associated with 
the SIR clinical insight factor. 
A Greater cognitive insight will be associated 
with greater distress. 
BA preference for denial as a coping style will 
be associated with poorer cognitive insight. 
SR factor score was negatively 
associated with preference for positive 
reinterpretation 
Self-certainty correlated with better 
self-esteem - i. e. poorer cognitive 
insight associated with better self- 
esteem. 
No relationship found. 
Study 4 
Where quadratic relationships between insight 
and neuropsychological measures had been 
found, those with low insight but high 
neuropsychological functioning will endorse 
denial as a coping style more than those with 
high insight. 
No relationship with denial found. 
Groups instead differed in preference 
for use of social support. 
2 Integrating measures from different models of Integrating brain structure and coping 
insight will explain greater variance in insight style variables explained greater 
than examining single models in isolation. variance in both the AAI and AP factor 
scores. 
The aim of the first study was to investigate the relationships between insight in 
schizophrenia and neuropsychological functioning across a range of domains. This 
was accomplished using a broad battery of neuropsychological tests which included 
measures of general cognitive ability, executive function, memory, attention, verbal 
fluency and social cognition. 
It was hypothesised that there would be either a linear or a curvilinear relationship 
between clinical insight and general cognitive ability, as measured by a 
standardised IQ test. A similar hypothesis was made regarding the relationship 
between insight and measures of executive function. It has been suggested that a 
failure to detect errors (which would lead to perseverative errors) may be a 
particularly important factor in individuals with schizophrenia being unaware of the 
'incorrectness' of symptoms (Laroi et al., 2000). It was therefore hypothesised that 
relationships between insight and executive functioning would be strongest for 
measures of perseveration. Given that measures of executive function, particularly 
the Wisconsin card sort test, are highly IQ dependent (Laws, 1999), it was 
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hypothesised that controlling for IQ would weaken any significant relationships 
found with executive function. 
Few studies have found relationships between insight and other domains of 
neuropsychological functioning and it was therefore hypothesised that no 
relationships would be found between insight and the domains of memory, 
attention, and verbal fluency. 
Novel hypotheses predicted that there would be relationships between insight and 
measures of social cognition, and that cognitive insight would have 
neuropsychological correlates. It was also hypothesised that relationships between 
clinical insight and neuropsychological measures would be strongest for the re- 
labelling of symptoms because it has been proposed that other dimensions of 
clinical insight are influenced by social factors to a greater extent (Drake et al., 
2003; Rossell et al., 2003). 
9.2.2 - Study 2: Insight and structural brain measures 
Some proponents of the neuropsychological model of insight in schizophrenia 
contend that poor insight reflects cognitive impairment which is secondary to brain 
abnormalities (Young et al., 1993; Lysaker et al., 1994b). This position has been 
supported by a number of studies which have found relationships between insight 
and structural brain measures, using both the region of interest approach 
(Flashman et al., 2001; Shad et al., 2004; Shad et al., 2006) and VBM (Ha et al., 
2004; Morgan et al., 2002). These studies have pointed towards the volume of the 
frontal lobes and the cingulate as being most highly correlated with clinical insight, 
although the region of interest studies have rarely examined cortical regions 
outside the frontal lobes, making it impossible for such studies to detect 
relationships with non-frontal regions. The brain structure correlates of cognitive 
insight had not previously been investigated. 
The aim of the second study was to utilise VBM to identify the structural brain 
correlates of poor insight in schizophrenia throughout the brain. On the basis of 
previous studies, it was hypothesised that smaller total grey matter volume would 
be correlated with lower clinical insight. Regionally, it was hypothesised that the 
clinical insight factor scores of awareness of and attribution to illness (AAI) and 
symptom re-labelling (SR) would both correlate with the volume of the cingulate. 
Within the frontal lobes, it was predicted that SR factor score would correlate with 
the volume of lateral frontal regions, while AAI score would be associated with the 
volume of medial regions (although the direction of the latter relationship was not 
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hypothesised due to conflicting previous research). Outside of the frontal lobes, it 
was hypothesised that poorer clinical insight would be correlated with lower grey 
matter availability in temporal lobe regions, and that clinical insight may also be 
associated with the brain regions implicated in anosognosia - right-sided temporal, 
parietal and frontal areas. A further exploratory hypothesis predicted that cognitive 
insight would be correlated with frontal but not non-frontal regional brain volumes. 
9.2.3 - Study 3: Coping and insight 
Schizophrenia is a highly stigmatising diagnosis, and the psychological denial model 
of insight in schizophrenia proposes that poor insight reflects the use of a 
psychological defence mechanism in the form of denial of illness (Moore et al., 
1999). This model predicts that those who deploy denial as a coping strategy will 
have poorer insight, but will suffer less distress. A number of previous studies 
support a relationship between insight and distress, but only a small number have 
investigated the relationships between insight and coping style directly. 
Relationships between poorer clinical insight and a number of coping style 
measures have been found, including denial (Moore et al., 1999; Young et al., 
1998), and 'positive reappraisal' (Lysaker et al., 2003a). The associations between 
coping style and cognitive insight have not previously been investigated. 
It was therefore hypothesised that both clinical and cognitive insight would be 
positively associated with measures of distress, and negatively associated with 
preference for denial as a coping style. On the basis of the findings of previous 
studies, it was also hypothesised that preference for positive reappraisal would be 
negatively associated with the SR factor score. 
9.2.4 - Study 4- Integrating models of insight 
Recent data have suggested that integrating multiple models of poor insight can 
explain insight in schizophrenia more fully than examining single models in 
isolation. To date, this research has focussed integrating measures relevant to the 
neuropsychological and psychological denial models. Green and colleagues (2000b) 
propose that good neuropsychological functioning is required for good insight, 
implying that those with poor cognitive functioning will have poor insight, but giving 
those with good cognitive functioning the 'potential' for possessing good insight. 
They also contend that some individuals who have relatively intact 
neuropsychological functioning may use a coping style which reduces distress but 
leads to poor insight. Recent data support this, suggesting that preference for 
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denial as a coping style is greater (and distress lower) in individuals with intact 
executive function but poor insight, compared to those with impaired executive 
function and poor insight (Lysaker et al., 2003b). 
It was hypothesised that where curvilinear relationships were found between insight 
and neuropsychological functioning in study 1, those with relatively intact cognitive 
functioning and poor insight would have a greater preference for denial as a coping 
style compared to those with relatively intact cognitive functioning and good 
insight. It was further predicted that integrating all significant linear findings for 
each insight measure in single regression would explain more variance than 
examining measures relevant to only one model in isolation. 
9.3 - Summary of key findings 
Clinical insiqht factors 
Measures of insight in schizophrenia based around the medical model (clinical 
insight) are widely regarded as multi-dimensional. A factor analysis of the two 
clinical insight scales (the BIS and the SAI-E) administered in the experimental 
investigations was undertaken to determine how best to combine the items from 
these scales (section 5.6.3). The loadings on the four factors identified were used 
to combine items from BIS and the SAI-E into the four factor scores, and these 
factor scores were used as the measures of clinical insight in the experimental 
studies. 
The first factor encompassed items relating to both awareness of illness, and the 
attribution of symptoms and other problems to a mental illness combining two 
aspects of insight that are separated in the SUMD (see section 2.2.4.2). It was 
labelled 'awareness of and attribution to illness' (AAI) and showed strong 
convergent validity with the PANSS G12 insight item. A second factor, named 
'recognition of the need for medication' (RNM) was made up of items relating to 
awareness of the need for treatment, specifically medication. This factor also 
showed strong convergent validity with the PANSS G12 item, which was expected 
given the focus on medication compliance and awareness of illness in the scoring 
criteria for this item. A third factor included items related to awareness of problems 
and the need to seek help and was labelled "awareness of problems" (AP). Finally, a 
fourth factor was made up of items relating to the awareness of symptoms (but not 
their attribution to an illness) and was named 'symptom re-labelling" (SR). 
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Study 1 
The predicted relationship between clinical insight and IQ was not found 
(hypothesis 1). A number of relationships were found between clinical insight and 
neuropsychological functioning which, although significant at the single test level (p 
< 0.05), did not survive False Discovery Rate (FDR) correction for multiple 
comparisons (controlling for the number of tests examined to reject each null 
hypothesis for each insight measure). Two linear relationships between executive 
function and the AAI clinical insight factor were found (hypothesis 2a), although 
these were not specific to perseveration (hypothesis 2b). A relationship was also 
found between higher AAI factor score and a measure of social cognition 
(hypothesis A). Curvilinear relationships were found between the AAI factor score 
and two executive functioning measures (hypothesis 2a), as well as a measure of 
verbal fluency (hypothesis 3). A curvilinear relationship was found between the SR 
factor score and a measure from the WCST, but was not in the hypothesised shape 
(see section 5.2.1). Two relationships were found between the self-certainty 
dimension of cognitive insight and measures of executive function, with one (BADS 
total score) surviving FDR correction for multiple comparisons (hypothesis C). 
Study 2 
In the VBM analyses of brain structure and insight, lower total grey matter volume 
was correlated with poorer clinical insight for the SR and AP factor scores 
(hypothesis 1), and was also associated with poorer cognitive insight for the self- 
certainty dimension. Regionally, none of the hypothesised relationships between 
insight and frontal / cingulate grey matter volume and clinical insight (hypotheses 
21 3 and 4) or cognitive insight (hypothesis B) were found. AAI clinical insight factor 
score was correlated with three temporal lobe clusters (hypothesis 5) and one large 
parietal lobe cluster (hypothesis A), SR factor score was correlated with a temporal 
lobe cluster (hypothesis 5), and awareness of problems (AP) factor score was 
correlated with a parietal lobe cluster (hypothesis A). Of these findings, only the 
relationships between AP factor score and the parietal cluster (left precuneus) 
survived FWE correction for multiple comparisons across the entire brain. However, 




The hypothesised relationship between clinical insight and distress was found 
for 
the AP and SR factor scores, which were correlated with depression. 
A correlation 
between the AP factor and anxiety was also found (hypothesis 1). Better cognitive 
insight (self-certainty dimension) was associated with poorer self-esteem 
(hypothesis A). The predicted negative correlation was found between SR 
factor 
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score and positive re-appraisal (hypothesis 3) - i. e. higher SR score was associated 
with less positive re-appraisal. However, the hypothesised relationship between 
preference for denial as a coping style and poor insight was not found for either 
clinical insight (hypothesis 2) or cognitive insight (hypothesis B). A number of 
unhypothesised relationships were identified between clinical insight and preferred 
coping style. Greater preference for use of instrumental social support was strongly 
correlated with higher AAI score and survived FDR correction for multiple 
comparisons. Associations between 'planning' and AAI score, 'suppression of 
competing activities' and SR score, as well as a negative correlation between 
'mental disengagement' and AP score were also found, but did not survive FDR 
correction for multiple comparisons. 
Study 4 
It was predicted that, where a curvilinear relationship had been identified between 
insight and neuropsychological functioning, preference for denial as a coping style 
would differentiate those with intact cognition and good insight from those with 
intact cognition but poor insight. However, preference for denial as a coping style 
did not differ significantly between these groups (hypothesis 1). Instead, these 
groups differed significantly in preference for 'use of instrumental social support'. 
As hypothesised, integrating the variables from multiple models explained more 
variance in insight for two clinical insight factors: AAI and SR (hypothesis 2). 
Specifically, a combination of preference for 'use of instrumental social support' and 
the volume of a right inferior parietal lobe cluster contributed to explaining variance 
in AAI factor score. A combination of preference for 'mental disengagement' as a 
coping style and the volume of the left precuneus (in the parietal lobe) 
differentiated those with high AP factor scores from those with low AP factor scores 
in a logistic regression. 
9.4 - Implications of key findings for research on insight in 
schizophrenia 
The implications for research on clinical insight are discussed first, followed by the 
implications for research on cognitive insight. 
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9.4.1 - The neuropsychological model of clinical insight 
9.4.1.1 - The neuropsychological correlates of clinical insight 
The findings of study 1 extend the literature on the neuropsychological correlates of 
insight in schizophrenia. This study addressed a number of the limitations of 
previous literature by including a broad battery of neuropsychological tasks 
covering a wide spectrum of cognitive domains, rather than concentrating solely on 
'frontal lobe' tests. Performance on these tests was investigated in relation to 
dimensions of insight (in the form of factor scores derived from a factor analysis of 
two clinical insight scales), rather than examining the relationships with total 
insight scores. 
The three linear relationships that were found between neuropsychological variables 
and the AAI clinical insight factor suggest that this aspect of clinical insight may 
have the greatest neuropsychological basis. Two of these significant correlations 
were with measures of executive function: the BADS total score and the Hayling 
sentence completion task. Such relationships are consistent with the hypothesis 
that poor insight in schizophrenia is related to a specific deficit in executive function 
(Lysaker et al., 1998a). However, this result in isolation does not address the 
question of how such deficits might be involved in the aetiology of poor insight. One 
way to investigate this question is through post-hoc tests to examine the 
relationships between insight and test sub-scores (as measures of executive 
function sub-processes), for example scores relating to perseveration. However, no 
significant relationships were found between the sub-scores of these tests and AAI 
factor score. This suggests that the relationship between AAI factor score and 
executive function is non-specific, and does not support Laroi's (2000) hypothesis 
that a failure to detect errors being the mechanism by which poor executive 
function leads to poor insight. The associations between AAI factor score and 
executive function did not survive FDR correction for multiple comparisons, 
indicating that the relationship is a weak one. 
Study 1 was the first to investigate the relationships between clinical insight and 
social cognition, as measured by the Iowa gambling task and the emotion 
perception task (EPT). The relationship found between the percentage of correctly 
identified fearful faces on the EPT and the AAI clinical insight factor suggests that 
there may be links between social cognition and awareness of illness. This is a 
particularly interesting finding given the relationships that were found between the 
AAI factor score and social support coping styles in study 3. The possibility of a 
relationship between these variables was examined, but they were not significantly 
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correlated. It therefore appears that better social cognition and the greater use of 
social support coping styles may contribute independently to higher awareness of 
illness (although the direction of causality cannot be established from a cross- 
sectional study). The relationship between AAI score and the identification of fearful 
faces did not survive FDR correction, again suggesting that this relationship is a 
subtle one. 
Interestingly, the previously reported findings of a linear relationship between 
better clinical insight and higher general cognitive ability (IQ), and better 
performance on the Wisconsin card sort test (WCST), were not replicated in study 
1. The R2 values for the parametric analyses in study 1 were very low (0.00 - 0.03 
for WCST perseverative errors, and 0.00 - 0.01 for WASI IQ), indicating that these 
variables explained very little variance in insight. This negative finding is unlikely to 
be due to differences in the overall level of insight in this sample compared to 
previous studies. In a recent large study, 35.6% of participants had PANSS G12 
scores of 4 or more (a threshold for poor insight adopted in a number of studies). 
In the present study, 36.5% of participants were above this threshold for poor 
insight. The negative findings are also unlikely to be due to the sample size for 
study 1 being too small, as it exceeds that in the 11 of the 22 studies which have 
found a relationship with either IQ or a WCST score. The fact that a linear 
relationship with IQ has only been reported in eight of the 29 studies that have 
examined it (less than one third) suggests that the relationship may be a relatively 
weak one (Morgan & David, 2004). The mean current IQ in the sample for study 1 
was 100.8. As this is relatively high compared to that reported in other samples of 
individuals with schizophrenia, it may be that the relationship between insight and 
general cognitive ability is most easily detected in individuals with more impaired 
cognitive ability. 
Amador and Kronengold (2004) have suggested that '... neuropsychological deficits 
are at the root of those cases of very poor insight that persists over time". Overall, 
the data from study 1 do not strongly support this position. A large number of 
neuropsychological tests were employed, and only a small number of modest 
relationships were found. Indeed, although a substantial number of studies have, 
for example, found a relationship between insight and categories completed on the 
WCST (9 studies), a greater number (11) have failed to find this relationship. The 
same is true for studies which have used a WCST measure of perseveration (10 
25 found a relationship). 
Morgan and David (2004) propose that the insight measures used in a study may 
influence whether relationships are found with neuropsychological variables -a so- 
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called 'insight instrument bias'. In their review, they note that a relationship 
between insight and both IQ and WCST variables is found far more frequently with 
the SUMD than the other frequently adopted measures (PANSS item, ITAQ and 
SAI). They suggest that the SUMD, a thorough 74 item interview assessing 
awareness across multiple domains and periods of time in its un-shortened form, 
may present a greater challenge for individuals with impaired cognitive function 
compared to other insight scales. It may therefore be the case that good cognitive 
ability is required to complete a demanding assessment of insight, rather than 
being required for insight itself. The insight measures used in this study, namely 
the SAI-E, the Birchwood Insight Scale and the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale, were 
selected partly because of their relatively brief administration time. These scales 
may therefore be more likely to tap insight per se rather than the mental stamina 
to complete a highly detailed interview. This may explain why the hypothesised 
relationships between clinical insight and WASI IQ and the WCST (which is heavily 
IQ dependent, Laws, 1999) were not found in study 2. 
The curvilinear relationships between neuropsychological variables and the AAI 
clinical insight factor identified in study 1 offer a degree of replication of Startup's 
(1996) finding of a curvilinear relationship between insight and neuropsychological 
functioning. The shape of three of these curvilinear relationships (high 
neuropsychological functioning associated with both very high and very low insight) 
is consistent with Green and colleagues' (2000b) hypothesis that 
neuropsychological function can interact with coping style to determine insight in 
schizophrenia. However, a relationship with the opposite shape was also found 
between WCST non-perseverative errors and SIR factor score, where low 
neuropsychological functioning was associated with both very high and very low 
insight. This unhypothesised finding is very difficult to account for, and should be 
considered a chance/spurious observation until replicated. This result highlights the 
possibility that the other curvilinear relationships observed in study 1 may also 
have been spurious, given that a substantial number of comparisons were made, 
and these relationships did not survive FDR correction. Nevertheless, these 
relationships are also of interest as they allow Green and colleagues' hypothesis to 
be investigated by integrating these analyses with coping style (see section 9.4.3). 
9.4.1.2 - The brain basis of clinical insight 
Anosognosia, the unawareness of deficits in individuals with organic neurological 
disorders (section 3.3.1), has often been held to be the neurological analogue of 
poor insight in schizophrenia, to the extent that it has been claimed that individuals 
with very poor insight '-should be diagnosed as having anosognosia for 
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schizophrenia. ' (Amador et al., 2004). The similarities with anosognosia, together 
with the correlations found between insight and measures of executive function, 
have commonly been used to argue that poor insight in schizophrenia results from 
frontal lobe dysfunction (e. g. Stuss et al., 1986; McGlynn et al., 1997). The recent 
advances in the collection of high-resolution neuroirnaging data and its analysis 
have allowed the brain basis of insight in schizophrenia to be investigated directly, 
rather than through extrapolating the results of neuropsychological studies. 
This is a relatively new and rapidly developing area of research on insight in 
schizophrenia. Study 2 extends this literature considerably and is one of the first to 
use VBM to examine the structural brain correlates of dimensions of clinical insight 
in schizophrenia in a large sample of patients. As such, it overcomes a number of 
limitations which have hindered previous studies. Rather than using a single-item 
measure of insight (Takai et al., 1992; Shad et al., 2004; Ha et al., 2004) or a total 
insight score (Laroi et al., 2000; Rossell et al., 2003), the neural correlates of 
dimensions of insight were investigated. Those studies which have examined 
dimension of insight have tended to use small sample sizes (n = 15, Flashman et 
al., 2001; n= 14, Shad et al., 2006). The sample size for study 2 was between 45 
and 52 (depending on the insight measure), overcoming this limitation. 
Furthermore, region of interest studies have tended to measure only frontal lobe 
regions of the cortex (Shad et al., 2006; Shad et al., 2004; Flashman et al., 2001). 
This limitation was overcome through the use of VBM, which provides coverage of 
the whole brain. 
The most striking finding of study 2 was that, rather than finding the hypothesised 
correlations between insight and the volume of frontal lobe regions, relationships 
were found with temporal and parietal lobe regions. This general finding will be 
addressed first, followed by exploring the implications of the specific relationships 
found. The position that poor insight reflects frontal lobe impairment is centred on 
the three main lines of argument detailed above: (i) poor insight is similar to 
anosognosia, (ii) poor insight is associated with poor performance on 'frontal lobe' 
tasks (e. g. WCST), (iii) poor insight has been associated with smaller volumes of 
frontal lobe regions in region of interest studies. Each of these tenets can be 
criticised, and such criticisms may help to explain why no frontal lobe correlations 
were found in study 2. 
Although it has been argued on theoretical grounds that anosognosia reflects 
frontal lobe dysfunction (Stuss et al., 1986), the regions of acquired brain damage 
associated with the phenomenon are diverse. They include lesions to subcortical 
structures as well as the frontal, parietal and temporal lobes, usually in the right 
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hemisphere or bilaterally (meta-analytic review, Pia et al., 2004). This suggests 
that it is not purely a frontal phenomenon. So-called 'frontal lobe' tasks do not 
simply index the integrity / function of the frontal lobes. For example, the WCST, 
often held to be the 'gold standard' frontal lobe task, has been found to activate a 
broad network of brain areas beyond the frontal lobes in fMRI studies, including the 
parietal (Asari et al., 2005) and temporal (Smith et al., 2004a) areas. Finally, the 
structural imaging studies which have found frontal lobe correlations have typically 
not measured regions outside of the frontal lobes, leaving the possibility of 
relationships with the volume of other areas unexplored. 
The findings of study 2 are more intuitive in this context and, when explored more 
closely, fit well with the previous literature regarding the cognitive functions 
subserved by these areas. The correlation between greater volume of the left 
precuneus (located in the medial parietal lobe) and better awareness of problems 
(AP) factor score was the strongest relationship found between clinical insight and 
brain structure. Indeed, it was the only finding to survive FWE correction for 
multiple comparisons across the whole brain. There is considerable evidence that 
the precuneus forms part of a network of brain regions which mediate self- 
awareness (Cavanna et al., 2006; Andreasen et al., 1995a). For example, a number 
of fMRI (Kircher et al., 2000; Kircher et al., 2002) and PET (Kjaer et al., 2002; Lou 
et al., 2004) studies have shown that healthy individuals activate the precuneus 
when comparing self to non-self representations. These data suggest that a deficit 
in precuneus volume could impair the ability of individuals with schizophrenia to 
access representations of their own mental states, limiting their ability to identify 
that these mental states are problematic, and therefore making him/her unaware 
that there is 'something wrong". 
The association found between a large lateral right parietal lobe cluster (including 
the supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule) and the 'awareness of and 
attribution to illness' (AAI) clinical insight factor can also be best interpreted on the 
basis of the known functions of these structures in healthy people as there has 
been an almost total absence of studies of the neuropsychological correlates of the 
volume of parietal lobe structures in schizophrenia (review, Antonova et al., 2004). 
Patients with acquired parietal damage often have attentional disorders 
(Feinberberg & Farah, 1997), and the role of lateral parietal areas in visual 
attention (as well as other modalities) has been demonstrated in a number of fMRI 
studies (review, Culham et al., 2001). This area of the brain is also activated in a 
number of other tasks, including eye movements, working memory and task 
switching, and the lateral parietal cortex is commonly referred to as a heteromodal 
association cortex because it integrates inputs from a number of other areas. The 
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potential involvement of such functions in the brain basis of insight in schizophrenia 
can perhaps best be understood by revisiting the analogy made between poor 
insight and anosognosia. 
The aetiology of anosognosia has been hypothesised to be a dysfunction in the 
circuit underlying awareness of motor acts (Pia et al., 2004). In schizophrenia, a 
dysfunction in this circuit, in which the lateral parietal cortex plays a major role, is 
hypothesised to underlie passivity experiences such as delusions of control 
(Danckert et al., 2004; Frith, 2005). Experimentally, such abnormal experiences of 
agency have been associated with an over-activation (as measured by PET) of right 
inferior parietal cortex (Farrer et al., 2004). It may be the case that as well as 
being involved in awareness of multiple modalities of sensory information (Culham 
et al., 2001), the right inferior parietal cortex may also be involved in the 'ABC' of 
judgements about the self - Appreciation (of the deficit), Belief (about the deficit 
and Check (the consequences of the deficit) - which have been hypothesised to 
form the basis of 'normal' nosogia (Vuilleumier, 2004). Dysfunction in one or more 
of these processes may underlie anosognosia in patients with demonstrable 
physical or mental impairments in patients with acquired brain damage. Such 
dysfunction might also explain poor awareness of illness in schizophrenia. 
The superior temporal gyrus (STG) has a well-established role in the cortical 
network subserving the interpretation, production and self-monitoring of speech 
and language in healthy people (review, Pearlson, 1997). There is considerable 
evidence of reductions in STG volume in schizophrenia (Shenton et al., 2001), and 
that STG volume has been found to correlate with severity of auditory 
hallucinations (Barta et al., 1990). Functional imaging data suggests that this area 
is involved in the self-monitoring of speech in healthy people (Hashimoto & Sakai, 
2003), and is activated when individuals with schizophrenia are experiencing 
auditory hallucinations (Suzuki et al., 1993). These data support the view that 
auditory hallucinations reflect impaired self-monitoring of internal speech (Frith, 
1992; Johns & McGuire, 1999). The correlations found in study 2 between left STG 
volume and the AAI insight factor score, and between right STG volume and SR 
factor score suggest that problems with self-monitoring may extend beyond an 
inability to monitor internal speech, to an inability to monitor whether mental 
experiences are abnormal (SR). This might further extend to an inability to 
conclude whether one is experiencing a psychiatric illness (AAI). In the same way 
that internal speech is misattributed to an external source in auditory 
hallucinations, these abnormal mental experiences may in turn be attributed to an 
external source, rather than an internal one (such as having a psychiatric illness). 
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The finding that total grey matter volume was correlated with both the SR and AP 
clinical insight factors suggests that total cognitive resources may be important for 
both an individual's awareness of having problems, and their ability to re-label 
symptoms as abnormal. This interpretation is supported by Flashman and 
colleagues' (2000) study where individuals with low awareness of symptoms (as 
measured by the SUMD) had smaller total brain volume than those with high 
awareness of symptoms. The correlation between grey matter volume and insight 
in this study may also account for why the regional findings were weakened by 
controlling for total grey matter volume. 
Overall, these findings demonstrate what can be gained by thinking beyond 'frontal 
lobology' (David, 1992), the notion that almost every psychiatric disorder (and by 
extension every aspect of these disorders) is a manifestation of frontal lobe 
dysfunction. 
9.4.2 - Clinical insight and coping style 
Research into the relationship between clinical insight in schizophrenia and coping 
style is in its infancy. Study 3 adds to this literature by examining the relationships 
between dimensions of clinical insight in schizophrenia and preference for the 15 
coping styles measured by the COPE questionnaire (Carver et al., 1989). This study 
also adds to the larger literature which has found modest relationships between 
clinical insight and measures of distress such as depression (meta-analysis, Mintz et 
al., 2003). In this study, awareness of problems (AP factor) and awareness of 
illness (AAI factor) were related to depression, while the AP factor was also 
correlated with anxiety. These data are consistent with the psychological denial 
model, and support the hypothesis that, within this sample, being aware of having 
problems and being aware of having an illness is something which is distressing. 
However, study 3 failed to replicate the previous finding of a relationship between 
insight and suicidality (Schwartz, 2000), perhaps because only a relatively small 
proportion of the participants in this sample were suicidal, with only 11 / 64 
participants (17.2%) scoring more than 3 on the BSS. Overall, these data support 
the notion that insight in schizophrenia is a two-edged sword (McGorry et al., 1999) 
- on one hand, good insight is associated with better functional outcome, while on 
the other it is linked to greated distress. 
Contrary to the hypotheses of study 3, preference for denial as a coping style was 
not found to correlate with any of the clinical insight factor scores. Previous studies 
which have found such a relationship have used different measures of coping style 
to that employed in the current study. Moore and colleagues (1999) used the 
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Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding. This measure deals specifically with 
two aspects of denial, "self-deceptive positivity' and 'impression management'. As 
such, it provides a detailed measure of denial, but does not index the wide range of 
coping styles measured by the COPE. Similarly, the 'denial items' from the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory were used as the measure of denial in 
the another study (Young et al., 1998). However, these were not designed 
specifically to measure the use of denial as a coping style, but rather assess a 
person's ability to acknowledge 'minor personal failings of virtually universal 
proportion' such as "I gossip a little at times. The only study to use a measure of 
multiple coping styles which reported a relationship between insight and a coping 
style aligned with denial (distancing) (Lysaker et al., 2003b) restricted their 
analysis to comparing the distancing score (calculated from the Ways of Coping 
Questionnaire, WCQ) between two clusters of individuals which both had relatively 
intact cognitive ability. Such a comparison is more relevant to study 4 below, 
although it does demonstrate that a questionnaire which measures multiple coping 
styles is capable of detecting a relationship between insight and a coping style 
aligned with denial. 
Study 3 replicated Lysaker and colleagues' (2003a) finding that greater use of a 
positive reinterpretation coping style is associated with lower awareness of 
symptoms. The measures for these two studies differed: while Lysaker and 
colleagues (2003a) found that the WCQ 'positive reappraisal' subscale was 
negatively correlated with SUMD awareness of symptoms subscale, study 3 found 
that preference for the COPE subscale of "positive reinterpretation and growth' was 
negatively correlated with symptom re-labelling (SR factor score). These coping 
subscales are broadly similar (as can be seen below), although the WCQ subscale 
includes some religious coping elements which are not present in the COPE items. 
COPE 'positive reinterpretation and growth" subscale items: 
I try to grow as a person as a result of the experience. 
I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive. 
I look for something good in what is happening. 
I learn something from the experience. 
WCQ 'Positive reappraisal' subscale items: 
Changed or grew as a person in a good way. 
I came out of the experience better than when I went in. 
Found new faith. 
Rediscovered what is important in life. 
I prayed. 
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I changed something about myself. 
01 was inspired to do something creative. 
It therefore appears that there is consistency in the specific relationship between 
poorer awareness of symptoms and greater preference for positive reinterpretation 
across two studies using different measures of insight and different measures of 
coping style. 
The stigma attached to the diagnosis of schizophrenia (Thornicroft, 2006) suggests 
that not attempting to re-frame the experience in positive terms may be 
psychologically threatening. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that negative illness 
appraisals are upsetting for individuals with schizophrenia (Watson et al., 2006). 
The significant negative correlation found between 'positive reinterpretation and 
growth' and multiple measures of distress in study 3 supports the view that 
adopting a positive reinterpretation style of coping may help to protect against 
distress, but at the cost of reducing awareness of symptoms. Positively reframing 
unusual mental experiences may enable individuals to find meaning in their 
symptoms outside of the medical model, for example by attributing a spiritual 
meaning to their experiences. In some circumstances, 'poor insight, in terms of 
rejecting a medical model explanation, may therefore be adaptive (McGorry et al., 
1999; Lysaker et al., 2005c). Indeed, Lysaker and colleagues (2005c) suggest that 
constructing a personal understanding in which symptoms are not assigned great 
importance, and where personal strengths are acknowledged may help individuals 
to ward off the "misery and social isolation' of schizophrenia. 
The most highly significant finding of study 3, which was not hypothesised and was 
the only one to survive FDR correction for multiple comparisons, was the 
relationship between the AAI clinical insight factor score and preference for the 'use 
of instrumental social support' as a coping style. This subscale of the COPE 
comprises the following four items: 
I try to get advice from someone about what to do. 
I talk to someone to find out more about the situation. 
I talk to someone who could do something concrete about the problem. 
I ask people who have had similar experiences what they did. 
These items address discussing "the problem' (in this case a mental health problem) 
with other people in order to gather information and decide what to do about it. 
This relationship suggests that people who are aware that they have a mental 
illness are more likely to talk to others about their mental health problems, and 
215 
concords with previous findings linking poor insight to poor interpersonal 
functioning (Lysaker et al., 1998b) and social isolation (White et al., 2000). The 
fact that preference for individual coping styles was used as the measure in study 3 
demonstrates that it is not just that individuals with insight are more likely to talk 
to others, but rather that they have a preference for doing so over-and-above their 
use of other coping styles. As a cross-sectional finding, causality in this relationship 
cannot be established. It is possible that discussing a mental health problem with 
others helps individuals with schizophrenia to realise that the difficulties they are 
having are the result of a mental health problem (possibly helping to compensate 
for the dysfunctional self-monitoring systems discussed above). Conversely, it may 
be that individuals who have come to the conclusion (on their own) that they have 
a mental health problem may be more likely to seek support from their peers, 
including people they have met who have had similar experiences (c. f. 4 th item in 
the subscale). It is also possible that individuals who have more insight have, or 
retain, more friends that they can talk to. Perhaps the most likely scenario is that 
the two are interactively linked, with greater awareness and discussion going hand- 
in-hand. 
A number of other relationships were found between clinical insight and coping 
style which did not survive FDR correction for multiple comparisons. However, 
these relationships are worthy of discussion as they may represent true effects of 
small sizes which could be confirmed in future research. Preference for 'behavioural 
disengagement' as a coping style was negatively associated with the AAI clinical 
insight factor. This COPE subscale comprises four items which deal with "giving up', 
such as 'I admit to myself that I can't deal with it, and quit trying' (see appendix 
7.1). It is interesting to note that behavioural disengagement was also correlated 
with depression (r = 0.457, p<0.001), anxiety (r = 0.382, p<0.005), and poor 
self-esteem (r = 0.386f p<0.005) suggesting that 'giving upf may lead to both 
increased distress and decreased insight. Behavioural disengagement therefore 
appears to be a dysfunctional coping style which could perhaps be targeted in 
cognitive behavioural interventions, with the dual aims of decreasing distress and 
improving insight. These data are consistent with Lysaker and colleagues (2005b) 
recent finding that individuals with low 'hope' about the future had a significantly 
greater preference for 'resigning' as a coping style (taking no action because none 
is possible). However, in their sample, preference for this coping style was not 
associated with insight. This may be, in part, due to methodological 
differences 
between the studies such as the use of dichotomised groups rather than a 
continuous insight score by Lysaker and colleagues (2005b). 
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9.4.3 - Integrating models of clinical insight 
It is apparent that neither the neuropsychological nor the psychological denial 
model can account for insight in schizophrenia completely. Study 4 adds to the 
small number of studies which have attempted to integrate these models in a single 
investigation (Lysaker et al., 2003a; Lysaker et al., 2003b). Where curvilinear 
relationships between insight and cognitive functioning were found, preference for 
'use of instrumental social support' as a coping style differentiated those with 
relatively intact cognitive function and good insight from those with relatively intact 
cognitive function and poor insight. The contrast with previous studies which found 
that 'denial' differed between these groups is perhaps not surprising, given that 
'denial' was not associated with any measure of insight in study 3. Although the 
differences in preference for 'use instrumental social support' as a coping style were 
greater between the good-insight, high-cognition and poor-insight, high-cognition 
groups, some differences were also found between the good-insight, low-cognition 
and poor-insight, low-cognition groups. This suggests that the influence of this 
coping style on insight is not restricted to those with relatively intact cognitive 
ability. It therefore appears that, unlike denying that there is something wrong, 
which Startup (1996) suggests is not a stance available to individuals with more 
severe (and more obvious) cognitive impairments, using a social support coping 
style could influence insight in schizophrenia across the range of cognitive ability. 
Combining the findings of studies 1,2 and 3 in regression models build on previous 
research which found that integrating multiple domains of investigation can offer a 
more complete explanation of insight in schizophrenia. No previous investigation 
has combined both neuropsychological functioning and coping style with structural 
brain measures. Both regional brain volume variables and preferred coping style 
significantly predicted AAI and AP factor scores, while a regional brain volume was 
the only predictor of SR factor score and RNM factor scores were not significantly 
related to any measured variable. These findings suggest that some aspects of 
clinical insight in schizophrenia may be more 'aetiologically multi-dimensional' than 
others. Furthermore, it appears that recognition of the need for medication is 
determined by variables which were not measured in studies 1,2 and 3. These may 
include cultural factors, or subjective response to medication, which has previously 
been found to correlate with insight (Cabeza et al., 2000). 
The finding that a combination of preference for 'use of instrumental social support' 
and the volume of a right inferior parietal lobe cluster explained variance in AAI 
factor score suggests that both brain structure and coping style could be important 
in the aetiology of awareness of illness in schizophrenia. Similarly, both a 
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preference for 'mental disengagement' as a coping style and the volume of the left 
precuneus differentiated those with high AP factor scores from those with low AP 
factor scores, suggesting that brain structure and coping style could also be 
important aetiological factors in individuals with schizophrenia being aware that 
there is 'something wrong. The fact that coping style and brain structure variables 
explained separate variance in both of these insight factors indicates that these 
influences may be independent of one another, each contributing separately to an 
individual's level of insight. While the direction of causality in these relationships 
cannot be established from cross-sectional data, this finding may be important for 
interventions which seek to improve insight in schizophrenia (Henry 2004). 
Specifically, despite associations with variables which current interventions can do 
little to address (brain structure), a separate proportion of insight in schizophrenia 
is accounted for by variables that are more amenable to change (coping style), 
possibly through cognitive behaviour therapy. 
It is interesting to note that neuropsychological measures did not emerge as 
significant predictors in these models. This may be related to data showing that 
domains of neuropsychological functioning are associated with specific structural 
brain measures in schizophrenia (review, Antonova et al., 2004). The methodology 
of VBM makes a large number of comparisons which must be controlled for (e. g. 
FWE correction). However, the most significant relationships are likely to explain a 
substantial proportion of the variance in insight. This makes it difficult for measures 
with which brain structure is highly correlated to enter a regression model and may 
explain why brain structure appeared to 'trump' neuropsychological test scores in 
the regression analyses. 
9.4.4 - Cognitive insight 
The studies in this thesis were the first to investigate the neuropsychological, brain 
structure, and coping style correlates of cognitive insight. Lower scores on the self- 
certainty dimension of the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale showed a strong 
relationship with better executive function (lower self-certainty indicates better 
cognitive insight). Study 1 found a negative correlation between self-certainty and 
both Brixton profile score and BADS total score, with the latter surviving FDR 
correction for multiple comparisons. This suggests that components of poor 
decision-making regarding mental products which make up the self-certainty 
dimension: jumping to conclusions, overconfidence about being right, and 
resistance to correction (Beck et al., 2004b) are associated with poor executive 
function. The relationship appears to be with executive functioning in general, 
rather than any specific component such as perseveration. This finding indicates 
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that this BCIS dimension, despite measuring aspects of insight that differ 
considerably from clinical insight measures based around the medical model, may 
have similar neuropsychological correlates to the AAI clinical insight factor. The 
negative correlation found between self-certainty and total grey matter volume is 
consistent with the idea that low self-certainly relies on the availability of cognitive 
resources in general: total grey matter volume has consistently been found to 
correlate with general intellectual ability (review, Antonova et al., 2004). The fact 
that total GM volume did not explain variance in self-certainty over and above that 
accounted for by BADS total score, suggests that these measures explain similar 
variance in self-certainty scores, but that BADS total score is a stronger predictor. 
Self- reflectiveness, the expression of introspection and the willingness to 
acknowledge fallibility (Beck et al. 2004), was not significantly associated with any 
neuropsychological or structural brain measure. This finding suggests that there is a 
degree of specificity in the relationship between these variables and the self- 
certainty dimension of cognitive insight. Self- reflectiveness was, however, 
significantly correlated with preference for 'planning' as a coping style at the single 
test level (although this did not survive FDR correction). This COPE subscale deals 
with thinking in depth about how to handle a problem and developing a strategy to 
deal with it. As such, there appear to be conceptual similarities between this coping 
style and self- reflectiveness, suggesting that both may be founded on a common, 
more flexible style of thinking. This thinking style, combined with intact executive 
function, may allow individuals with schizophrenia to better overcome the 'crucial 
cognitive problems' of schizophrenia highlighted by Beck and colleagues (2004b): 
their inability to distance themselves from their cognitive distortions (e. g. 
delusions), their resistance to corrective feedback from others, and their 
overconfidence in the conclusions they make. 
9.5 - Methodological considerations 
The experimental studies which make up this thesis overcame a number of the 
methodological limitations of previous studies. However, methodological 
considerations remain which need to be taken into account when interpreting their 
findings. The inclusion of a broad battery of neuropsychological tests in study 1 
ensured that the relationships between insight and a wide range of cognitive 
domains were investigated. However, this meant that a large number of statistical 
tests were undertaken, creating multiple comparisons problems. The False 
Discovery Rate method of controlling for multiple comparisons was employed to 
address this issue. This method was selected because it controls the likelihood of 
type I error, while not being as conservative as the Bonferroni correction, which 
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would increase the risk of making type II errors (incorrectly not rejecting the null 
hypothesis). However, the relationships found between insight and 
neuropsychological functioning in the previous literature have generally not been 
large in size. This makes it difficult to interpret tests which are significant at the 
single test level, but do not survive the FDR control for multiple comparisons, as it 
is possible that small but 'genuine" effects will be ignored. To this end, tests which 
are significant at the single test level but not after FDR correction have been 
reported as such in this thesis, allowing maximum comparability with previous and 
future research. 
The appropriate control of multiple comparisons was also an issue in study 2. The 
VBM method makes a great number of comparisons, which are controlled for by the 
application of random field theory to derive family-wise error (FWE) corrected 
significance values. However, this correction has been reported as being overly 
conservative for structural data (Sowell et al., 1999). In order to minimise the 
chance of making type II errors while controlling the type I error rate, clusters with 
a maxima voxel T value of greater than 4.50 were reported, and the small volume 
correction was applied to results in hypothesised areas to determine whether these 
clusters were significant after correcting for multiple comparisons within a locally 
defined volume rather than across the whole brain. This approach is slightly more 
conservative (and therefore less likely to lead to type I errors) than that adopted in 
a previous VBM study of insight in schizophrenia (Ha et al., 2004), which set the 
threshold for significance at the p<0.001 (uncorrected) level. 
The ability of study 3 to examine the structural brain basis of insight in 
schizophrenia is also limited by the range of structural brain differences that T1 
weighted MRI scans can detect. Such scans are not able to detect subtle 
abnormalities in cellular orientation, structural connectivity, receptor distribution 
and sensitivity, or neurotransmitter distribution. Study 3, in common with other 
structural MRI studies, could therefore not detect relationships between insight and 
these variables. 
A number of interesting relationships were found between the subscales of the 
COPE and both clinical insight factors and cognitive insight dimensions. However, 
previous studies which have investigated the relationships between insight and 
coping style have used the WCQ. The brief COPE was initially chosen as the 
measure of coping style in preference to the WCQ because of its brevity. However, 
this was changed to the full COPE at an early stage at the request of the Psychology 
PhD committee. In hindsight, switching to the WCQ as a 'long' measure of coping 
style may have been preferable in order to make it more comparable with previous 
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studies. Nevertheless, the WCQ is a copyrighted questionnaire which would have 
taken time to acquire, further reducing the number of participants who completed 
the revised measure, whereas the full COPE was freely available on the internet 
(http: //www. psy. miami. edu/faculty/ccarver/scICOPEf. htm1). 
In study 4, the fact that not all participants completed every measure reduced the 
sample size when multiple measures were integrated in a single analysis. This limits 
the power of such analyses, but most of factors contributing to the reduced sample 
size were unavoidable. For example, in terms of the collection of structural imaging 
data, there were a number of individuals who were either physically too large to fit 
in the scanner, had metal in their body, or had delusions about having metal 
devices in their body. Likewise, there were some individuals who were 
asymptornatic at the time of assessment, so could not be rated in terms of insight 
into symptoms, making it impossible to calculate an AAI or SR clinical insight factor 
score. If the SUMD had been used as the insight measure, it may have been 
possible to measure past awareness of symptoms in these individuals. However, 
the SUMD is a substantially more lengthy and complex assessment than the SAI-E, 
and this brings with it the problems which are detailed above. 
The experimental studies which make up this thesis cover the relationship between 
insight and a large number of variables. However, the more comprehensive a study 
is in the variables that it measures, the greater the assessment burden that is 
placed on the participants. In all three studies, every effort was made to 
accommodate individuals level of ability and concentration, for example by 
completing the assessments over multiple sessions and allowing participants to 
take breaks. Nevertheless, it is likely that the most cognitively impaired and highly 
symptomatic individuals with schizophrenia were u nder- represented in the sample 
and the results may not generalise to this section of the schizophrenia population. 
Likewise, as all of the participants were outpatients, the results may not generalise 
to inpatients. 
9.6 - Directions for future research 
This thesis identifies a number of research questions for future investigations to 
pursue. The findings of study 1 suggest that future studies of the 
neuropsychological basis of both clinical and cognitive insight should not be limited 
to measures of general intellectual ability and the WCST. The inclusion of more 
ecologically valid measures of executive function, particularly the BADS, seems 
warranted in future investigations. The issue of how best to measure insight in 
schizophrenia remains problematic, and future studies could usefully address the 
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extent to which the insight measure(s) used determine whether relationships with 
neuropsychological variables are found. The question of whether relationships are 
more often found with the SUMD because of the intellectual demands that it places 
on participants also needs to be resolved. 
The results of study 2 point clearly to the need for future studies of the brain basis 
of insight not to focus exclusively on the frontal lobes. This is particularly relevant 
to region of interest studies, which by their very nature must select the regions to 
be investigated in advance. The findings of study 2 also suggest that VBM is a 
useful approach to addressing the structural brain basis of insight. Future research 
could investigate the functional brain correlates of insight in schizophrenia by 
examining its correlations with the activations generated by fMRI tasks, particularly 
those known to activate the areas found to correlate with insight in study 3. For 
example, tasks involving spatial perception and working memory are well known to 
activate lateral parietal cortex, and language and semantic memory retrieval tasks 
consistently activate the lateral temporal lobes (review, Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). 
Given the potential explanations of the findings of study 3 in terms of self- 
monitoring, it would be particularly interesting to examine whether the level of 
functional brain activation generated by either verbal (Fu et al., 2005) or spatial 
(Farrer et al., 2004) self-monitoring tasks correlates with measures of clinical 
insight in people with schizophrenia. 
The findings of study 3 clearly point to the potential of preferred coping style to 
explain variance in insight. It is interesting to note that in the anosognosia 
literature, despite initially having been dismissed as irrelevant, the role of such 
factors is generating renewed research interest. For example, Vuilleumier (2004) 
stated: 
",... affective factors might have been too quickly discarded and remain 
insufficiently investigated, by contrast with more cognitive factors. " 
The same may be true of research on insight in schizophrenia, particularly when 
such variables can account for variance in insight which is not accounted for 
by 
neuropsychological and structural brain variable (c. f. study 4). The question of 
how 
best to measure preferred coping style is also an important area for future 
theoretical and experimental research to address, in particular how 'denial' is 
conceptualised and operationalised. 
Study 3 replicated previous findings of a relationship between better insight and 
greater personal distress. Previous research has found that good insight 
is 
222 
associated with both better functional outcome and greater personal distress. 
'Optimal' insight for individuals with schizophrenia may therefore involve possessing 
enough insight to gain the benefits which lead to good outcome (e. g. a proactive 
role in managing the disorder), but not having 'too much' insight (McGorry et al., 
1999), where acceptance of schizophrenia as a life-long, degenerative, brain-based 
illness leads to depression. A recent study has indicated that negative illness 
perceptions about psychosis may explain 34% to 46% of the variance in measures 
of distress (Watson et al., 2006), suggesting that clinical interventions that foster 
appraisals of recovery rather than of chronicity and severity may improve emotional 
well-being in people with schizophrenia. Future studies could usefully extend this 
line of enquiry by investigating the relationships between illness perceptions, 
distress, coping style and functional outcome. Such research may help in the 
development of interventions which help individuals to find the appropriate 
balancing point on insight's two-edged sword. 
9.7 - Conclusion 
Considerable progress has been made over the last 15 years in understanding the 
aetiology of poor insight in schizophrenia. Recent studies which have sought to 
combine measures relevant to more than one aetiological model have proved 
particularly fruitful. This thesis sought to improve upon what is known about the 
neuropsychological, brain structure and coping style correlates of poor insight in 
schizophrenia. Its findings suggest that multiple processes contribute to dimensions 
of clinical insight, with a combination of brain structure and coping style explaining 
separate variance in some dimensions. This highlights both the importance of 
examining dimensions of insight rather than total scores, and the value of 
combining different domains of investigation in a single sample. This was the first 
study to investigate how the correlates of cognitive insight differ from those of 
clinical insight. It showed that the correlates of self-certainty, one of the 
dimensions of cognitive insight, bear some similarities (executive function, global 
grey matter volume) to those of clinical insight. 
Crucially, the findings of this thesis demonstrate the value of thinking outside the 
'box' of previously replicated findings in insight research: going beyond the WCST 
when examining relationships with executive functioning, going beyond the frontal 
lobes when considering poor insight's brain basis, and going beyond denial when 
considering the role of coping style. In doing so, this thesis has highlighted a 
number of avenues for future research to follow in the pursuit of an integrated 
model of the aetiology of poor insight in schizophrenia. 
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APPENDICIES 
APPENDIX 2.1: Schedule for the assessment of insight - expanded 
Question 1: 
""Do you think you have been experiencing any emotional or psychological changes or 
difficulties? " 
often (thought present most of the day, most days) 
sometimes (thought present occasionally) 




If brief write verbatim reply, otherwise summarise response. Please add explanatory comments if 
appropriate. 
Question 2: 
"Do you think this means there is something wrong with you? " (For example, a nervous condition). 
If previous answer was "never" or "no" ask ; "If the doctor(s) and/or others think you have been 
experiencing emotional or psychological changes or difficulties do you think there must be 
something wrong with you even though you don't feel it yourself? " 
often (thought present most of the day, most days) 
sometimes (thought present occasionally) 




If brief write verbatim reply, otherwise summarise response. Please add explanatory comments if 
appropriate. 
Question 3: 
"Do you think your condition amounts to a mental illness or mental disorder? " 
often (thought present most of the day, most days) 2 
sometimes (thought present occasionally) I 
never (ask why doctors / others think so) 0 
If brief write verbatim reply, otherwise summarise response. Please add explanatory comments if 
appropriate. 
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If positive score on previous two items, proceed to 4, otherwise go to item 6. 
Question 4: 
"'How do you explain your condition /disorder /illness? " 
Reasonable account given based on plausible mechanisms (appropriate given social, 
cultural and educational background, e. g. excess stress, chemical imbalance, family 
history, etc. ) 
Confused account, or overheard explanation without adequate 
= 
understanding or "don't know" 
Delusional or bizarre explanation 
=1 
= 
If brief write verbatim reply, otherwise summarise response. Please add explanatory comments if 
appropriate. 
If positive score on items 1,2, and 3, proceed to 5, otherwise go to item 6. 
Question 5: 
"'Has your nervous/ emotiona I /psychological /mental /psychiatric condition (use 
patient's term) led to adverse consequences or problems in your life? (For example, 
conflict with others, neglect,, financial or accommodation difficulties, irrational, 
impulsive or dangerous behaviour). 
Yes (with example) 
Unsure (cannot give example or contradicts self) 




If brief write verbatim reply, otherwise summarise response. Please add explanatory comments if 
appropriate. 
Question 6: 
"'Do you think your ... condition (use patient's term) or the problem resulting 
from it 
warrants (needs) treatment? " 
Yes (with plausible reason) =2 
Unsure (cannot give example or contradicts self) =1 
No = 
If brief write verbatim reply, otherwise summarise response 
appropriate. 
Please add explanatory comments if 
259 
Question 7: 
Pick the most prominent symptoms ug to a maximum of 4. Then rate awareness of 
each Symptom out of 4 as below. (Interviewer to assess which symptoms to rate from 
previous interviews e. g. highest scoring on BPRS and/or from patient's current 
presentation). 
Examples: 
"Do you think that the belief ... is not really / happening (could you be imagining things)? " 
"Do you think the 'voices' you hear are actually real people talking, or is it something arising 
from your own mind? " 
"Have you been able to think clearly, or do your thoughts seem mixed up / confused? Is your 
speech jumbled? " 
"Would you say you have been more agitated / overactive / speeded up / withdrawn than 
usual? " 
"Are you aware of any problem with attention / concentration / memory? " 
"Have you a problem with doing what you intend / getting going / finishing tasks / motivation? " 
Symptom I- type. Symptom 2- type: 
rating rating rating 
Symptom 3- ty : 
rating 
Symptom 4- typ 
Definitely (full awareness) 
Probably (moderate awareness) 
Unsure (sometimes yes, sometimes no) 
Possibly (slight awareness) 
Absolutely not (no awareness) 
mean 




For each symptom rated above (up to a maximum of 4), ask patient ... "How do you 
explain ... (false beliefs, hearing voices, thoughts muddled, lack of drive etc. )? " 
Symptom 1 Symptom 2 Symptom 3 Symptom 4 
Part of my illness =4 
Due to nervous condition =3 mean 
Reaction to stress / fatigue =2 
Unsure, maybe one of the above =1 
Can't say, or delusional / bizarre explanation =0 




APPENDIX 2.2: Birchwood insight scale 
Please read the following statements carefully and then tick the box, which best applies to you. 
AGREE DISAGREE UNSURE 
Some of my symptoms are made by my 
mind 
2.1 am mentally well 
3.1 do not need medication 
4. My stay in hospital is necessary 
5. The doctor is right in prescribing 
medication for me 
6.1 do not need to be seen by a doctor or 
psychiatrist 
7. If somebody said that I have a nervous or 
a mental illness then they would be right 
None of the unusual things I experience 
are due to an illness 
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APPENDIX 2.3: Beck cognitive insight scale 
Do not Agree Agree Agree a Lot 
Agree 
at All Slightly Completely 
At times, I have 
1 misunderstood other people's 
attitudes towards me. 
My interpretations of my 2 experiences are definitely 
right. 
other people can understand 
3 the cause of my unusual 
experiences better than I can. 
4 1 have jumped to conclusions 
too fast. 
Some of my experiences that 
5 have seemed very real may 
have been due to my 
imagination. 
Some of the ideas I was 
6 certain were true turned out 
to be false. 
7 If something feels right, it 
means that it is right. 
Even though I feel strongly 
8 that I am right, I could be 
wrong 
9 1 know better than anyone 
else what my problems are. 
10 When people disagree with 
me, they are generally wrong. 
11 1 cannot trust other people's 
opinion about my experiences 
If somebody points out that 
12 my beliefs are wrong I am 
willing to consider it. 
13 1 can trust my own judgement 
at all times. 
There is often more than one 
14 possible explanation for why 
people act the way they do. 
My unusual experiences may 
15 be due to my being extremely 
upset or stressed. 
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APPENDIX 5.1: Regression analyses of the AAI and SR clinical insight factors and 






















Awareness of, and Attribution 
to Illness factor (AAI) 
Symptom Recognition factor 
(SR) 
Linear Quadratic I Linear Quadratic 
R2 change (sig) 0.01 (ns) 0.08 (p < 0.05) 
Model F (sig) 0.75 (ns) 2.62 (p = 0.08) 
MI 53,1 52,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.03 (ns) 0.05 (ns) 
Model IF (sig) 1.41 (ns) 2.05 (ns) 
Model df 55,1 54,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
Model IF (sig) 0.01 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 
Model df 55,1 54,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.03 (ns) 0.09 (p < 0.05) 
Model IF (sig) 1.69 (ns) 3.50 (p<0.05) 
Model df 55,1 54,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.02 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
Model IF (sig) 1.34 (ns) 0.74 (ns) 
Model df 54,1 53,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.02 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
Model IF (sig) 1.14 (ns) 0.74 (ns) 
Model df 54,1 53,2 
R2 change (sig) 0.07 (p < 0.05) 0.01 (ns) 
Model IF (sig) 4.29 (p < 0.05) 2.59 (p = 0.08) 
Model df 
R2 change (sig) 0.07 (p = 0.06) 0.00 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 3.86 (p = 0.06) 1.92 (ns) 
Model df 55,1 54,2 
BADS total scoreA R2 change (sig) 0.07 (p < 0.05) 0.09 (p < 0.05) 
Model IF (sig) 4.05 (p < 0.05) 5.13 (p < 0.01) 
v 53,1 52,2 
* Log transformed 
AData reflected then log transformed 
WASI - Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
WCST - Wisconsin Card Sort Task 
BADS - Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive 
Syndrome 
0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
0.08 (ns) 0.14 (ns) 
53,1 52,2 
0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
55,1 54,2 
0.02 (ns) 0.14 (p<0.005) 
1.16 (ns) 5.04 (P< 0.01) 
55,1 54,2 
0.01 (ns) 0.03 (ns) 
0.57 (ns) 1.01 (ns) 
0.06 (p = 0.07) 0.03 (ns) 
3.48 (p = 0.07) 2.51 (p = 0.09) 
54,1 53,2 
0.00 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 
0.01 (ns) 0.32 (ns) 
54,1 53,2 
0.04 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 
2.17 (ns) 1.30 (ns) 
55,1 54,2 
0.01 (ns) 0.00(ns) 
0.67 (ns) 0.35 (ns) 
55,1 54,2 
0.01(ns) 0.01 (ns) 
0.56 (ns) 0.49 (ns) 
53,1 52,2 
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APPENDIX 5.2: Regression analyses of the AAI and SR clinical insight factors and 
the domains of verbal fluency, sustained attention, memory and social cognition 
Awareness of, and Attribution 










Phonological R2 change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.10 (p < 0.05) 0.01 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
fluency (F, A, S) Model IF (sig) 0.06 (ns) 3.08 (p = 0.06) 0.45 (ns) 0.25 (ns) 
Model df 54,1 53,2 54,1 53,2 
Semantic fluency R2 change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.12 (p< 0.01) 0.02 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
(categories) Model IF (sig) 0.06 (ns) 3.79 (p< 0.05) 1.24 (ns) 0.65 (ns) 
Model df 54,1 55,2 54,1 55,2 
Sustained attention 
CPT d'Prime R2 change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.03 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 0.11 (ns) 0.79 (ns) 0.04 (ns) 0.09 (ns) 
Model df 54,1 53,2 54,1 53,2 
Memory 
Letter-number test R2 change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 
Model F (sig) 0.09 (ns) 0.35 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.06 (ns) 
Model df 55,1 54,2 55,1 54,2 
Hopkins verbal R2 change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.02 (ns) 0.02 (ns) 
learning test total Model F (sig) 0.02 (ns) 0.22 (ns) 1.21 (ns) 1.07 (ns) 
score Model df 54,1 53,1 54,1 53,1 
Social cognition 
Iowa Gambling 
2 R change (sig) 0.00 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 0.00 (ns) 0.06 (p = 0.09) 
Task total picks Model F (sig) 0.02 (ns) 0.22 (ns) 0.14 (n s) 1.58 (ns) 
from C and D Model df 53,1 52,1 53,1 52,1 
Iowa Gambling R2 change (sig) 0.04 (ns) 0.04 (ns) 0.04 (ns) 0.01 (ns) 
Task emotional Model F (sig) 1.99 (ns) 2.17 (ns) 2.04 (ns) 1.24 (ns) 
learning score Model df 53,1 52,2 53,1 52,2 
* Log transformed 
A Data reflected then log transformed 
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APPENDIX 7.2: Correlations between insight and distress 
Distress 
measure 
Clinical insight factors 
AAI RNM AP SIR 
Correlation 
. 106 -. 058 . 308 . 273 BDI-II P value . 439 . 652 . 013* . 042* N 56 63 64 56 
Correlation 
. 063 -. 018 . 293 . 146 BAI P value . 644 . 889 . 018* . 278 N 57 64 65 57 
Correlation -. 013 . 067 . 064 . 190 BSS P value . 923 . 600 . 614 . 160 N 56 63 64 56 
Correlation . 052 . 023 . 222 . 257 RSE P value . 701 . 854 . 076 . 054 N 57 64 65 57 
*p<0.05 
Non-parametric correlations in italics 
BDI-II - Beck Depression Inventory - II 
BAI - Beck Anxiety Inventory 
BSS - Beck Suicide Scale 
RSE - Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale 
AAI - Awareness of and attribution to illness 
RNM - Recognition of the need for medication 
AP - Awareness of problems 
SR - Symptom re-labelling 
Cognitive insight dimensions 
Self-certainty Self- 
reflectiveness 
-. 111 . 017 
. 382 . 894 64 64 
. 043 -. 187 
. 733 . 136 65 65 
-. 161 -. 185 
. 205 . 143 64 64 
-. 291 . 091 
. 019* . 469 65 65 
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APPENDIX 7.3: Correlations between insight and coping style 
COPE Clinical insight factors Cognitive insight dimensions 
subscale 
AAI RNM AP SR Self-certainty Self- 
reflectiveness 
Positive Correlation -. 186 -. 031 -. 195 -. 323 . 235 -. 249 reinterpretation P value . 212 . 826 . 154 . 027* . 084 . 067 and growth N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Mental Correlation -. 124 -. 091 -. 338 -. 084 -. 060 -. 184 
disengagement P value . 408 . 512 . 012* . 573 . 663 . 178 N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Focus on Correlation -. 087 . 040 -. 044 -. 214 -. 136 . 016 venting P value . 559 . 772 . 748 . 148 . 323 . 907 emotions N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Use of Correlation . 458 . 075 . 149 -. 056 -. 170 . 055 instrumental P value . 001* . 589 . 276 . 709 . 216 . 690 social support N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Correlation . 176 . 054 . 067 -. 058 . 060 . 261 Active coping P value . 237 . 698 . 628 . 697 . 666 . 055 N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Correlation . 067 . 040 -. 029 . 249 . 007 . 013 Denial P value . 655 . 776 . 832 . 091 . 961 . 923 N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Religious Correlation . 155 . 147 -. 034 -. 045 . 017 . 083 P value . 300 . 287 . 805 . 763 . 902 . 544 coping N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Correlation -. 311 -. 135 -. 271 -. 230 . 194 -. 058 Humour P value . 033* . 332 . 046 . 120 . 157 . 672 N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Correlation -. 301 -. 067 . 222 . 098 -. 047 -. 175 Behavioural P value . 040* . 631 . 103 . 510 . 732 . 202 disengagement N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Correlation -. 222 -. 129 . 155 . 217 . 217 -. 064 Restraint P value . 133 . 354 . 258 . 143 . 111 . 641 N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Use of Correlation . 219 . 238 . 166 . 034 -. 128 . 
220 
emotional P value . 140 . 083 . 227 . 820 . 
350 . 107 
social support N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Correlation -. 146 -. 127 -. 190 . 018 -. 023 -. 169 
Substance use P value . 329 . 361 . 165 . 905 . 
869 . 217 
N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Correlation -. 099 -. 049 . 123 -. 028 -. 002 -. 
139 
Acceptance P value . 507 . 723 . 369 . 852 . 987 . 
312 
N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Suppressing Correlation . 129 . 094 . 281 . 305 -. 155 . 135 
competing P value . 387 . 499 . 038* . 037* . 257 . 327 
activities N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
Correlation . 317 -. 059 . 267 . 198 -. 006 . 335 
Planning P value . 030 . 672 . 048 . 182 . 964 . 012* N 47 54 55 47 55 55 
*P<0.05 AAI - Awareness of and attribution to illness 
Non-parametriC correlations in italics RNM - Recognition of the need for medication 
AP - Awareness of problems 
SR - Symptom re-labelling 
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APPENDIX 8.1: Differences in preferred coping style between individuals with high 
and low AAI score who scoring at or above the group median for BADS total score 
COPE subscale AAJA N Mean (SD) T (df) P value 
1. Positive Low 13 1.42 (0.5) 
reinterpretation High 15 1.24 (0.47) 
1.01 (26) 0.321 
2. Mental disengagement 
Low 13 1.39(0.61) 
1.45 (26) 0.158 
High 15 1.07 (0.54) 
3. Venting of emotions 
Low 13 0.88 (0.7) 
- 0.17 (26) 0.868 High 15 0.92(0.64) 
4. Use of instrumental Low 13 0.98(0.44) 
social support High 15 1.48 (0.43) - 
3.05 (26) 0.005 
Low 13 1.06(0.6) 
5. Active coping - 1.17 (26) 0.252 High 15 1.31 (0.52) 
Low 13 0.5 (0.36) 
6. Denial -0.65 (26) 0.520 High 15 0.66 (0.83) 
Low 13 1.16 (0.64) 
7. Religious coping - 0.6 (26) 0.555 High 15 1.4(1.25) 
Low 13 0.67 (0.56) 
8. Humour 1.2 (26) 0.242 
High 15 0.43 (0-5) 
9. Behavioural Low 13 0.6 (0.48) 1.19 (26) 0.247 
disengagement High 15 0.38 (0.48) 
10. Restraint 
Low 13 0.97 (0.57) 
1.77 (26) 0.088 
High 15 0.61 (0.5) 
11. Use of emotional Low 13 1 (0.53) -2.38 (26) 0.025 social support High 15 1.55 (0.67) 
12 Substance use 
Low 13 0.6(1.14) 
0.62 (26) 0.540 
. High 15 0.39 (0.64) 
13. Acceptance 
Low 13 1.71 (0.51) 0.98 (26) 0.336 
High 15 1.48(0.67) 
14. Suppression of Low 13 0.9(0.61) 
- 0.56 (26) 0.581 
competing activities High 15 1 (0.34) 
Planning 15 
Low 13 1.17 (0.59) 
0.43 (26) 0.673 
. High 15 1.08(0.47) 
A high AAI = AAI factor score ý! 11, low AAI = AAI factor score < 11 
*p<0.05 
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APPENDIX 8.2: Differences in preferred coping style between individuals with high 
and low AAI score who scoring below the group median for BADS total score 
COPE subscale AAJA N Mean (SD) T (df) P value 
1. Positive Low 10 1.41 (0.63) 0.04 (15) 0.968 
reinterpretation High 7 1.4(0.22) 
Low 10 1.29 (0.89) 
2. Mental disengagement 0.5 (15) 0.626 
High 7 1.11 (0.31) 
Low 10 0.97 (0.79) 
3. Venting of emotions -0.03 (15) 0.976 High 7 0.98 (0.36) 
4. Use of instrumental Low 10 0.96 (0.41) 
- 1.25 (15) 0.231 social support High 7 1.17 (0.22) 
5. Active coping 
Low 10 1.22 (0.53) 
-0.56 (15) 0.584 High 7 1.34 (0.24) 
6. Denial 
Low 10 0.72 (0.69) 
-0.39 (15) 0.699 High 7 0.84 (0.41) 
7. Religious coping 
Low 10 1.14(1.1) 
- 0.24 (15) 0.817 High 7 1.24 (0.6) 
8 Humour 
Low 10 0.92 (0.96) 0.51 (15) 0.616 
. High 7 0.71 (0.54) 
9. Behavioural Low 10 0.62 (0.5) 0.48 (15) 0.636 
disengagement High 7 0.51 (0.41) 
10 Restraint 
Low 10 0.99 (0.6) 0.52 (15) 0.613 
. High 7 0.87 (0.26) 
11. Use of emotional Low 10 1.22 (0.87) 0.45 (15) 0.658 
social support High 7 1.06 (0.33) 
Low 10 0.47 (0.69) 0.2 (15) 0.841 12. Substance use High 7 0.41 (0.57) 
Low 10 1.4 (0.71) 58 (15) 0 0.572 13. Acceptance High 7 1.24 (0.23) . 
14. Suppression of Low 10 0.92 (0.6) - 0.02 (15) 0.984 
competing activities High 7 0.92 (0.33) 
Planning 15 
Low 10 0.76 (0.72) 
- 1.58 (15) 0.134 . High 7 1.2 (0.17) 
A high AAI = AAI factor score ý! 11, low AAI = AAI 
factor score < 11 
p<0.05 
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APPENDIX 8.3: Differences in preferred coping style between individuals with high 
and low AAI score who scoring at or above the group median for WCST categories 
completed 
COPE subscale AAJA N Mean (SD) T (df) P value 
1. Positive Low 11 1.49 (0.51) 1.42 (22) 0.168 
reinterpretation High 13 1.24 (0.36) 
Low 11 1.4 (0.61) 
2. Mental disengagement 1.35 (22) 0.190 
High 13 1.09 (0.49) 
Low 11 1.18 (0.86) 
3. Venting of emotions 1.05 (22) 0.305 High 13 0.86 (0.65) 
4. Use of instrumental Low 11 0.93 (0.5) 
- 2.65 (22) 0.015 social support High 13 1.44 (0.45) 
5. Active coping 
Low 11 0.81 (0.55) 
- 2.54 (22) 0.019 High 13 1.29 (0.35) 
6. Denial 
Low 11 0.66 (0.61) 0.5 (22) 0.619 
High 13 0.56 (0.43) 
7. Religious coping 
Low 11 0.93 (0.79) 
- 1.46 (22) 0.157 High 13 1.56 (1.22) 
8 Humour 
Low 11 1.02 (0.91) 1.89 (22) 0.072 
. High 13 0.45 (0.56) 
9. Behavioural Low 11 0.68 (0.49) 1.35 (22) 0.189 
disengagement High 13 0.41 (0-51) 
Restraint 10 
Low 11 0.84 (0.59) 0.64 (22) 0.527 
. High 13 0.7 (0.5) 
11. Use of emotional Low 11 0.88 
(0.6) 
- 2.63 (22) 0.015 
social support High 13 1.49 (0.54) 
Substance use 12 
Low 11 0.75 (1.33) 1.13 (22) 0.269 
. High 13 0.3 (0.5) 
Acceptance 13 
Low 11 1.63 (0.7) 0.94 (22) 0.356 
. High 13 1.39 (0.55) 
14. Suppression of Low 11 0.97 (0.63) - 0.29 (22) 0.774 
competing activities High 13 1.02 (0.31) 
Planning 15 
Low 11 0.82 (0.53) 
- 1.93 (22) 0.066 
. High 13 1.21 (0.45) 
A high AAI = AAI factor score ý! 11, low AAI = AAI 
factor score < 11 
p<0.05 
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APPENDIX 8.4: Differences in preferred coping style between individuals with high 
and low AAI score who scoring at below the group median for WCST categories 
completed 
COPE subscale AAJA N Mean (SID) T (df) P value 
1. Positive Low 13 1.35 (0.56) 
-0.01 (21) 0.990 reinterpretation High 10 1.35 (0.46) 
Low 13 1.27 (0.81) 
2. Mental disengagement 0.6 (21) 0.552 
High 10 1.09 (0.46) 
Low 13 0.71 (0.49) 
3. Venting of emotions - 1.88 (21) 0.074 High 10 1.07 (0.38) 
4. Use of instrumental Low 13 0.99 (0.33) 
- 2.11 (21) 0.047 social support High 10 1.28 (0.31) 
Low 13 1.32 (0.53) 
5. Active coping High 10 1.29 (0.58) 
0.13 (21) 0.898 
6. Denial 
Low 13 0.51 (0.44) 
- 1.45 (21) 0.161 High 10 0.94 (0.93) 
7. Religious coping 
Low 13 1.4(0.85) 0.81 (21) 0.430 
High 10 1.12 (0.79) 
8 Humour 
Low 13 0.65 (0.61) 0.24 (21) 0.810 
. High 10 0.6 (0.44) 
9. Behavioural Low 13 0.64 (0.58) 0.7(21) 0.493 
disengagement High 10 0.49(0.4) 
10 Restraint 
Low 13 1.05 (0.55) 1.62 (21) 0.120 
. High 10 0.71 (0.4) 
11. Use of emotional Low 13 1.29 (0.69) 0.24 (21) 0.812 
social support High 10 1.22 (0.71) 
Substance use 12 
Low 13 0.36 (0.32) 
- 0.52 (21) 0.610 . High 10 0.48 (0.71) 
Acceptance 13 
Low 13 1.55 (0.52) 0.47 (21) 0.645 
. High 10 1.44(0.6) 
14. Suppression of Low 13 0.81 (0.58) -0.45(21) 0.655 
competing activities High 10 0.91 (0.35) 
Planning 15 
Low 13 1.09 (0.75) 0.27 (21) 0.786 
. High 10 1.03 (0.28) 
A high AAI = AAI factor score ý! 11, low AAI = AAI factor score < 
p<0.05 
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APPENDIX 8.5: Differences in preferred coping style between individuals with high 
and low AAI score who scoring at or above the group median for categorical fluency 
COPE subscale AAJA N Mean (SD) T (df) P value 
1. Positive Low 12 1.4(0.52) 
reinterpretation High 11 1.28 (0.42) 
0.6 (21) 0.554 
2. Mental disengagement 
Low 12 1.37 (0.49) 
1.27 (21) 0.218 
High 11 1.11 (0.48) 
Low 12 1.16 (0.8) 
3. Venting of emotions 0.47 (21) 0.644 
High 11 1.02 (0.63) 
4. Use of instrumental Low 12 1.06 (0.45) 
- 2.64 (21) 0.015 social support High 11 1.49 (0.3) 
Low 12 1.09 (0.57) 
5. Active coping - 1.21 (21) 0.241 High 11 1.33 (0.35) 
Low 12 0.75 (0.62) 
6. Denial 1.48 (21) 0.155 
High 11 0.45 (0.29) 
Low 12 0.82 (0.8) 
7. Religious coping - 2.04 (21) 0.054 High 11 1.69 (1.22) 
Low 12 0.91 (0.92) 
8. Humour 1.59 (21) 0.126 
High 11 0.42 (0.45) 
9. Behavioural Low 12 0.62 (0.48) 1.1 (21) 0.282 
disengagement High 11 0.39 (0.5) 
Low 12 0.8(0.54) 
10. Restraint 
High 11 0.52 (0.41) 
1.39 (21) 0.180 
11. Use of emotional Low 12 1.01 (0.6) - 2.42 (21) 0.025 social support High 11 1.55 (0.45) 
12 Substance use 
Low 12 0.38 (0.67) 0.2 (21) 0.842 
. High 11 0.32 (0.51) 
13. Acceptance 
Low 12 1.67 (0.68) 1 (21) 0.331 
High 11 1.41 (0.55) 
14. Suppression of Low 12 0.83 (0.49) - 0.27 (21) 0.792 
competing activities High 11 0.88 (0.31) 
Planning 15 
Low 12 1.13 (0.68) 
0.03 (21) 0.973 
. High 11 1.12 (0.44) 
A high AAI = AAI factor score ý! 11, low AAI = AAI factor score < 11 
*p<0.05 
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APPENDIX 8.6: Differences in preferred coping style between individuals with high 
and low AAI score who scoring below the group median for categorical fluency 
COPE subscale AAJA N Mean (SD) T (df) P value 
1. Positive Low 11 1.43 (0.6) 
reinterpretation High 12 1.3 (0.39) 
0.66 (21) 0.518 
2. Mental disengagement 
Low 11 1.31 (0.94) 
0.78 (21) 0.445 High 12 1.07 (0.47) 
3. Venting of emotions 
Low 11 0.66 (0.56) 
-1.03 (21) 0.313 High 12 0.88 (0.48) 
4. Use of instrumental Low 11 0.86 (0.36) 
social support High 12 1.25 (0.45) - 
2.29 (21) 0.032 
Low 11 1.18 (0.58) 
5. Active coping - 0.33 (21) 0.742 High 12 1.25 (0.55) 
Low 11 0.43 (0.38) 
6. Denial - 1.92 (21) 0.069 High 12 0.97 (0.88) 
Low 11 1.51 (0.78) 
7. Religious coping 1.35 (21) 0.190 High 12 1.06 (0.81) 
Low 11 0.63 (0.53) 
8. Humour 0.15 (21) 0.883 
High 12 0.6 (0.56) 
9. Behavioural Low 11 0.59 (0.49) 0.56 (21) 0.582 
disengagement High 12 0.49 (0.42) 
10. Restraint 
Low 11 1.17 (0.57) 
1.41 (21) 0.173 
High 12 0.88 (0.43) 
11. Use of emotional Low 11 1.19 (0.79) -0.06(21) 0.949 social support High 12 1.21 (0.72) 
12 Substance use 
Low 11 0.73 (1.19) 0.76 (21) 0.456 
. High 12 0.43 (0.68) 
13. Acceptance 
Low 11 1.47 (0.55) 0.25 (21) 0.803 
High 12 1.41 (0.59) 
14. Suppression of Low 11 0.99(0.7) 
-0.3 (21) 0.765 
competing activities High 12 1.06 (0.32) 
Planning 15 
Low 11 0.84 (0.65) 
- 1.36 (21) 0.187 . High 12 1.14(0.36) 
A high AAI = AAI factor score ý! 11, low AAI = AAI factor score < 11 
*p<0.05 
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Disease, deficit or denial? Models of poor a0 insight in psychosis 
Cooke MA, Peters ER, Kuipers E, Kumari V. Disease, deficit or denial? Models of poor insight in psychosis. 
Acta Psychiatr Scand 2005: 112: 4-17. @ 2005 Blackwell Munksgaard. 
Objective: To examine the evidence for the three kinds of aetiological 
model that dominate the current literature on poor insight in 
psychosis: clinical models, the neuropsychological model, and the 
psychological denial model. 
Method: Studies pertaining to one or more of these aetiological models 
were identified, reviewed and critically evaluated. 
Results: There is little support for clinical models, partly because they 
lack testable hypotheses. Several studies reveal a positive relationship 
between insight and executive function, which may be related to frontal 
lobe dysfunction. However, the extent to which this relationship is 
specific and independent of general cognitive impairment remains 
unclear. There is tentative evidence to support the psychological denial 
model. Recent data combining the latter two approaches suggest that 
multiple factors contribute to poor insight. 
Conclusion: Integration of different aetiological models is necessary for 
a fuller understanding of insight in psychosis. Future research should 
assess multiple aetiological mechanisms in single investigations. 
Introduction 
It has long been recognized that many individuals 
with psychosis disagree with their clinicians, 
friends and families about whether they have a 
mental illness, whether their unusual experiences 
and behaviours are abnormal, and whether they 
are in need of clinical treatment. These disagree- 
ments are traditionally held by clinicians to reflect 
a lack of insight on the part of the individual with 
psychosis, although this is not a universally accep- 
ted position (1,2). 
Insight in psychosis was initially described as a 
binary, 'all or nothing' phenomenon, which indi- 
viduals are considered categorically either to pos- 
sess or lack. However, there is now a general 
agreement that insight is multi-dimensional and 
consists of several continua. These changes in the 
conceptualization of insight have driven the devel- 
opment of numerous scales to assess the particular 
dimensions that are held to be important by 
different conceptual frameworks (3). 
Based on a review of the previous literature, 
David (4) contends that there are three distinct but 
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overlapping dimensions of insight: recognition that 
one has a mental illness, compliance with treat- 
ment, and the ability to relabel unusual mental 
events as abnormal, Three scales have been devel- 
oped to assess these dimensions; two structured 
interviews, the Schedule for the Assessment of 
Insight (SAI, 5), and the SAI-Expanded (SAI-E, 6) 
and one self-report measure, the Insight Scale (7). 
Amador et al. (8) define insight in terms of a five- 
dimensional construct, further divisible into cur- 
rent and retrospective components. Their definition 
is also derived from previous literature, and they 
have developed an interview, the Scale to assess 
Unawareness of Mental Disorder (SUMD, 9) 
to assess these dimensions. The SUMD measures 
both current and retrospective awareness of having 
a mental disorder, the achieved effects of medica- 
tion, the social consequences of mental disorder, 
the awareness of symptoms and the attribution of 
symptoms to a mental disorder. 
Self-report scales have been developed to assess 
still further aspects of insight, including 'self- 
reflectiveness about unusual experiences', 'capacity 
to correct erroneous judgments', 'certainty about 
4 
Models of poor insight in psychosis 
mistaken judgments' (Beck Cognitive Insight Scale, 
10) and awareness of more general changes occur- 
ring within individuals and their environments 
(Markova and Berrios Insight Scale, 11). Despite 
general agreement on the multi-dimensional nature 
of insight (if not its dimensions), isolated items 
from broad symptom rating scales are also fre- 
quently used as uni-dimensional measures of 
insight, including the G12 item from the Positive 
and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS, 12). A uni- 
dimensional measure of insight focussing on the 
need for treatment, the Insight and Treatment 
Attitudes Questionnaire (ITAQ, 13) has also been 
used, particularly in earlier studies, 
One important point to note, however, is that 
significant correlations have been found between 
the total scores on most insight scales (14,15) 
supporting a degree of inter-scale reliability for 
these measures (14) and allowing some general 
conclusions to be drawn from the existing studies 
which have used different measures of insight. 
For the current purposes, we will use the opera- 
tional definition of insight in psychosis employed in 
a recent meta-analysis (16), namely that it consists 
of five components: awareness of mental disorder, 
awareness of the social consequences of disorder, 
awareness of the need for treatment, awareness of 
symptoms of mental disorder and attribution of 
symptoms to mental disorder. The use of this 
definition is intended to provide a pragmatic 
framework for the comparison of studies, rather 
than adopting a particular theoretical viewpoint. 
Some studies have found insight to be lower in 
individuals with psychotic diagnoses than those 
with non-psychotic diagnoses (such as major 
depressive disorder) (17), with evidence of a con- 
tinuum within psychotic diagnoses from schizo- 
phrenia (poorest insight), to psychotic depression 
(highest), with schizoaffective disorder and bipolar 
affective disorder being intermediate. However, 
other studies have found no difference in insight 
between diagnostic groups (18,19). There is sub- 
stantial variation in the proportion of individuals 
with psychosis who are reported to 'lack insight' 
from as low as II% (20) to as high as 89 % (2 1). 
This is perhaps in part due to the use of different 
instruments to measure insight and, when continu- 
ous scales are used, the choice of which score 
constitutes the threshold of 'poor insight'. 
It has been noted previously (22,23) that three 
aetiological models of poor insight in psychosis 
dominate the current literature. However, as these 
models have not, in general, been formalized, we use 
the term 'kinds' of aetiological model in this review 
to provide a heuristic framework for the evaluation 
of research findings on insight in psychosis. The first 
kind, which we term 'clinical models', views insight 
either as a primary symptom of a disease process in its own right (24) or propose it to be related to how a 
particular symptom is formed (25). The second 
kind, the 'neuropsychological model'(26), proposes 
poor insight to be the product of deficits in 
neurocognition that are secondary to brain deficits. 
The third kind, the 'psychological denial model' 
(27), contends that poor insight reflects the use of 
denial as a coping strategy in an attempt to protect 
against distress. 
A fourth theoretical strand, the 'missing social 
dimension' (28) has also been proposed. This 
theory suggests that a psychotic individual's level 
of insight is greatly influenced by the social context 
in which it is rated (28,29). For example, the 
greater the social distance between the clinician 
and the individual with psychosis, the lower the 
insight rating attributed to that individual by the 
clinician. However, this hypothesis was not sup- 
ported in a large cross-sectional study (29) once 
level of current symptoms had been controlled for, 
and is therefore not discussed further. 
Aims of the study 
Our aim is to evaluate the evidence for and against 
each model of poor insight in psychosis and 
examine whether a better understanding of insight 
can be reached by integrating these models. 
Material and methods 
Relevant studies were identified through an elec- 
tronic search of abstract databases PsycINFO 
(1967 to December 2004) and Medline (1966 to 
December 2004) by combining keywords indicating 
the participation of individuals with psychosis 
(psychosis, schizophrenia), their level of insight 
(insight, unawareness), and its relationship to 
factors relevant to one of the three kinds of 
aetiological model described above (symptom, 
clinical; cognition, IQ, executive function, neuro- 
psychological; denial, coping). Following the elec- 
tronic search, the reference lists of the identified 
literature were searched by hand. From these 
primary and secondary references, we included in 
our review every report that fulfilled four criteria: i) 
the studies were written in English, ii) the majority 
of participants were diagnosed with psychotic 
disorders, including schizophrenia, schizoaffective 
disorder and psychotic affective disorders, ill) a 
measure of insight was used, and iv) either a 
measure of either neuropsychological ability or 
coping style was used, or the study presented a 
clinical model of insight. 
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Two clinical models of insight in psychosis 
were identified (24,25). Forty-five studies inves- 
tigating the relationship between insight and 
neuropsychological test performance were identi- 
fied, of which 44 are presented in Table 1. Five 
studies examining the relationship between 
insight and a measure of coping style or denial 
were identified. 
The criterion for a positive relationship between 
insight and a dependent variable in each reviewed 
study was that the variable must show an associ- 
ation with at least one insight dimension or the 
Table 1. Insight in psychosis and cognition (study denoted by first author in chronological order) 
Insight measure 
(where participants divided 
into two groups, the criterion 
for insight impairment 
IQ 
Relationship Controlled for 
Author N appears in parentheses) 
VVILII 11IaIUIIL! III 01101yola: 
Koren (32) 30 SUMD Yes Corrected data 
not fully reported 
Smith (33) 50 SUMID 
Shad (34) 35 HORS insight item (score 1+) No No 
Donohoe (35) 38 SAI Yes 
Nakano (36) 37 SAI No No 
Keshavan (31) 535 PANSS G12 
Mintz (37) 180 PANSS G12 (score 4+) 
Freudenreich (38) 122 SUMD No No 
Lysaker (39) 64 PANSS G12 Years of education only 
Ora ke 0 5) 33 SUMD, SAI-E, ITAQ, BIS, PANSS G12, No Yes 
Davidhizar Insight Scale 
Kim (40) 333 SADS insight item No No 
Rossell (41) 78 SAI-E No No 
Arcluini (42) 64 SUMD - shortened 
Lysaker (43) 132 SUMD - shortened 
Upthegrove (44) 30 SAI-E 
Lysaker (45) 121 SUMD (1+ unaware rating, No No 
or 2+ partially aware ratings) 
Aleman (46) 38 PANSS G12 
Buckley (47) 50 SUMD 
Chen (48) 80 SUMD Years of education only 
Goldberg (49) 150 PANSS G12 (score 3+) No No 
Laroi (23) 21 SUMD No Yes 
Marks (50) 59 SAIQ No No 
Mohamed (51) 46 SUMD - different subscales Yes 
Carroll (22) 61 ITAO No No 
Young (52) 108 SUMD Yes No 
q; in7 1141 1.1 ITAn SAI SAI-F Markova and No No . -I -- .. ' ---- Berrios insight scale, PANSS G12 
Lysaker (53) 81 PANSS G12 (score 4+) No No 
Voruganti (54) 52 PANSS G12 
Dickerson (55) 77 PANSS G12 (score 4+) No No 
Collins (56) 58 SAI 
Startup (57) 44 ITAQ Yes 
Startup (58) 26 ITAQ Yes 
Kemp (59) 74 SAI, SAI-E No No 
McEvoy (60) 32 ITAO No No 
MacPherson (61) 64 SAI No 
Almeida (62) 40 SAI No No 
Cuesta (63) 52 AMDP items 97-99 
David (19) 150 PSE item, SAI Yest 
Cuesta (24) 40 AMDP items 97-99 No No 
Lysaker (64) 85 PANSS G12 Yes No 
Lysaker (26) 92 PANSS G12 (score 4+) Yes Yes 
McEvoy (65) 25 ITAQ No No 
Young (66) 31 SUMD Yes No 
David (5) 91 SAI Yes 
*WCST: perseveration, P; categories, C: other, 
0: non-significant results in parentheses 
tNon-linear relationship. 
jPart of a factor derived from a factor analysis of multiple cognitive variables. 
§Association in opposite direction - better memory correlated with poorer 
insight. 
Relationship between poorer insight and 
worse scores on tests of 
Executive Verbal 
function WCST* Memory Attention fluency 
No (P, C, 0) 
Yes p 
Yes P (C) 
No (P, C, 0) 
Yes C, 0 Yes No Yes 
No No No No 
No (P, 0) No No 
Yest pt 
Yest 
No (P. Q No No 
Yes C, (P) No No No 
No (P, C, 0) 





Yes P, (0) 
No (P, Q 
Yes P, C, (0) 
Yes P. C. (0) Yes 
Yes Pt Ot Yest 
No 
Yes P, C 
No (P, C, 0) 
Yes P. (C. 0) No No 
Yes 0, (P) Yes Yes 
No (P, C) No No 
No (P) 
Yest, t Yest, T 
Yes No 
No (C) No 
No No No No 
No (P, C) 
No 
No Yes§ No 
Yes C, 0, (P, 0) 
Yes P. C, (0) 
No No 
Yes P. C No 
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total insight score at the P<0.05 significance 
level, either cross-sectionally or longitudinally. 
Results 
Disease? Clinical models 
Clinical model I. - a primary symptom? Cuesta and 
Peralta (24) propose that poor insight arises directly 
from the 'illness process' of psychosis, Poor insight 
could thus be considered, in the terminology of 
Bleuler (30), to be a 'primary' or 'basic' symptom. 
Primary symptoms such as 'loosening of associa- 
tions' are held to arise directly from the 'disease 
process' itself, whereas 'secondary' symptoms 
involve reactions to internal or external processes. 
For example, the content of hallucinations and 
delusions can only be understood in terms of 
external events and are therefore considered to be 
secondary symptoms (30). Cuesta and Peralta 
contend that the 'independence' of insight from 
both positive and negative symptoms of psychosis 
supports its status as a 'primary symptom'. 
Indeed, there are several studies showing no 
relationship between insight and symptom levels 
(31). Even in those studies showing moderate 
correlations between symptoms (positive, negative 
or both) and insight, only 3-7% of variance in 
total insight scores (across a variety of measures) 
seems to be accounted for by symptom measures 
(meta-analytic review, 16). 
The lack of a strong relationship between 
psychotic symptoms and insight, although taken 
as the main support for the Cuesta and Peralta's 
clinical hypothesis, does not mean that insight is 
, independent' of the presence of other psychotic 
symptoms. One dimension of insight involves 
awareness of current symptoms, so one cannot 
possess this aspect of insight when symptoms are in 
remission (3), and this aspect of insight must 
therefore be dependent on the presence of current 
symptoms rather than being independent of them. 
Such individuals can, however, be rated on insight 
into past symptoms. Furthermore, it remains 
possible that 'poor insight' could be both weakly 
related to the presence of other psychotic symp- 
toms and caused by factors other than 'the disease 
process itself'. Indeed, both the neuropsychological 
model and the psychological denial model offer 
explanations for poor insight which are consistent 
with the lack of correlation between insight and 
symptornatology. This is incompatible with the 
view that poor insight is a 'primary' Bleluerian 
symptom of psychosis, as these models view poor 
insight as secondary to a cognitive deficit, and 
coping style respectively. 
Clinical model 2: Symptoms not 'insight 
tagged'? Markova and Berrios (25) conceptualize 
insight in relation to symptoms as being construc- 
ted in a hierarchy of three levels. The higher the 
level in this functional hierarchy, the greater the 
amount of information incorporated and the more 
developed the 'version' of insight becomes. As we 
understand their description (see Fig. 1), at the first 
(and lowest) level, unusual but 'formless' experien- 
ces that are caused by pathological 'brain signals', 
are 'echoed' in a parallel system where the emo- 
tional and cognitive registration of the experience 
takes place. This echoed information is then judged 
against templates of past experiences along a 
continuum from a perfect match to a complete 
mismatch. If it reaches the threshold on this 
continuum for a match, it is judged to be normal. 
If it is below this threshold, this experience is 
'insight tagged'. That is to say, the individual 
becomes aware that the formless experience is 
unusual, but does not mean that they are con- 
sciously aware that it is a symptom. 
At the second level of insight construction, 
experiences which are recognized as being unusual 
are subjected to 'secondary elaborations' of emo- 
tional and cognitive registration. At this level, the 
individual may become consciously aware that 
their unusual experience is a symptom. The third 
and highest level of insight structure involves the 
judgement of the symptom in terms of its impact 
on the individual, at which point individual factors 
such as intelligence, culture and attitudes come into 
play. 
Markova and Berrios contend that some symp- 
toms, such as thought disorder, may bypass all 
levels of insight construction as they are not 
directly 'experienced' (in the sense that they do 
not become 'formless experiences'). Their con- 
struction as 'symptoms' is instead held to rely on 
the judgement of the clinician based on his/her 
experience of the speech and behaviour of the 
individual with psychosis. In terms of insight into 
'the disease as a whole', Markova and Berrios 
suggest that it involves factors similar to those 
that determine insight in relation to symptoms. 
They do not, however, specify a model for such 
processes. 
The lack of specification of the mechanisms 
involved in 'insight construction' makes it difficult 
to generate hypotheses which would either support 
or falsify Markova and Berrios's model. For 
example, factors including 'attitudes and intelli- 
gence' are hypothesized to come into play in the 
third level of the model, but the mechanisms by 
which these factors could contribute to an individ- 
ual's level of insight are not specified. The utility of 
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experience is a symptom 
Judgement of symptom 
IQ, attitudes, culture 10 in terms of its effects 
on the individual 
this model in guiding future research into insight 
into symptoms is therefore limited. Furthermore, 
the model only deals with insight in relation to 
symptoms and does not specify the processes 
involved in awareness of illness, widely acknow- 
ledged to be an important aspect of insight in 
psychosis. This further reduces the clinical utility of 
the model. 
Deficit? The neuropsychological model 
Apparent similarities between awareness e cits in 
neurological disorders and poor insight in psycho- 
sis have led to the suggestion that both may result 
from similar deficits. First described by Babinski 
(67) in relation to unawareness of left-side hemi- 
plegia, anosognosia refers to the unawareness of 
deficits in individuals with organic neurological 
disorders. For example, individuals may maintain 
that there is nothing wrong with a limb that is 
paralysed in the face of direct evidence to the 
contrary. Impaired awareness of such deficits is 
sometimes domain specific; a patient may, for 
example, be aware of a motor deficit but not a 
Fig. 1. Markova and Berrios's clinical 
model of insight. 
visual field defect, or vice versa (68). The parallels 
with impaired insight in psychosis have led to the 
suggestion that it too may have a neurological 
basis (8,69), specifically that it reflects cognitive 
impairment, secondary to brain abnormalities (26, 
66). This hypothesis has primarily been investi- 
gated by examining the correlations between 
measures of insight and performance on neuropsy- 
chological tests that index different domains of 
cognition. More recently, relationships with brain 
measures have been examined directly. 
The focus of the majority of this research has 
been on the relationship between insight and tests 
which purport to measure 'executive function', a 
term used as an umbrella for various complex 
cognitive processes and subprocesses. Defining 
'executive function' remains a highly controversial 
matter (70), yet it bears heavily on conclusions that 
are made about the relationship between this 
domain of cognition and dimensions of insight. It 
has recently been summarized as 'a product of the 
co-ordinated operation of various processes to 
accomplish a particular goal in a flexible manner' 
(71). 
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Despite the obvious complexity of executive 
function, a single test, the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test (WCST, 72) is often held to be its defining 
measure and is by far the most popular test (28/45 
studies) examined in relation to insight. The 
impaired performance of individuals with frontal 
brain lesions on the WCST (73) has led many to 
conclude that the WCST is a 'frontal' task, 
specifically sensitive to damage to this area of the 
cortex, although this is controversial (74,75). 
A large number of scores can be derived from 
the performance of an individual on the WCST, 
and there is considerable variation in which scores 
are selected for analysis across the studies 
reviewed. In total, 19 different scores were used. 
Seven studies found worse performance on all 
WCST scores examined to be related to poorer 
insight, nine found associations with some scores 
but not others, while 11 found no significant 
relationships. One study (39) found a non-linear 
relationship. Interestingly, there are no reported 
instances of better WCST scores being related to 
poorer insight. 
In order to summarize this diverse range of 
findings in the studies reviewed, three groups of 
WCST scores were used. The first, categories 
achieved, was by far the most popular single 
score reported (19/28 studies). Almost every 
study (25/28) included a score indexing persevera- 
tion (including percentages and raw totals of 
perseverative errors and responses). Given that 
perseveration is held to be the most characteristic 
aspect of the performance of individuals with 
psychosis on the WCST (76), it was selected as 
the second group of scores, Finally, all other 
WCST scores were assigned to the third category, 
other'. 
Nine of 20 studies found a relationship between 
poorer insight and fewer categories achieved. 
Eleven found no significant relationship. Ten of 
25 studies found a linear relationship between a 
score indexing greater perseveration and poorer 
insight, 14 found no significant relationship and 
one (39) found a non-linear relationship between 
perseveration and insight. Finally, WCST poorer 
scores in the 'other' group were found to have a 
significant relationship with poorer insight in three 
studies, while 10 studies found no significant 
relationships. One study (64) found both signifi- 
cant and non-significant results for 'other' varia- 
bles. 
A major difficulty in interpreting these data is 
that the neuropsychological model of poor insight 
is often referred to, but has never been formally 
defined. Rather than simply establishing whether 
there are relationships between executive function- 
ing measures and measures of insight, a key 
question is how deficits in executive function lead 
to poor insight in psychosis. It has been suggested 
that a failure to detect errors may be particularly 
important in the apparent unawareness of the 
'incorrectness' of symptoms in individuals with 
psychosis (23). It follows that poor insight should 
show a relationship with perseveration on the 
WCST, as individuals with poor insight would be 
expected to fail to alter their responses in the light 
of negative feedback. The reviewed studies offer 
some support for a relationship between persever- 
ation on the WCST, although the number failing to 
replicate the relationship is considerable (14 of 25). 
A number of factors are likely to contribute to 
the inconsistency with which a relationship 
between insight and perseveration is found. Insight 
is unlikely to have a single aetiology, making the 
neuropsychological model an incomplete account 
of its determinants. The relationship may only exist 
in a subgroup of patients, although it is unclear 
what defines this subgroup. Weiler et al. (77) 
suggest that it may be in individuals whose insight 
is stably poor that insight neuropsychological 
deficits are related. However, some studies using 
chronic samples have failed to find such a rela- 
tionship (78). There is also some suggestion that 
the relationship between insight and cognition may 
be curvilinear rather than linear (see further), 
which may account for some of the inconsistency 
in findings when only linear relationships are 
examined. Finally, the relationship between insight 
and perseveration may be a subtle one, explaining 
only a small amount of the variance in insight 
scores, making it difficult to detect. 
Beyond executive function, memory is the next 
most investigated domain in relation to insight in 
psychosis. Fifteen studies have examined this 
relationship, with four finding an association 
between poorer memory and poorer insight (3 1, 
43,44,54). One study found the unexpected result 
of better performance on memory tasks (immediate 
verbal and delayed visual) relating to poorer 
insight (24) and the remaining 10 found no 
significant relationships. One study (78, not inclu- 
ded in Table 1) found relationships between insight 
and the Motor and Arithmetic subscales (of a total 
of II subscales) of the Luria Nebraska Neuropsy- 
chological Battery (which could not be meaning- 
fully described by standard cognitive domains and 
is therefore not included in Table 1). 
Only two (50,54) of the seven studies evaluating 
attention found poor attention to be related to 
poor insight, while five found no significant 
relationships. Two (31,5 1) of 14 studies found 
poor insight to be related to verbal fluency deficits, 
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one found a non-linear relationship (58), and the 
remaining II studies finding no significant rela- 
tionships. However, two of these positive results 
(51,58) relate to measures of verbal fluency that 
were combined with measures of executive function 
by factor analysis into composite factor scores, 
making the contribution of each cognitive domain 
to the relationship with insight unclear. The lack of 
association with verbal fluency is of particular 
relevance to the question of whether specific 
frontal brain deficits are associated with poor 
insight as the inferior frontal lobe is strongly 
involved in verbal fluency tasks (79), whereas there 
is evidence for dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) involvement in WCST performance 
(80). This suggests that dysfunctions in some 
regions of the frontal lobe might be more strongly 
related to poor insight than others. 
An alternative formulation of the relationship 
between insight and neuropsychological measures 
is that poor insight is related to a broad, general- 
ized cognitive deficit (31), rather than a specific 
impairment of, for example, executive function. IQ 
tests provide an index of global cognitive function 
and lower scores were found to have a significant 
linear relationship with poorer insight in eight (5, 
26,32,35,52,57,64,66) of 29 studies, with two 
further studies finding trends in this direction 
(P ý- 0.05) (41,45). One study found a non-linear 
relationship (19) while the remaining 18 found no 
significant association. The possibility of a rela- 
tionship between lower IQ and poor insight sug- 
gests that relationships between insight and specific 
cognitive domains, when investigated in isolation, 
could be explained by a generalized cognitive 
deficit. This is of particular importance for 
WCST studies, as performance of individuals 
with psychosis on this test is strongly related to 
IQ (74). 
A major limitation of the literature is that even 
when both WCST and IQ data are collected, IQ is 
not controlled for in the majority of studies where 
a relationship between WCST performance and 
insight is found (34,41,45,50,52,53,64,66). 
Three (52,64,66) of these eight studies found a 
significant relationship between lower IQ and 
poorer insight [two studies found trends in the 
same direction (41,45)], as well as between WCST 
performance and insight. This suggests that the 
relationships between WCST performance and 
insight may be IQ dependent. Indeed, controlling 
for IQ in one study led to one relationship with a 
study-specific 'card sorting' factor losing signifi- 
cance (51). Nevertheless, two studies controlling 
for IQ in the analysis of the relationship between 
WCST performance and insight have found the 
results to be robust (23,26), suggesting that the 
relationship may not be due to general cognitive 
impairment alone. IQ was only measured in one 
study reporting a significant association between 
memory and insight (24), but was not controlled 
for in its analysis. 
Research on the neuropsychological basis of 
poor insight in psychosis has focussed heavily on 
tests which purport to index frontal lobe function. 
However, anosognosia, the supposed neurological 
analogue of poor insight in psychosis, has tradi- 
tionally been associated with lesions in the parietal 
area of the right hemisphere (81), although a recent 
meta-analysis (82) indicates that anosognosia is 
equally frequent after damage to the frontal, 
parietal and temporal lobes, when damage occurs 
to a single cortical area. Stuss and Benson (83) 
propose that frontal lobe damage is the basis of 
anosognosia, although this is based on the hypo- 
thesis that self-awareness relies on frontal lobe 
function, rather than on evidence from individuals 
with frontal lobe damage. The preoccupation with 
frontal lobe function in the literature on insight in 
psychosis may reflect 'frontal lobology' (75), the 
notion that almost every psychiatric disorder is a 
manifestation of frontal lobe dysfunction. This 
preoccupation may contribute to the fact that 
many insight studies do not use test batteries that 
are designed on the basis of clear hypotheses about 
associations with specific neuropsycho logical dys- 
functions (15), although there are some notable 
exceptions to this rule (15,32). Without a formal- 
ized neuropsychological model of poor insight in 
psychosis to test, studies examining the relation- 
ships between insight and cognition have tended to 
include cognitive tests which have been shown to 
have relationships with insight in previous studies. 
However, Koren et al. (32) designed an adapted 
version of the WCST to test their hypothesis that 
metacognition, which they define as a person's 
awareness or knowledge of their cognitive abilities, 
mediates between cognitive deficits and the 
observed phenomenon of poor insight. Participants 
in their study were asked to rate their confidence in 
each WCST sort they made, and also chose 
whether each sort should count towards their 
overall performance score. Although this is a 
pilot study with a relatively small sample size 
(n == 30), its results are intriguing. Koren et al. 
found that the metacognitive scores were much 
more strongly associated with insight than the 
conventional WCST scores (including categories 
and perseverative errors). However, controlling for 
IQ reduced the number of significant associations 
with metacognitive variables, suggesting that this 
association may be partially IQ dependent. Con- 
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trolling for IQ also caused four associations 
between insight and conventional WCST measures 
to reach significance, although these are not 
specified in detail and were 'in sharp contrast to 
the study's hypothesis'. Nevertheless, this study 
clearly demonstrates the value of examining what 
mediates the link between insight and cognition, 
rather than simply asking whether such a link 
exists. 
The emergence of neuroimaging as a research 
tool has allowed the possible relationship between 
insight and brain structure to be investigated 
directly. Two studies have investigated the associ- 
ation between insight (measured with a single item) 
and ventricular enlargement on CT scans. One 
found a significant association with poorer insight 
(84), while another found no relationship (19). 
Likewise, measures of total brain volume have 
been found to relate to total SUMD score in one 
study (85), but not to total SAI-E score in another 
(41). A further study found cortical atrophy on CT 
scans to be related to total SUMD score (23). 
Modern neuroimaging methods allow more 
detailed analyses of the relationships between 
specific brain areas and measures of poor insight 
in psychosis, including the hypothesis that intact 
insight relies on the integrity of the frontal lobes 
(69,83). Shad et al. (34) applied a 'region of 
interest' approach to this question by manually 
tracing the size of the DLPFC and hippocampus on 
both sides of the brain. They found that individuals 
with poor insight (measured using a single item 
from the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale) had 
significantly reduced right DLPFC volumes com- 
pared with those with good insight. The volumes of 
the other brain areas did not differ between the 
good and poor insight groups, and those with poor 
insight made more perseverative errors on the 
WCST (but did not complete fewer categories). 
Although this study uses a relatively crude categ- 
orical measure of insight, its results are consisted 
with an association between insight and a cognitive 
deficit (perseveration) that is mediated by a specific 
brain alteration (right DLPFC reduction). 
In a more sophisticated region of interest study, 
Flashman et al. (86) examined the relationships 
between dimensions of insight and the volumes of 
eight frontal lobe subregions, manually traced 
from structural MRI scans. With total intracranial 
volume controlled for in the analysis and the 
SUMD as the insight measure, lower awareness of 
mental disorder was found to correlate with 
smaller volumes of the bilateral middle frontal 
gyrus, the right gyrus rectus and the left anterior 
cingulate gyrus, Lower awareness of symptoms 
was correlated with smaller superior frontal gyrus 
volume. It thus appears that lower scores on 
specific insight dimensions are associated with 
reductions in the volumes of specific frontal lobe 
subregions. While consistent with the view that 
insight is related to frontal lobe structures, the 
possibility of relationships with non-frontal brain 
areas was not explored by this study. 
Interestingly, the preliminary conclusions of 
Flashman et al. highlight the possible role of 
working memory in poor insight in psychosis, 
suggesting that the inability to hold symptom 
information in working memory while comparing 
it with past experiences may make it difficult to 
recognize that a symptom is aberrant. They cite 
evidence of the involvement in working memory of 
the frontal brain structures found to be related to 
insight in their study and suggest that impairment 
on the WCST is evidence of working memory 
impairment, rather than the more traditional 
interpretation of an executive functioning deficit. 
However, the sample size of this study was small 
(n =: 15) and requires replication before firm con- 
clusions can be drawn. 
An alternative structural brain analysis 
approach, Voxel-Based Morphometry (VBM), 
has also shown relationships between specific 
frontal lobe regions and dimensions of insight. Its 
automated algorithms eliminate subjectivity in the 
measurement of brain structures from MRI 
images, a limitation of the 'region of interest' 
approach (87). Analyses of VBM data permit the 
use of multivariate statistics and are not limited to 
selective regions of interest as the entire brain is 
covered. The preliminary analysis of Morgan et al. 
(88), using the SAI to measure insight, found low 
awareness of illness to be associated with both grey 
and white matter reductions at the cingulate gyrus, 
while low symptom recognition was associated 
with grey matter reductions at the cingulate gyrus 
and inferior frontal lobes. Lower global insight 
scores were associated with grey and white matter 
deficits at the cingulate, increased white matter and 
decreased grey matter at the left insula, as well as 
increased grey matter superior to the left insula. A 
well-controlled regression analysis showed that 
cingulate gyrus deficits were predictive of 36% of 
the variance in illness awareness and 20% of 
variance in symptom recognition, However, the 
full results of this study have yet to be published. 
Denial? The Psychological denial model 
Psychosis is seen by many as a chronic, lifelong, 
debilitating disorder with little chance of recovery. 
As such, a diagnosis of psychosis can be viewed 
as threatening, and it has been hypothesized that 
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some individuals use denial to help them to cope 
with this threat and reduce the amount of distress 
that it causes. Poor insight in psychosis may thus 
reflect the use of a psychological coping mech- 
anism in the form of denial of the fact of illness 
(27). This does not correspond to older psycho- 
dynamic theories that conflict and denial actually 
cause delusions. Such ideas have not been sup- 
ported by more recent psychological models, 
which focus on extending cognitive behavioural 
theories to the problem of psychosis and inter- 
ventions based on these models show evidence of 
success (89,90). 
The psychological denial model predicts that 
those who deploy denial as a coping strategy will 
have poorer insight, but will suffer less distress and 
maintain a greater degree of self-esteem. Greater 
insight should, therefore, be related to greater 
distress in individuals with psychosis. Consistent 
with this model, there is considerable evidence 
from cross-sectional studies to suggest that posses- 
sing good insight in psychosis is associated with 
measures of distress. A recent meta-analysis has 
shown a significant but modest relationship 
between better insight and worse depression (16), 
with depression scores accounting for 3.2% of the 
variance in total insight scores. Insight has also 
been found to be related to other measures of 
distress including hopelessness (91) and suicidality 
(92). In longitudinal studies, Increases in insight 
are associated with worsening measures of distress, 
including depression (22), and suicidal ideation 
(93). Furthermore, insight increases in those who 
develop postpsychotic depression (PPD) following 
the remission of an acute psychotic episode (94). 
Such individuals are more likely to feel greater loss, 
humiliation and entrapment before they become 
depressed than those who do not go on to develop 
PPD. Schwartz (95) speculates on the direction of 
causality of these associations by suggesting that a 
linear insight-demoralization-depression-suicidali- 
ty syndrome develops in many individuals with 
psychosis. In a large prospective study utilizing 
structural equation modelling to determine the 
direction of causality in the relationships between 
insight, depression, paranoia and self-esteem, 
Drake et al. (96) found the likely direction of 
causation was that increasing insight leads to 
greater depression. This was particularly marked 
at baseline assessment, when the participants were 
most acutely ill and was not entirely mediated 
by low self-esteem. However, these relation- 
ships appeared to reach a 'dynamic equilibrium' 
quickly, and this study found little evidence that 
insight at baseline determines depression at later 
timepoints. 
While consistent with the psychological denial 
model, evidence for an association between greater 
distress and higher insight does not directly test the 
hypothesis that poor insight is related to the use of 
denial as a coping strategy. Recently, studies have 
begun to address this question empirically. Moore 
et al. (27), compared scores on SUMD dimensions 
to the two scores from the Balanced Inventory for 
Desirable Responding and found 'Self-Deceptive 
Positivity' (the tendency to give self-reports that 
are honest but positively biased) to be correlated 
with lower current (but not past) awareness of 
illness and its consequences. Greater 'Impression 
Management' (deliberate positive self-presentation 
to an audience) was correlated with lower past (but 
not current) awareness of illness and of social 
consequences of disorder, as well as both current 
and past awareness of the effects of medication. 
Young et al. (52) investigated the relationship 
between insight and the 'denial items' of the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, 
minor personal flaws held to be of 'virtually 
universal proportion', such as 'I gossip a little at 
times'. They found lower endorsement of these 
items to be correlated with both lower awareness 
and poorer attribution of symptoms, as measured 
by the SUMD. 
Using the Ways of Coping Quesionnaire, Ly- 
saker et al. (43) found that greater preference for 
ýescape-av oi dance' as a coping style is related to 
lower awareness of the consequences of illness, and 
that lower awareness of symptoms is associated 
with greater preference for 'positive reappraisal' as 
a coping style. Donohoe et al. (35) recently exam- 
ined the relationships between insight and two 
different measures of coping, the Multi-dimen- 
sional Health Locus of Control Questionnaire, and 
the Coping Resources Inventory (CRI). They 
found that poorer insight was related to attributing 
health outcomes more to chance factors, and less 
to one's own actions. No relationships between 
insight and the CRI were found. 
The variety of coping measures which have 
been associated with insight illustrates the com- 
plexity of the concept that they are attempting to 
measure. There is some evidence to suggest that 
there is an association between poor insight 
scores and coping styles aligned with denial. 
The use of multiple coping scales in a single 
investigation may help to establish the extent to 
which the psychological variables measured by 
each scale explain unique variance in measures of 
insight. If the concept of coping style were 
clarified and its measurement standardized, 
future studies could be compared and interpreted 
more meaningfully. 
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Integrating the neuropsychological and psychological denial 
models 
None of the models described thus far offer a 
complete explanation of insight in psychosis. A 
more comprehensive understanding may be reached 
by integrating these models, particularly as they are 
not mutually exclusive. Green et a]. (97) contend 
that neuropsychological functioning interacts with 
coping style to determine insight in psychosis. They 
propose that the first influence on insight is neuro- 
psychological (good neuropsychological function- 
ing predicts good insight), as some insight, 
particularly in terms of relabelling symptoms, 
appears to require a certain level of neuropsycholo- 
gical functioning. The second influence is psycholo- 
gical, where those individuals who have 'access' to 
good insight by virtue of spared neuropsychological 
functioning may then use denial to cope with their 
problems, and thus manifest 'poor insight'. Such a 
formulation predicts that those with poor neuro- 
psychological functioning will display poor insight. 
It is consistent with a curvilinear relationship 
between cognition and insight which was found in 
a study by Startup (58). Those with impaired 
cognition displayed moderate insight, while those 
with intact cognition showed either very good or 
very poor insight. However, this is a relatively small 
study (n = 26) and did not measure coping style and 
thus does not test Green et al. 's hypothesis directly. 
Furthermore, other studies which have examined 
the possibility of a curvilinear relationship have 
failed to find one (15,31,5 1). Stronger support for 
this integrated model comes from recent research by 
Lysaker et al. (39). In a k-cluster analysis, they 
found three groups: one group had poor executive 
function and poor insight (group 1), while the other 
two groups had relatively intact executive function, 
one showing good insight (group 2) and the other 
poor insight (group 3). Group 3 showed a signifi- 
cantly greater preference for endorsement of denial 
as a coping style than group 2. Preference for two 
other coping styles, positive-reappraisal and escape- 
avoidance, did not differ between clusters. It thus 
appears that the use of denial specifically as a coping 
style has the potential to make a significant contri- 
bution to the explanation of the complex relation- 
ship between insight and executive function. 
Discussion 
Clinical models, as described by Cuesta and Peralta 
(24) and Markova and Berrios (25), fall to account 
for poor insight in psychosis. They offer few 
testable hypotheses and are of little clinical or 
research utility. However, it remains possible that 
there are important relationships between specific 
symptoms and Insight that are lost when symptoms 
are combined into broad categories (positive/neg- 
ative), such as grandiosity and thought disorder. 
There are also issues surrounding the assessment of 
insight in individuals whose psychotic symptoms 
are in remission. Scoring such individuals as 
lacking insight when they agree with statements 
such as J am mentally well' is problematic as it 
appears reasonable for such individuals to consider 
themselves mentally healthy, a view that may be 
encouraged by mental health professionals (98). 
This raises the interesting question of whether 
'good insight' means something qualitatively dif- 
ferent for this group, possibly involving awareness 
of past symptoms and vulnerability to future 
relapse. 
A large number of studies have investigated 
whether a neuropsychological deficit is associated 
with poor insight in psychosis. However, various 
issues limit the ability of this research to answer 
this question. While there is considerable evidence 
that poor insight is associated with poorer WCST 
scores, questions remain about exactly what this 
relationship means. The variation in the WCST 
measures used in different studies also makes it 
difficult to establish whether a specific association 
exists between perseveration (as opposed to poor 
WCST performance in general) and poor insight. 
The question of how this specific relationship, if it 
exists, gives rise to poor insight has only very 
recently begun to be addressed (15,32). The lack of 
a formalized neuropsychological model leaves an 
explanatory gap between the associations found in 
research studies and the clinical phenomenon of 
poor insight in psychosis. 
Neuroimaging provides an alternative methodo- 
logy for investigating the hypothesis that poor 
insight in psychosis has a neurological basis. There 
is tentative evidence to suggest a relationship with 
frontal lobe structures. An interesting question is 
the extent to which the influence of brain deficits 
on insight is 'direct', rather than via its influence on 
basic cognitive functions. One is that poor insight 
could be caused by specific cognitive deficits which 
are secondary to brain deficits (26,66). For 
example, functional MR1 evidence suggests that 
the anterior cingulate is involved in error monit- 
oring in healthy subjects, and that error-related 
anterior cingulate activation is reduced in individ- 
uals with schizophrenia (99). Cingulate deficits 
have been found to relate to poor insight (86,88), 
and thus a common brain alteration may underlie 
both executive functioning deficits (involving error 
monitoring) and poor insight. Flashman et al. (86) 
propose a similar hypothesis for a common frontal 
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brain deficit underlying working memory deficits 
and poor insight. 
An alternative explanation, commonly adopted 
in the anosognosia literature (100), is that brain 
differences may have an influence on insight 
separate to their influence on basic cognitive 
processes. In such a formulation, poor insight in 
psychosis arises directly from differences in brain 
structure, rather than via the involvement of that 
area in a particular neuropsychological function. 
Although the notion of an 'insight centre' in the 
brain may be far fetched (101), it is nonetheless 
possible that the cerebral networks that are neces- 
sary for intact insight in psychosis could be 
disrupted independently from the networks neces- 
sary for normal performance on neuropsycholog- 
ical tests. This distinction is yet to be investigated 
empirically, but the multivariate statistical power 
of VBM, if combined with comprehensive assess- 
ment of insight and neuropsychological test per- 
formance, appears to offer a means of doing so. 
The evidence for a relationship between better 
insight and increased distress is consistent with the 
psychological denial model. However, such a rela- 
tionship is also consistent with the neuropsycholog- 
ical model as having insight into psychosis may be 
distressing regardless of the origin of such insight. 
Testing the psychological denial model more 
directly, there is preliminary evidence for a relation- 
ship between insight and measures relating to denial, 
but consensus is yet to be reached on how denial is 
best measured in this context. Complicating this 
matter further, the concept of 'denial' may mean 
something qualitatively different for individuals in 
remission as there are no symptoms to deny. Studies 
investigating the relationship between denial and 
insight may therefore be most interpretable if the 
sample is stratified according to symptom levels. 
Currently, the most promising avenue of 
research involves the integration of the neuropsy- 
chological and psychological denial models, 
although this does not preclude the involvement 
of symptom levels in determining insight. Only by 
capturing measures relevant to all three models in a 
single sample can the question of how multiple 
factors combine and give rise to their level of 
insight be answered. Furthermore, only by apply- 
ing such a range of measures to different samples of 
individuals with psychosis can the question of 
whether different models are relevant to different 
groups of individuals be addressed. 
Much of the research in this area is struggling to 
overcome the distance between how measures of 
insight are used in research and modern clinical 
concepts of insight. Bo i 
th the choice of insight 
measure and the way in which these 
data are 
reduced for the purposes of hypothesis testing 
influence the results that are obtained and the 
conclusions that can be drawn. The multi-dimen- 
sionality of insight, so prominent in modern 
clinical descriptions, is either not measured (20 of 
45 neuropsychological studies reviewed), or are 
combined into a total insight score for the purposes 
of the analysis (14,23,35,41,42,44,48,56,61, 
62). These data are often reduced further to 'poor 
insight' and 'good insight' groups at arbitrary cut- 
off points (34,37,45,53,55,26) which, in one 
study (49), is at odds with the cut-off point selected 
in other studies using the same measure. This 
effectively reduces insight to the dichotomous 
conceptualization that has been rejected in recent 
years (4,8), albeit measured with sophisticated 
instruments. This further hampers interpretation of 
the reviewed findings. 
Recent research has begun to address this issue 
by focussing on the dimensions of insight (15,32, 
33,38,42,43,47,51,52,59) rather than composite 
scores. However, the lack of formalized models of 
insight in psychosis continues to limit the conclu- 
sions that can be drawn. Without such models, 
only broad questions relating to whether relation- 
ships exist, rather than how poor insight arises, can 
be addressed. For example, how does a failure of 
error monitoring lead to poor insight into symp- 
toms? The answer to this question requires a model 
which incorporates how the processes necessary for 
the 'correct' monitoring of symptoms are compro- 
mised in individuals who display poor insight. 
Although work has begun to address this question 
(32), greater integration of different approaches to 
the basis of poor insight is also necessary, both in 
terms of theoretical models and experimental 
research as it is likely that multiple factors are 
involved. The work of Lysaker et al. (39) demon- 
strates that such an integrated approach has the 
potential to explain more of the observed variation 
in insight than focussing on single models of poor 
insight in psychosis in isolation. 
In conclusion, the reviewed data provide little 
empirical support for the clinical models, in part 
because of their restricted ability to generate 
testable hypotheses. There is considerable support 
for the neuropsychological model, in particular a 
relationship between insight and executive function 
deficits. At an anatomical level, there are prelim- 
inary indications that this relationship might reflect 
disturbances of the functions of the DLPFC, and 
may not be associated the functions of some other 
frontal lobe regions. However, the extent to which 
this relationship is independent of general intellec- 
tual impairment commonly associated with psy- 
chotic disorders remains to be ascertained. Recent 
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evidence indicates that the relationship between 
neuropsychological factors and insight might be 
subject to the modulating influences of coping 
styles relevant to psychological denial, 
Suggestions for future research 
We offer a number of suggestions for how the 
literature on insight in psychosis can progress 
towards the formulation of a model which can 
integrate the research findings of different theoret- 
ical strands. Future research should strive to 
develop an integrated model of insight in psychosis 
capable of explaining greater variance than is 
offered by single models in isolation. Such a 
model requires empirical investigation of multiple 
aetiological mechanisms in parallel for the multi- 
dimensional construct of insight to serve a useful 
purpose in interventions for individuals with psy- 
chosis. In studies where detailed information is 
gathered on different dimensions of insight (such as 
when the SAI or SUNID is used), separate analyses 
should be conducted for each of these dimensions. 
While this may create difficulties with multiple 
comparisons, these are out-weighed by the poten- 
tial benefits of developing a comprehensive aetio- 
logical model of poor insight in psychosis. 
Furthermore, in order to bring research into line 
with the current clinical conceptualization of 
insight in psychosis, it should be treated as a 
continuous rather than dichotomous variable. 
More theoretical work is needed to determine 
whether insight is a qualitatively different phenom- 
enon in individuals who are in remission and 
symptom-free. Until this issue is resolved, it would 
be useful if studies restrict their samples to either 
symptomatic or non-symptomatic individuals, or 
at least treat them as subgroups in their analyses. 
Investigations of the relationships between insight 
and cognition should consider collecting informa- 
tion on IQ as well as specific cognitive functions. 
Where such data is collected, the analyses for 
specific functions should investigate the effect of 
controlling for IQ on the relationship between 
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